Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Sociology & Criminal Justice Theses &
Dissertations

Sociology & Criminal Justice

Spring 2014

Patriarchal Ideology and Violence Against Women: A Theoretical
Contribution Using Longitudinal, Individual-Level Analyses
Jesse Robert McKee
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociology_criminaljustice_etds
Part of the Criminology Commons, Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical
Methodologies Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
McKee, Jesse R.. "Patriarchal Ideology and Violence Against Women: A Theoretical Contribution Using
Longitudinal, Individual-Level Analyses" (2014). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, Sociology &
Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/c1cd-3j98
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociology_criminaljustice_etds/31

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology & Criminal Justice at ODU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology & Criminal Justice Theses & Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.

PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION USING LONGITUDINAL, INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
ANALYSES
by
Jesse Robert McKee
B.S. May 2006, Northern Arizona University
M.A. May 2008, Northern Arizona University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
May 2014

Approved by:

lanne C. Carmody (Director)

er (Member)

Randy R. Gainey
iney (Member)
(M<

Brian K. Payne (Member)

ABSTRACT
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION USING LONGITUDINAL, INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
ANALYSES
Jesse Robert McKee
Old Dominion University, 2013
Director: Dr. Dianne C. Carmody

Feminist researchers have recently highlighted the need to revive patriarchy as a
theoretical tool in regards to violence against women. Patriarchy is typically considered
to be a structural concept, but a theory o f patriarchy for violence against women must
also include an individual-level component o f patriarchal ideology. Patriarchal ideology
has not been clearly conceptualized and is rarely operationalized. Very little research has
assessed patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable and almost none has done this
longitudinally. This research aims to fills these gaps. The current study also seeks to
identify significant predictors of change in patriarchal ideology, an issue of tremendous
importance for a theory of violence against women. Stronger theories that can
appropriately incorporate patriarchy may lead to more effective proactive policies rather
than the existing reactive policies based on poor theoretical understanding.
The data used for this dissertation comes from the Longitudinal Study of Violence
against Women: Victimization and Perpetration among College Students in a StateSupported University in the United States, 1990-1995 (White, Smith, and Humphrey
2001). Since the data was from a sample of college men, the first wave o f data is just
before individuals transitioned into college. This was followed by three subsequent
waves of data assessing patriarchal ideology after the first, second, and third years of
college. Because of the various challenges posed by longitudinal data and specific

challenges posed by this data, two major analyses were performed. The main goals o f
these analyses were to: come up with reliable operational measures o f patriarchal
ideology, determine their measurement invariance over time, assess predictors of
patriarchal ideology, evaluate the change/stability in patriarchal ideology, and account for
the predictors of change/stability. The first major analysis operationalized individual
patriarchal ideology using attitudinal measures over two waves of data in a traditional
test/re-test panel design. The second major analysis operationalized patriarchal ideology
using vignettes that were proxy measures of patriarchal ideology over three waves o f
data. Latent growth-curve modeling was used in order to assess the intra-individual and
inter-individual changes in patriarchal ideology over time.
The analyses were the first of their kind to assess patriarchal ideology as an
outcome variable overtime. Overall, findings suggest patriarchal ideology is a
multidimensional concept that can be measured using attitudinal measures and vignettes,
with some support suggesting vignettes may be preferred. During the transition from pre
college to the end of one’s freshman year, patriarchal ideology was stable. After this
time period, over the next three years o f college patriarchal ideology declined for the
sample as a whole. Interestingly, there was inter-individual change but no intra
individual change in patriarchal ideology. The means that regardless of one’s initial
levels of patriarchal ideology, everyone’s levels declined over these three years. These
results are discussed further regarding their theoretical, methodological, and policy
implications. Suggestions for future research assessing the role patriarchal ideology
plays in theories of violence against women are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

PATRIARCHY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Although a variety of perspectives attempt to explain violence against women and
intimate partner violence, there are two specific perspectives that have gained popularity
over recent decades. The first perspective claims that violence between intimate partners
is committed equally amongst men and women (for a recent review o f this literature see
Straus 2011), while the second perspective argues that intimate partner violence is largely
the product of patriarchy, with most serious forms o f violence being male perpetrated
(Brownmiller 1975; DeKeseredy 201 la; DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz 2007; Dobash and
Dobash 1977, 1979; Ferraro 1988; Johnson 2008, 2011; Koss et al. 1994; Kurz 1989;
Tjaden and Thoennes 2000; Websdale 1998; Yllo 1990, 1993).
Those perspectives based on the assumption o f “gender symmetry” include the
“family violence school” (e.g. Straus and Gelles 1990) as well as the psychological
perspective (e.g. Dutton 2006). There are several differences between these two
perspectives, however, one major point o f congruence is that both see violence between
intimate partners as gender neutral. In the same sense that there are multiple schools o f
thought regarding a psychological approach to studying intimate partner violence (see
note 1), there are numerous feminist theories o f intimate partner violence, or the more

appropriate term- violence against women1. Prior to discussing the specifics o f this
current research, it is important to note the mounting evidence showing that “intimate
partner violence” is indeed a gendered phenomenon. While this may seem redundant to
anyone familiar with the field o f violence against women, it is necessary since a large
number of researchers and anti-feminists in general continue to ignore, minimize, or
purposefully misrepresent this research (DeKeseredy 1999, 201 la; Dragiewicz 2011).
Current research clearly shows that intimate partner violence is a gendered
phenomenon. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) found that roughly
85% of all intimate partner violence involves female victims (Rennison and Welchans
2000). When women use violence against male partners, it is often in self-defense
against male-initiated violence or threats of violence (Allen, Swan, and Raghavan 2009;
Daly and Wilson 1988; Dasgupta 2002; Dobash and Dobash 2004; Hamberger and
Potente 1994; Saunders 1986; Swan et al. 2008; Walby and Allen 2004). Self-defense
also applies in some extreme cases where a woman may kill an intimate partner. In these
cases, women have killed after suffering years o f abuse or in response to immediate lethal
threats (Browne 1987; Websdale 1999). Within intimate relationships, women are also

1Terms like this or “wife abuse/assault”, “woman abuse/assault”, “woman battering”, or
similar concepts are preferred in this dissertation. Generic, gender-neutral terms such as
“partner abuse”, “family violence”, or “spouse abuse” are inconsistent with reality and
fail to contextualize men’s use of violence against former or current partners (Bograd
1990). The actual term “domestic violence”, is used at times when referring to specific
phrases like the “domestic violence movement” or “domestic violence policing.”
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significantly more likely to be victims o f more severe forms o f violence including rape
and homicide (Dobash and Dobash 1990; Dobash, Dobash, and Cavanagh 2009; Dobash
et al. 2007; Russell 1990; Stark 2007; Yllo 1990; Websdale 1999) as well as violence
likely to result in serious injuries (Feder and Henning 2005; Stark and Flitcraft 1991;
Walker 1979). The violence extends beyond adult relationships. Adolescent girls in
dating relationships are more likely to experience severe violence both physically and
emotionally than married or cohabitating adults (Molidor and Tolman 1998).
“Gender symmetry” proponents also utilize narrow definitions of violence that
fail to capture the various ways that men control, or attempt to control, their partners
through nonviolent means. This can include threats, intimidation, manipulation, or
financial control (Johnson 2008; Miller and Smolter 2011; Pence and Paymar 1993; Stark
2007). These nonviolent control measures can affect a victim’s physical and mental
health (White et al. 2000). In short, a substantial body o f empirical research produced
over the past 40 years shows that “partner violence” is overwhelmingly men’s violence
against women.
The domestic violence movement o f the 1970s is well known for shifting the
dominant ideology o f domestic violence from a private matter to a social problem
affecting many that requires significant societal attention (Sherman 1992). Yet the most
substantive outcome of the domestic violence movement over the past four decades is
arguably this ideological shift producing more public awareness (Nixon and Humphreys
2010). Public awareness, however, has not necessarily translated into the safety and
empowerment of women in regards to their intimate relationships. The main reason for
this has been a myopic focus on criminal justice interventions regarding violence against
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women. Similar to the largely ineffective criminal justice policies regarding crimes in
general over the past four decades (see Chambliss 2001; Pratt 2009; Senjoy 2010; Tonry
1995), domestic violence policies have failed to lead to widespread reductions in men’s
use of violence and control of their intimate partners. This failure can be linked to weak
theoretical explanations o f violence against women.

Domestic Violence Policy
Prior to the domestic violence movement in the 1970s, domestic violence policy
could be described as what Lutze and Symons (2003:320) have called, “male privilege
and the right to discipline.” The violence directed against women during this time period
was not significantly different from current types of victimization, but law did little to
protect victims from the abuse suffered at the hands of their male partners. This was the
era when domestic violence was viewed as a private, non-criminal matter, requiring
almost no formal interventions (Raphael 2004; Sherman 1992). As support for the
domestic violence movement grew, pressure from women’s advocates was placed on the
state to do something to assist the millions o f women victimized by male intimate
partners. Pressure was also placed on social scientists to develop theoretical and
empirical studies regarding domestic violence. Eventually, policy makers responded to
the increased attention given to domestic violence by relying on empirical research and
political rhetoric.
The major contributing empirical research was the Minneapolis Domestic
Violence Experiments (MDVE) by Sherman and Berk (1984). Using a quasiexperimental research design, these researchers found support for the notion that arresting

domestic batterers significantly reduced the chances o f re-offending, more than
separation or mediation2. The subsequent policies adopted by lawmakers were
mandatory and pro-arrest policies where officer discretion was largely removed. In most
cases, police officers were told that they must arrest the primary aggressor when
responding to domestic violence calls. The goals of these policies were to provide safety
for women, deter abusers, and reduce victim intimidation by shifting responsibility for
the arrest decision to the police (Dasgupta 2002; Phillips and Sobol 2010).
Some victim advocates and feminists have been receptive to criminal justice
policies that hold perpetrators accountable and take domestic violence seriously (see
Humphries 2002; Stark 2007). After all, one way to empower marginalized groups is
through formal institutions such as the criminal justice system. However, others argue
that mandatory arrest and pro-arrest policies are ineffective and should not be considered
the primary policy for combating violence against women. Specifically, empirical
research regarding the effectiveness of these policies find that: 1) officers do not always
make arrests even when they are required to (Avakame and Fyfe 2001; Buzawa and
Austin 1993; Chesney-Lind 2002; Websdale 1998), 2) they are often ineffective for

2 Despite significant changes in the original research design, subsequent studies were still
considered “replications” as part of the Spouse Assault Replication Program (SARP)
(Maxwell, Gamer, and Fagan 2002). These replication studies produced mixed results
from the original Sherman and Berk research (see Gamer, Fagan, and Maxwell 1995),
calling into question the original findings regarding the universal effectiveness of arrest
for cases of wife assault.
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marginalized men who have minimal stakes in conformity (Chesney-Lind 2002; Klein et
al. 1997; Sherman 1992), 3) they can result in the arrest o f the victim or “dual arrests”
(DeLeon-Granados, Wells, and Binsbacher 2006; Martin 1997; Miller 2001; Simpson et
al. 2006), 4) they can lead to further victimization, or “backlash”, if the man’s job suffers
from the arrest (Buzawa and Buzawa 2003) and 5) they likely will not work without an
effective court system (Fleury-Steiner et al. 2006; Mills 1998; Ptacek 1999; Stark 1993).
Despite the research suggesting policies adopting a one-size-fits-all approach of
mandatory or pro-arrest policies are weak at best, they remain the most significant policy
response to domestic violence since the movement began in the 1970s (Paterson 2009;
Dobash and Dobash 2011) as well as the most researched (Belknap et al. 2001; Ptacek
1999).
It may be ironic to some that the most profound policy since the domestic
violence movement has been one that relies so heavily on state interventions. After all,
women and feminists have had legitimate reasons to distrust the state. Thus, for
ideological reasons regarding the relationship between women and the state and/or the
continual, widespread amount of violence against women, many researchers have
reassessed domestic violence policies, especially policies based on mandatory arrest or
pro-arrest (e.g. Ferraro and Pope 1993; Lutze and Symons 2003; Mills 2003; Peterson
2008). These policies may merely displace rather than alleviate the problem. This
displacement of the problem is a reactive approach to domestic violence, an inherent
weakness of any social policy based on deterrence theory.
Other reactive policies that have been given much less attention than policing
policies (and are focused on change and reform, rather than deterrence) include: batterer
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intervention programs (e.g. Pence and Paymar 1993; Saunders 2008), domestic violence
fatality reviews (e.g. Websdale 2003), restorative justice (e.g. Gaarder and Presser 2006;
Presser, Gaarder, and Hesselton 2007; Miller 2011; Ptacek 2010), safety planning (e.g.
Goodkind, Sullivan, and Bybee 2004) and domestic violence shelters3 (e.g. Lyon, Lane,
and Menard 2008). These policies and programs, used holistically, offer much more in
terms of providing safety and empowerment for women than policing strategies alone.
Yet, no matter how well-intentioned these reactionary policies may be, they do not
provide proactive solutions that specifically target the incipient factors that are present
before men use violence against their female partners.
Reactionary policies have been criticized for ignoring the etiology of men’s
violence against women, yet research noting the exact etiological factors involved has
been inconclusive. Despite this, the work of many feminist researchers and activists has
been instrumental in providing a safer world for millions o f women today. The exact
degree to which these policies have been effective, however, is debatable. Recent reports
of a decline in intimate violence against women have also been challenged. Whether or
not one attributes these declines to the women’s movement or shifting demographics (see
Stark 2007), the amount of violence that remains is still extensive (Belknap and Potter
2005; Chancer 2004). The policies developed since the domestic violence movement

3 Both safety planning and domestic violence shelters are not entirely reactive. That is,
they can also be conceptualized as proactive in preventing future abuse. Nonetheless,
they are still reactive in the sense that they are not utilized until after one has been a
victim.
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have not led to a widespread or drastic decrease in women’s victimization for various
reasons. Chief among these is the fact that most feminist researchers and activists have
operated under a platform that is largely atheoretical (Hunnicutt 2009; Yllo 1993).
Widespread pro-arrest policies are based on the simplistic theory o f deterrence. The
major problem with these and other “silver bullet solutions” (Mears 2007) to social
problems is that they are often based on weak theoretical understanding (Barlow 1995;
Mears 2007; Simon 2007). Blalock (1994) made note o f how simplistic theories can be
used to motivate policy-oriented research, but that they will fail to have strong
explanatory power across the board. A likely reason for this lies in the fact that the key
concept in all feminist theories, patriarchy, is often underdeveloped, ignored, simplistic,
essentialist, or reified in theories of violence against women (Hunnicutt 2009;
Messerschmidt 1995; Ogle and Batton 2009).

“RESURRECTING PATRIARCHY”
Hunnicutt (2009) challenges feminists to “resurrect” patriarchy in theories of
violence against women. She notes that past feminists (specifically radical feminists)
have failed to understand the complex role patriarchy plays in violence against women.
She is also critical of simplistic applications o f patriarchy as an explanatory concept for
violence against women. These simplistic explanations assume that all men are powerful
due to the gender hierarchy and men that engage in violence towards women do so in
order to maintain their patriarchal positions. Such explanations obviously do not explain
why all (and in fact, most) men are not violent towards women. They incorrectly assume
that all men are powerful, ignoring other intersecting inequalities such as race, class, or
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sexual orientation. In short, the simplistic and essentialist explanations of patriarchy in
the past have led some researchers to challenge feminist explanations o f what they claim
is a non-gendered phenomena (see Dutton 1994, 2006, 2010; Mills 2003, 2005). These
critics have attacked feminist perspectives for being based on a “single-causal factor”
(Straus 2006:1086) in that feminists’ answer to why violence against women exists and
persists is simply “patriarchy.” These critics are either reducing feminist theories of
violence against women because o f their own biased agendas or they have incorrectly
interpreted the feminist perspective. Either way, a brief review of feminist theory should
dispel these weak interpretations.
In reality, there are a multitude o f feminist theories (Chafetz 1997, 2004; Daly
and Chesney-Lind 1988; Jaggar 1983; Martin 1990; Meyer and Post 2006; Ogle and
Batton 2009; Tong 2009). There are also many feminist theories o f violence against
women (DeKeseredy 201 la; O’Neill 1998), including many with stark disagreements.
The commonality amongst the feminist theories lies in the centrality placed on hierarchal
gender relations (i.e. patriarchy). Thus, patriarchy remains at the forefront o f feminist
discussions, albeit in different ways depending on the specific feminist theory. For
example, despite psychological researchers’ critiques o f feminist explanations of violence
against women (e.g. Dutton 2006; 2010) very few feminist researchers assume that
individual men engaging in violent behavior do so to maintain their patriarchal privilege.
This type of logic makes the false assumption that all men are benefactors o f patriarchy
and all women are subordinate victims of patriarchy, thus, what is called the myth of
patriarchy’s “false universalism” (see Schwartz 1988). The reality is, many men and
women face subordination both within and outside their familial or intimate settings,
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particularly lower class individuals and racial minorities (Connell and Messerschmidt
2005). This type o f false universalism may have been applied by early feminist theorists
since the relative exclusion of racial minorities and lower-class women from the women’s
movement was an issue (hooks 2003). Yet feminist scholarship eventually has come to
understand the “matrix o f domination” (Collins 2000) in which race, class, and gender
can intersect with one another (Danner 1991). Basically, men who hold a considerable
amount of power in their familial settings often lack any power in other institutions such
as their places of employment. For example, Websdale’s (1998) ethnography showed
that although white men in rural Kentucky had almost no power in their daily jobs (in the
economy), they clearly dominated the lives of the female partners they abused (in the
family).
In contrast, some men may use violence because they do not dominate in their
familial settings (Fox 1993; Websdale 2010). In this way, violence is used as an attempt
to gain power and control over a partner- not as a way of maintaining power and control
(Websdale 2010). These examples highlight the complexities involved in explaining the
specific role patriarchy plays in violence against women. The key here is to recognize
that many feminist perspectives may use patriarchy as an explanatory concept, but not all
do so as part of a formal theory of violence against women.
Hunnicutt states that her work is not a formal theory o f violence against women,
nor is it a formal feminist theory. Instead, her work intends to “lay some foundations for
a more fully developed theory of violence against women” (2009:554). She does this by
providing five essential components to a theory of violence against women. These are
summarized as: 1) accounting for the fact that patriarchy is variable across different

cultures, 2) understanding that men’s violence is structural and accounting for the fact
that different men are marginalized in different ways, 3) accounting for the potential
divergence between structural conditions and ideological components o f patriarchy, 4)
understanding other structural forms of oppression in relation to patriarchy (i.e. matrix of
domination), and 5) understanding that there are “labyrinths of power dynamics in
patriarchal systems” [emphasis in original], in which power is variable for women and
men (Hunnicutt 2009:554-555).
It is not the intent of this dissertation to develop a formal theory o f violence
against women. The purpose o f this dissertation is to provide a much-needed
understanding of the ideological components of patriarchy (number 3 above) in relation
to violence against women. While the goal is not to discourage the development of all
five of Hunnicutt’s theoretical components, this is a daunting task for one research
project. Focusing on one of these five components will provide an in-depth
understanding o f this underdeveloped component regarding a theory of violence against
women. Furthermore, as the following chapters will show, perhaps the least developed
theoretical component of patriarchy is the ideological one. Before moving on to an
outline of the whole dissertation, conceptual clarity is needed.

DEFINITIONS

Violence against Women
It is important to clarify the types of “violence against women” addressed in this
research. The global concept “violence against women” can include many types of
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violence against women such as genocidal rape. However, “violence against women” is
used throughout this dissertation to refer to various types o f relationship violence. Most
o f the previously reviewed literature has focused on domestic violence rather than dating
violence, but these two concepts overlap. Typically, “dating violence” is conceptualized
as violence during high school or college, whereas domestic violence is thought to occur
between married or cohabitating couples. While relationship violence can occur between
cohabitating couples (married or not), “dating violence” is usually used in the research
literature to define violence in relationships between young adolescents in high school or
young adults in college. “Domestic violence” is violence that occurs in more serious
relationships (e.g. cohabitating, married). These definitions are distinguished largely by
the seriousness of the relationships involved. This does not mean the most serious
relationships that have violence always involve the most serious forms o f violence.
Overall the two concepts fit within the same general theoretical framework and can often
be used interchangeably. However, important distinctions should not go unnoticed.
There are two important distinctions between dating violence and domestic
violence. First, dating violence occurs frequently enough and can produce many negative
outcomes that although there is evidence to suggest it serves as a precursor to domestic
violence, it still warrants attention as a significant social problem by itself. Second, there
is evidence to suggest that relationship violence against women occurs on a continuum
where many cases of domestic violence are preceded by dating violence that occurs
earlier in one’s life. In short, dating violence and domestic violence can both be
researched as unique social problems, but both occur within the broader context o f
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violence against women, with dating violence often acting as a precursor to domestic
violence.
It should be noted that researchers that focus primarily on “dating violence” are
much more likely to adopt “gender symmetry” arguments, framing the issue as a problem
with young people rather than a problem perpetrated by boys and young men (Reed et al.
2010). Amongst non-cohabitating dating partners, the National Violence against Women
Survey (NVAW) found women were more likely than men to be victims of physical
aggression, forced sex, and stalking (Slashinski, Coker, and Davis 2003). Research from
Molidor and Tolman (1998) found frequencies o f violence between male and female
dating partners to be similar, yet they discovered consistencies with the NVAW in that
women’s victimization was much more severe. Not all research in this area supports the
“gender symmetry” frame, but many focus on specific psychological correlates o f young
boys’ violence (e.g. Boivin et al. 2012; Foshee, Reyes, and Ennett 2010), in a way that
decontextualizes the violence. This is because the psychological factors are often not
contextualized within a system o f gender stratification.
A plethora of studies have found that dating violence, like domestic violence, is
gendered (for a review see Jackson 1999), and those that claim “gender symmetry” in
dating violence are using the same de-contextualized measures of violent acts as the
family violence school (Slashinski et al. 2003). In a study from Bethke and Dejoy
(1993), a sample o f college students viewed men’s use of violence as much more
consequential than women’s use of violence. Thus, the individuals that are likely to be in
dating relationships do recognize the different degrees of seriousness when it comes to
male perpetrated vs. female perpetrated dating violence.
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There are many negative consequences girls and women face as a result o f their
victimization in dating relationships. Some researchers have found negative
psychological outcomes (i.e. post-traumatic stress, dissociation) for young girls (13-19)
as they experienced increased levels of dating violence (Callahan, Tolman, and Saunders
2003). Others have discovered links between dating violence victimization and posttraumatic stress disorder and depression (Wolitzky-Taylor et al. 2008). Many similarities
between dating and domestic violence are found regarding types of intimate partner abuse
used by violent male adolescents (Crooks et al. 2011). One extreme (although atypical)
difference is that serious dating relationships are often at a greater risk o f intimate partner
homicide than married couples (Dobash et al. 2009). Overall, dating violence shares
many similarities with domestic violence regarding the frequency and seriousness of the
violence.
Many studies have found that adulthood domestic violence is often preceded by
adolescent dating violence (for a review see Shorey, Cornelius, and Bell 2008; see also
Slashinski et al. 2003). Data collected from a college sample found women that
experienced dating violence in high school were more likely to be victimized in college
than women that did not experience high school dating violence (Smith, White, and
Holland 2003). Also, adolescent dating violence can occur within the context o f ongoing
child abuse for both victims and perpetrators. More specifically, Laporte et al. (2011)
found that young women victimized in adolescent dating relationships often have had
abusive parents and some young men that perpetrated violence experienced violent
discipline from their fathers.
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In short, “violence against women” is used throughout this dissertation to refer to
relationship violence against women. Compared to domestic violence, dating violence
often involves less serious forms of relationship violence between less serious couples
(usually adolescents or young adults). Although dating violence is a social problem in
and of itself, theories of violence against women should note that dating violence is often
a precursor to domestic violence. The data used in this research comes from a sample of
college students, whose experiences are most likely limited to dating violence. However,
their patriarchal ideology is measured from items related to domestic violence.

Patriarchy
Literal definitions of patriarchy state that it is a system where the father is the
head of the household. However, patriarchy as a social concept has been defined by
social scientists in far different ways. These definitions are much more descriptive than
the literal translation but there remains a large amount o f variation in the literature in
regards to patriarchy’s meaning (Barrett 1988; Fox 1988; Gonzalez et al. 2010; Hunnicutt
2009; Stacey 1993). This lack of a clear definition has limited theoretical developments
related to patriarchy (especially in criminology, see Ogle and Batton 2009). When
defined, patriarchy is sometimes defined too simplistically (Barrett 1988). In order to
develop patriarchy as a theory at any level, it is important to use a holistic definition that
is explicit and meticulous.
There is no doubt that patriarchy is a system in the same way that capitalism and
racism are systems. A system where men dominate and control women has never had an
equal counterpart in history where women dominated and controlled men (Crane-Seeber
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and Crane 2010; Eller 2000). Even anthropological research that notes a pre-history of
matriarchal societies (what Cynthia Eller, 2000, calls a “myth”) appears to really be
describing matrilineal societies. These societies are ordered around female kinship and
female decision-making but female dominance over men is lacking (Figes 1986).
Uncertainty concerning the history and definition of patriarchy has led to many that use
the term in such a general sense “it is redolent of a universal and trans-historical
oppression” (Barrett 1988:14). Chafetz (1994) notes that unclear constructs and concepts
have further complicated sociologists’ use of the term patriarchy.
Various feminist theorists use the term ‘patriarchy’ to refer to ideology (secular
and/or religious), to properties of the family, economy or polity, or to some
combination thereof. Because the term has entered the popular feminist idiom, it
has been rendered even more broad and vague than might otherwise have been the
case. Clearly, it is heavily laden with ideological and pejorative meaning. To the
extent that it refers to more than one o f the several institutions listed above, it is
truth-asserting. [...] ‘Patriarchy’ refers to an abstract property distilled from
human behaviors and utterances. It is therefore reification to use any active verb
with it. Yet throughout the gender literature one finds patriarchy ‘requiring,’
‘producing,’ ‘creating,’ ‘causing,’ ‘needing,’ ‘encouraging,’ and so on. In this
way, it sounds like a profound explanation is being offered when in fact nothing
concrete is being uttered. (Chafetz 1994:144)
Often, it appears, social scientists have used the term patriarchy in such a general, vague,
and undefined manner that it is presented as a system that is omnipresent, influencing
anything and everything. If this is the case, then patriarchy is an invariant concept that
explains nothing. Many problems arise when viewing patriarchy as only a system.
Failing to see that patriarchy is not just social or structural, but that it also has ideological
components has been the shortcoming of many feminist conceptualizations in the past
(Fox 1988).
There are, however, feminist researchers that have found patriarchy to vary in a
variety of ways and they have contributed to a clearer understanding both conceptually
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and theoretically. A useful conceptualization will provide a term that accurately
describes the domination of women by men (Stacey 1993). Specific to a theory of
violence against women, an accurate conceptualization will help explain the origins and
persistence of violence against women.
Hunnicutt (2009) provides one o f the more inclusive and precise (as well as
current) definitions of patriarchy, which will be used for this dissertation. She states
that„”[...] it means social arrangements that privilege males, where men as a group
dominate women as a group, both structurally and ideologically-hierarchical
arrangements that manifest in varieties across history and social space” (557). This
definition is similar to others that have noted that patriarchy is not static (Beechey 1979;
Chafetz 2004; Fox 1988; Pateman 1988, 1989; Walby 1990; Zajicek and Calasanti 1998).
Hunnicutt goes on to note that there are variants to patriarchy that exist at the structural
level, called social patriarchy, and the private domain, called familial patriarchy
(discussed below). Perhaps the most crucial component of Hunnicutt’s definition for
future theoretical developments is that it acknowledges male privilege and male
domination exist institutionally and ideologically (see also Dobash and Dobash 1979;
Fox 1988; Grana 2010). In this dissertation, I argue that the ideological component o f
patriarchy is one o f the least understood and least developed components of patriarchy in
regards to a theory of violence against women.
Dichotomies o f Patriarchy. Patriarchy is often conceptualized to have two major
components. The first is usually called either public patriarchy or social patriarchy. The
second is usually referred to as private patriarchy or familial patriarchy. Some have
used all of these terms as four distinct concepts (Dobash and Dobash 1979), but Hearn
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(1992) considers public patriarchy and social patriarchy to be similar concepts as well as
private patriarchy and familial patriarchy. In the literature, public patriarchy/social
patriarchy is typically conceptualized to mean patriarchy within organizations or
institutions whereas private patriarchy and familial patriarchy exist within domestic
settings (see Dobash and Dobash 1979; Hearn 1992; Walby 1990). At times it is
acceptable to substitute these terms with one another, but there is some confusion when
researchers use them. The major confusion lies in the fact that public/social patriarchies
exist in “institutions”, yet the family is a social institution. Specificity is needed. For the
current project, public patriarchy/social patriarchy refers to patriarchy within institutions
outside of the family. However, these terms are avoided. The broader issue with these
four concepts is that they create distinct divisions between the family and other social
institutions. While this may be useful at times, it contributes to the false perception o f the
family as an autonomous unit outside of other social institutions. While Chapter 2
discusses this in more depth, for now, it should be noted that the family is a social
institution and conceptualizations of private and public forms of patriarchy should be
used having an understanding that they cannot be easily separated from one another.
Moreover, these varieties of patriarchy are mutually reinforcing (Chowdhury 2009;
DeKeseredy 201 la; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2009; Hearn 1992; Smith 1990).
Institutional Patriarchy. The concept institutional patriarchy is used throughout
and is broader than the terms social patriarchy or public patriarchy. It refers to the
macro-level forms of organized patriarchy in all social institutions, including the family.
Hence, familial patriarchy is also present under this broader rubric o f institutional
patriarchy. This conceptualization o f institutional patriarchy does not negate the

19
importance of distinguishing between familial and social patriarchy. However,
dichotomized terms like public patriarchy/private patriarchy and social
patriarchy/familial patriarchy can be perceived as supporting the bifurcated view of
“separate spheres” (Ferree 1990). The current concept o f institutional patriarchy notes
macro-level forms o f male domination regarding the five major social institutions,
including the family. The idea behind separate spheres is that the family is separate from
broader social institutions, free from their influence. Instead, institutional patriarchy
acknowledges that structural patriarchy operates within and between social institutions,
reinforcing wide-scale male domination (Epstein 2007). Chapter 2 notes the varying
ways in which male dominated social institutions reinforce patriarchy through various
practices (e.g. criminal justice laws, subjective equal employment legislation). Outside
of these institutional actions, there is an ideological component of patriarchy that exists
structurally and individually.

Institutional and Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Patriarchal ideology was first introduced by Kate Millett (1970). Millet saw
patriarchal ideology as the justification for societal-wide male domination. She believed
that the etiology of patriarchal ideology was rooted in the family. She argued that these
ideologies were important to the overall sustainability of societal patriarchy. Most
importantly, Millett and others have discussed how changes in societal patriarchy can
occur with little to no change in the ideological component o f patriarchy or other micro
level variables concerning gender equality (Ferraro 1988; Hunnicutt 2009; Meyer and
Post 2006; York 2011). Clarity in the use of the term “patriarchal ideology” in this
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dissertation, from this point forward, is needed. The first point of clarification is that
patriarchal ideology used throughout refers to individual-level ideology. Second,
specification is needed in that patriarchal ideology is a specific to patriarchal ideology
about violence against women.
Regarding the use of patriarchal ideology as an individual-level concept, it is
important to note that this can include individual attitudes, beliefs, and values. This is not
to suggest that social institutions do not or are unable to have ideologies, let alone
patriarchal ones. For example, Belcher (1997:62-63) discusses “The Maleness of
Organizational Life” in which companies as well as the law operate a male value system.
Similarly, Acker (1990, 1992) shows how “gendered organizations” create symbolic
images regarding ideal types of men and women and these male-dominated organizations
work to reproduce these images over time. But it is also important to note that these
“images” can be preexisting and their exact origins could come from sources outside o f
singular organizations (Acker 1990, 1992; Britton 2003).
Despite the fact that various institutions themselves can hold certain ideologies,
patriarchal ideology and the micro/macro distinction is best understood through an
understanding of Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony. Hegemony can help explain
institutional patriarchy, which often contextualizes individual-level patriarchal ideology.
Moreover, an explanation of hegemony will help in understanding how patriarchy is
maintained at the institutional level.
The term hegemony was used by Gramsci when analyzing the historical
contingencies of the state (i.e. “political society”). Gramsci (1971:14) notes that the state
comes into power and maintains its power over social groups (i.e. “civil society”) in two
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ways: direct coercion (i.e. “direct domination”) and through hegemony. Put simply,
through hard power and soft power. Hegemony involves, “internal control” and this:
[...] refers to an order in which a common social moral language is spoken, in
which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of
thought and behaviour. It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained
by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes. And
whereas ‘domination’ is realized, essentially, through the coercive machinery of
the state, ‘intellectual and moral leadership is objectified in, and mainly exercised
through ‘civil society’, the ensemble of educational, religious and associational
institutions. Hegemony is attained through the myriad ways in which the
institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive
and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate the problematic social
reality, [emphasis in original] (Femia 1981:24)
Hegemony can comprise ideologies, norms, or different modes of socialization. It should
not be reduced to just ideology (Buci-Glucksmann 1982). The point is that patriarchal
ideology should not be thought of strictly in terms of some sort of patriarchal hegemony
or hegemonic patriarchy that is entirely structural. While Gramsci uses the term
hegemony primarily to discuss dominant ideologies, he does this by focusing primarily
on how social institutions play a role in developing, legitimizing, and maintaining these
ideologies. Thus, Chapter 2 discusses patriarchy and social institutions but more
importantly, it discusses the hegemonic nature of these social institutions when it comes
to their patriarchal character. The macro-level patriarchal ideology is embedded into
multiple social institutions and is called institutional patriarchal ideology. These
ideologies operate to maintain the dominance of these institutions.
It is also important to discuss various concepts that refer to male cultural values
and beliefs (also called cultural scripts). In Heise’s (1998) ecological theory, she
conceptualizes cultural values related to men’s violence against women (e.g. male
supremacy, dominance, male honor) as “macrosystem factors.” It is important to note
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that these cultural values or cultural scripts are embedded into social institutions. This
does not mean, however, that every man will adopt these scripts at the individual-level.
A focus on ideologies solely at the institutional level might lead to simplistic
understandings of micro-level ideologies. The focus on individual ideology and not
culturally-based or institutionally-based patriarchal ideology avoids conceptualizations o f
the concept in a top-down, structurally deterministic way.
The specification of patriarchal ideology regarding violence against women is
necessary. Referring to patriarchal ideology in the manner Millett (1970) did may be
useful if one were interested in individual’s rationalizations of male dominance in
general, which clearly relates to violence against women. However, the connections
between this broader concept of patriarchal ideology and violence against women are
very indirect and may be difficult for one empirical study to uncover. In Chapter 3,
Smith’s (1990) definition of patriarchal ideology is used. He distinguished between
patriarchal beliefs and patriarchal attitudes. Essentially, both center on male dominance
in the family with the latter supportive of the use o f violence against women that
violate/challenge an individual man’s ideal authority. In short, patriarchal ideology may
be explored in future research studies interested in male dominance in general and not
specifically male violence. My focus on violence against women means that from this
point forward, patriarchal ideology is used to refer to patriarchal ideology about violence
against women.
M en’s Individual Patriarchal Ideology. The current research focuses solely on
the patriarchal ideology of men. This does not imply that women do not or cannot have a
patriarchal ideology, nor does this suggest that their ideologies are unimportant.
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However, for a theory of violence against women, understanding men’s patriarchal
ideologies separately is crucial. Since men comprise the dominant group in society,
focusing on their ideologies should hopefully help in understanding ways these
ideologies change. Additionally, most of the early research on violence against women
has focused almost exclusively on victims (Dobash and Dobash 2011). While the
insights gained from women as advocates and victims have been extremely beneficial,
the dearth of research focusing on men’s actions and ideologies give further evidence for
the narrowness of past research and theories o f violence against women.

PURPOSE OF DISSERTATION
This dissertation addresses Hunnicutt’s (2009) call for feminist theories of
violence against women to bring back the concept of patriarchy and use it as a theoretical
tool. It also responds to challenges presented by Ogle and Batton (2009) to show the
utility of patriarchy as a useful concept for criminologists. Research on patriarchal
ideology has often been plagued with poor conceptualizations and operationalizations
and/or has taken the concept for granted as a static independent variable. This study uses
feminist conceptualizations of patriarchal ideology with consistent operationalizations of
this concept. It also treats patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable in order to assess
the micro-level origins and changes related to it. The careful attention given to
patriarchal ideology will expand our understanding of its place in a larger theory of
violence against women. The goals o f this dissertation are summarized as follows:
1) To accurately conceptualize patriarchal ideology.
2) To explore the reliability o f operational measures o f patriarchal ideology.
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3) To investigate potential etiological variables related to patriarchal ideology.
4) To better understand how patriarchal ideology changes over time.
5) To uncover how patriarchal ideology fits in feminist theories o f violence
against women.
6) To consider potential social policies that might effectively target patriarchal
ideologies.
Although Chafetz (2004:964) states, “The goal of the social and behavioral
sciences is to develop explanations (theories) [...]” this should not be the primary focus of
research. Responding to this quote from Chafetz, Baber (2004:979) more accurately
noted that social scientists should use theory to guide scholarly work, but from that point,
the goal should be, “improving the opportunities and well-being o f women and other
silenced groups.”

DISSERTATION OUTLINE
Chapter 2 focuses on institutional patriarchy. Specifically, it shows how
patriarchy is widespread in the major social institutions o f society, so much that they can
be described as patriarchal institutions. This helps show how violence against women is
part of the broader gender hierarchy while also helping to show the various actions
regarding the maintenance and reinforcement of institutional patriarchy. Chapter 3
begins with a review of some social science concepts that relate to patriarchal ideology.
A brief discussion of the “gender symmetry” researchers that claim patriarchal ideology
is irrelevant in explaining domestic violence is discussed. These perspectives are easily
discredited and dismissed. The argument is then made that patriarchal ideology is
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important in explaining violence against women, especially when conceptualized in ways
these critics have failed to consider. Moreover, the argument is made that their direct
predictive power in explaining individual men’s violence is less important than their
overall presence as a reflection of male culture. There are two major analyses performed.
Chapter 4 provides the methodology for the first major analyses (results in Chapter 5)
assessing attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology with two-wave panel data. Chapter
6 describes the methodology for analyses that use the same original data source described
in Chapter 4, but uses latent growth curve modeling over three waves o f data, while
operationalizing patriarchal ideology with vignettes (with results in Chapter 7). The final
chapter, Chapter 8, includes a discussion of the findings from the two major analyses
using a holistic approach.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a broad overview o f the gendered nature of violence
against women that is rooted in patriarchy. The increased attention placed on violence
against women since the domestic violence movement has been remarkable, but current
levels of violence against women likely indicate a stalled revolution (Stark 2007). For
too long researchers have accepted simplistic theoretical explanations for violence against
women. Hunnicutt (2009) argues that feminist theories of violence against women can be
reinvigorated through a better understanding of patriarchy. Specifically, individual
patriarchal ideology is one of the most underutilized and least understood aspects of
patriarchy in a theory of violence against women.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHY AND INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHAL
IDEOLOGY

“A theory of violence against women has to account for varieties in patriarchal
structures.” [emphasis in original] (Hunnicutt 2009:554)

PATRIARCHY AS A THEORY
While this dissertation follows Hunnicutt’s lead and uses patriarchy as a
“theoretical tool” or as a “theoretical concept”, this current work is not a formal theory of
patriarchy or a formal theory of violence against women. Theories o f patriarchy are
fairly rare. Instead, it is feminist theories that prioritize patriarchy. A discussion of the
work of Walby (1990) shows some of the ways patriarchy has been used as a theoretical
concept.
One of the earliest attempts to theorize patriarchy came from Walby’s (1990)
book, Theorizing Patriarchy. Walby claimed that patriarchy is composed o f six main
structures: women’s unpaid household work, women’s paid work, the patriarchal state,
male violence, sexuality, and cultural institutions. Most notably, she made the distinction
between private and public forms o f patriarchy.
Private patriarchy is based upon household production, with a patriarch
controlling women individually and directly in the relatively private sphere o f the
home. Public patriarchy is based on structures other than the household, although
this may still be a significant patriarchal site. Rather, institutions conventionally
regarded as part of the public domain are central in the maintenance o f patriarchy.
(Walby 1990:178)
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Walby provided excellent historical and current, for its time, accounts of patriarchy’s
many manifestations. Unfortunately, her work falls short as a practical, formal theory of
patriarchy that could be used in explaining violence against women for two main reasons.
First, Walby failed to pose theoretical questions. She also failed to provide clearly
defined concepts related to social institutions. These two central problems with formal
theory construction exist within all o f “gender sociology” (Chafetz 1994).
Walby’s research question is unclear in her w ork'. She merely provided a rich
context of useful examples of patriarchal practices throughout her six structures of
patriarchy, yet often relied on existing feminist theories for explanations. For example,
she did pose questions at the beginning of her chapter on paid employment regarding why
women earn less than men, why women are excluded from certain jobs, and why women
are excluded from paid work more than men. Her answer to all of these questions in
regards to the economy is that after first-wave feminism gave women the right to work,
the historical years of patriarchy at the hands of their husbands (private patriarchy) was
replaced by a new form of oppression (public patriarchy) in economic institutions. The
private/public shift explanation is confusing when applied to other “structures”,
especially violence against women. Walby described how first-wave feminists were

1 While not all research requires formally stated research questions (e.g. this dissertation
does not), they should at least state what it is they are trying to better understand (e.g. the
goals laid-out in Chapter 1 of this dissertation). Because of this, the chapters in which
Walby does not pose questions or goals are unclear regarding what theoretical
propositions/assumptions she is attempting to address.
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influential in bringing violence against women to the forefront of the state where it could
no longer be seen as a private matter (see also Sherman 1992). The explanation, again, is
that patriarchy shifts from private patriarchy produced by violent men to public
patriarchy where the state (which is patriarchal) is called on to protect women. When
Walby’s work first came out in 1990, it was not clear whether or not this shift was going
to be a positive change for women (Walby frames it as negative). Even after Walby’s
work, it is unclear how the public to private shift in patriarchy should be viewed. Some
have argued state intervention in domestic violence is beneficial for victims (Mirchandani
2006; Sherman and Berk 1984; Stark 1993, 2007) while others disagree (Presser et al.
2007). The question Walby’s theory is fit to answer is unclear regarding her “structure”
of patriarchy- violence. Is it, “what causes violence against women?” If so, her answer
appears to be her thesis throughout the book: the shift from private forms of patriarchy in
the family to public forms of patriarchy in the economy. The problem is violence within
intimate settings is inherently a form of private patriarchy, in the same way male partners
and fathers that control a family’s finances is. Because o f this, it is confusing to explain
violence against women as a social problem that results from the shift from private to
public patriarchy.
Another shortcoming of Walby’s work lies in the obscurity and confusion
surrounding her definition of the structures of patriarchy. Three of her six structures, or
what one reviewer of her book calls “practices” o f patriarchy (Maynard 1992:311) are
directly related to social institutions: the economy (“paid work”), polity (“the state”), and
the family (“house work”). She then attempted to explain the other components of
patriarchy (i.e. “violence against women”, “culture”, “sexuality”). If she developed her
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“theory” as an explanation for the existence or persistence o f patriarchy at the macro
level as well as those at the interactional level, her theory might suffice. Unfortunately,
her work reads as examples o f how some institutions are patriarchal, followed by
examples of patriarchal practices. This is related to critiques from Jaggar (1983) about
radical feminists’ inability to differentiate between “description and explanation”
(Sprague and Zimmerman 1989:79).
The unclear nature of Walby’s six main concepts, however, should not distract
from the significance of her book for future theoretical developments of patriarchy. Her
discussion of the historical shift from private to public patriarchy is extremely important
in noting the various levels of patriarchy and how these shifts have shaped (and continue
to shape) social institutions. A formal theory o f patriarchy can build on Walby’s work in
developing structural concepts of patriarchy and historical shifts within them, which can
also lead to a better understanding o f ideological changes (see Stacey 1993 for similar
criticisms).
Walby’s public patriarchy and private patriarchy overlap considerably with the
terms social patriarchy and familial patriarchy. To better understand both social and
familial patriarchy, we must consider how each variety o f patriarchy operates separately
but keep in mind that they are mutually reinforcing (Chowdhury 2009; DeKeseredy
201 la; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2009; Ferree 1990; Hearn 1992; Smith 1990). Because
of this, the concept institutional patriarchy was introduced in Chapter 1 to describe
institutional forms of patriarchy within and between social institutions. The “varieties of
patriarchal structures” that Hunnicutt (2009) mentioned can be further explored in future
formal theories of patriarchy at the macro-level. What follows is not an exhaustive
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description of each form of institutional patriarchy, but is used to demonstrate some
examples of their variations and their interactions. Such examples should help
contextualize the individual-level concepts of patriarchal ideology.

INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHY

Dominant and Subordinate Institutions: Contextualizing Patriarchies
Since patriarchy presents itself in all social institutions (Acker 1992; Britton
2003; Danner 1991; Johnson 1997), institutional patriarchy is best understood using the
institutional taxonomies o f C. Wright Mills. Wozniak (2009) summarized the major
works of Mills (1956, 1959) to describe Mills’ societal institutions. These are the
“dominant institutions” (i.e. the economy, political order, and the military order) as well
as the “subordinate institutions” of society (i.e. the family, education, religion, and mass
media). A review o f the literature will show the many manifestations o f institutional
patriarchy, but first the classifications used by Mills must be abbreviated and clarified.
Although the military has been shown to be a patriarchal institution (Hopton
2003; Howard and Prividera 2004), researchers have made convincing arguments to not
include it as one of the dominant institutions in sociology. Domhoff (2006) shows how
large corporations have taken over the role of defense contractors and the military should
be considered subordinate to the corporate community (i.e. the economy). Similarly,
Scimecca (1995) argues that the military is also a subsidiary social institution but that it is
encompassed under the government (i.e. polity). Regardless o f which dominant
institution claims the military or how patriarchal it may be, it is no longer a dominant
institution in the way Mills considered it during his time.
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Mass media is also not considered a social institution in this current work. The
media has been shown to be patriarchal (e.g. Carmody 1998; Meloy and Miller 2009;
Websdale 1996), but its close relationship to dominant institutions (i.e. economics and
polity) make it more a manifestation o f these two institutions (Cushion and Lewis 2009;
Esser 2008; Hickey 1998). It appears that the primary, dominant institutions to focus on
for understanding institutional patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideologies are the
economy and politics.
Mills’ “subordinate institutions” for this dissertation are reduced to the family,
religion, and education with the utmost attention given to the family. Although education
and religion may indeed operate as independent institutions, the evidence related to
patriarchy shows them to have tremendous overlap with the primary institutions of the
economy and politics. Keep in mind that such a conceptualization does not treat familial
patriarchy as “separate” from other social institutions. Lastly, clarification on the naming
of one institution is needed. Throughout this research, the dominant institution Mills
referred to as the “political order” and others as “politics” will be referred to as polity.
Polity usually implies the organizational structure, whereas politics involves the social
interactions related to polity. With that, it should also be mentioned that the duality o f
socialist feminism is used in primarily focusing on the economy and the family, but does
not imply these are the only societal institutions that relate to patriarchy.
In short, the two dominant institutions discussed in relation to institutional
patriarchy are the economy and polity. Understanding how patriarchy operates through
social institutions helps in understanding individual patriarchal ideology (see Chapter 3).
The following sections focus primarily on past socialist feminist theories that have given
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the utmost attention to the economy and the family. These two social institutions fit
nicely with previous conceptualizations of patriarchy that emphasize connections
between public and private patriarchy. The importance of education and religion are
briefly discussed. The former is discussed primarily in relation to the economy and the
latter, primarily in relation to the family. The discussion on institutional patriarchal
ideology is provided to highlight the fact that ideology can be embedded into social
institutions. These examples will show how institutional patriarchal ideology is
important to study further, but they often manifest themselves as descriptions of these
institutions. That is, they are embedded into the culture of the institutions, making them
difficult to conceptualize and operationalize. Related to this, it is often difficult to
conceive of structures as having ideological components. This closely falls into the trap
o f reifying the term “institutional patriarchal ideology.” Nonetheless, they are briefly
mentioned in acknowledging that individual patriarchal ideology might be contextualized
within larger structural ideologies but individual agency is assumed to have the greatest
influence on individual ideologies.

Institutional Patriarchy and the Economy
Institutional patriarchy operates within the economy at various levels. Tilly
(1998) and later Massey (2007) explained how stratification is generated and maintained
through exploitation and opportunity hoarding. The aforementioned definition of
patriarchy references male domination of women. When referring to this domination in
regards to the economy, one can substitute male domination with male exploitation, a
term that implies material interests (Wright 1984).
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Exploitation. The exploitation of women in the economy is clearly reflected in
wage differentials between men and women. Even after the first wave of feminism,
women were almost entirely excluded from the paid workforce. However, with the
progressive second wave of feminism, women gained some ground in regards to their
employment status and income relative to men. Despite these changes, disparities still
remain. Wage differentials exist for women that work the same jobs as men, even in the
instances that women hold prestigious positions (Shin 2012). What is more alarming is
the little ground that women appear to have gained since the second wave of feminism
may actually be the result of men’s wages decreasing during this time period (Massey
2007). Although access into the economy has been difficult to say the least, wage
differentials have been a staple of gender stratification in the economy.
Other institutions (i.e. polity) have been used to address women’s exploitation in
the economy. The Equal Pay Act o f 1963 set out to eliminate the exploitation of
women’s work by making it a requirement, by law, for employers to pay women the
same wages as men for the same exact work. This legislation has failed to combat
patriarchal exploitation in the economy due in large part to large-scale ideologies on the
relative value of men and women as workers. Thus, the legislation allows for
discrimination against women in regards to wages based on “seniority, merit, differences
in quantity or quality of production, and ‘a differential based on any other factor other
than sex’” (Bacchi 1999:78). The first three variables allow for discrimination since men
have far more opportunities to accumulate seniority, merit, and higher amounts o f work
at higher qualities. Other “differentials” outside o f sex is such vague terminology that it
makes legal cases involving discrimination difficult to win (Burstein 1979). Blau and
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Ferber (1992) along with Blau and Kahn (2004) have shown compelling evidence to
suggest gender wage disparities are the result o f discrimination (not the lack of qualified
women) since wage differentials remain after controlling for important variables such as
education, experience, and job location. Related to this, Coleman (2003) noted that
blatant racial wage discrimination is a stronger predictor o f wage differentials than jobskill disparities. It is reasonable to assume that gender and racial discrimination continue
to be strong determinants of wage differentials and that this is widespread, rather than the
result of just a few prejudiced individuals. Case in point, as recently as March 2011,
women in the United States still earn around 75% of what men do (Jansen 2011).
The wage differences have been even greater for black women compared to white
women. This is partially due to the exclusion of black women from the early women’s
movement (Collins 2000; Stark 2007). The early women’s movement was myopic in
regards to women in the paid workforce and incorrectly assumed the social status o f all
women was the same (hooks 2000). When this middle-class, white women’s movement
urged women to “get to work”, many black women were excluded. This was due to the
fact that black women had been historically exploited for cheap labor and were already
working, albeit for low wages. After the civil rights and women’s rights movements,
however, little ground may have been gained for black women’s wages. This is reflected
in recent research reporting that since the 1980s, the gap between black women’s wages
compared to white women’s wages has widened significantly (Pettit and Ewert 2009).
Opportunity Hoarding. Institutional patriarchy in the economy also occurs
through opportunity hoarding (Massey 2007; Tilly 1998). The wage differentials
mentioned should be alarming, but it cannot be emphasized enough that this form of
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exploitation occurs when women do the same jobs as men- something that rarely takes
place (Acker 2006; Hesse-Biber, Nagy, and Carter 2000; Petersen and Morgan 1995).
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent executive orders in 1965 and 1967
(Albelda, Drago, and Shulman 2004), women had been discriminated against in the
economy since industrialization through outright exclusion (Fox and Fox 1986; Hartmann
1979). Since the second-wave of feminism, exclusion has remained regarding prestigious
positions.
Denying women access to jobs, especially prestigious ones, is a common practice
of economic institutions. Some researchers have argued that women’s denied access to
power and decision-making within the family transfers to the paid workforce (Kanter
1977; Messerschmidt 1986) a point emphasized further in the section regarding familial
patriarchy2. Thus, women are almost entirely excluded from positions of worth, and this
is especially the case for women of color (Wilensky 1968; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff
1998) as well as for mothers (Benard and Correll 2010). Prestigious positions are
redefined as ubiquitously male in that they require masculine characteristics. Successful
companies are defined by how male they are. Even if women do somehow gain entrance
into positions of power within these companies, they are still expected to act in a manner

2 This relationship has also been hypothesized reciprocally in that as women’s entrance
into the paid workforce increased along with the entrance into higher paying jobs, this
would translate into more decision making within the family. However, Tichenor (2005)
has found through her qualitative research that even women making significantly higher
wages are less likely to make decisions within the family or control familial finances.
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consistent with being male or masculine (Cockbum 1991; Kanter 1977; Wajcman 1998).
In the rare exception that women do obtain membership on corporate boards, they are
usually placed on committees dealing with “soft governance issues” whereas men are
typically dealing with “hard governance issues” (Bilimoria and Piderit 1994:1465).
These patriarchal institutions resist promoting or hiring females, with the exception o f a
few token individuals, and they justify their discriminatory actions by claiming they are
in the best interests of their shareholders3 (Belcher 1997). Equal opportunity legislation
has failed to level the playing field regarding opportunities since the practices by men
involve adaptively devaluing women’s work (Hartmann 1979; Reskin 1988).
Previously it was noted that polity can be used to institutionally combat economic
exclusion and discrimination (e.g. Equal Pay Act). Education is seen by some as another
institutional equalizer (Codd 1988). One can see the obvious issue, however, with
encouraging women into education if this institution itself is patriarchal. Despite decades
o f harsh patriarchal practices in education (e.g. outright exclusion, curriculums aimed at
helping them be “better wives”), the passage of Title IX in 1972 helped women
tremendously (Grana 2010). As the previous section showed, however, education has not
been the great equalizer. One reason for this lies in the areas of study women typically
“choose.” Thus, women are typically discouraged from joining “male fields” o f study
such as engineering, medicine, or law. This is reflected in data showing that although
women’s enrollments in college have increased, during the academic year 1996-1997

3 As a result, challenges to these practices are seen as impeding with the ffee-market o f
capitalism.
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women’s percentages in the following traditionally male fields were: law (44%),
medicine (41%), dentistry (37%), physical science (37%), computer science (27%), and
engineering (17%) (United States General Accounting Office 2000:11). More direct
forms of patriarchy in education are seen in the research on violence against college
women.
Koss, Gidycz, and Wisniewski (1987:166) discovered through a nationally
representative survey of more than 3,000 U.S. college women that more than half
(53.7%) had experienced some form o f sexual victimization. DeKeseredy and Kelly
(1993a:148) found that among female Canadian college students, almost half (45.1%)
had been victimized since high school. There is no doubt that the prevalence of male
violence towards women in such large numbers is evidence enough o f direct patriarchal
practices by individual men, but the response to the violence from educational institutions
demonstrates how macro-level institutions sustain the violence (Humphrey and Kahn
2000; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1998; Sanday 2007; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).
In other words, enrolling in college does not simply produce violent men (Chapter 3
discusses how patriarchal ideology may be present in some college men prior to college
enrollment). Although the institutions may not breed violent men, they do very little to
deter this violence through inaction or extremely weak punishments levied against
individual males and college-based organizations that encourage violence against women.
For illustrative purposes, Sanday’s (2007) work on fraternity gang rape on college
campuses (originally published in 1990) highlighted the patriarchal nature o f college
institutions. Her in-depth case studies painted a portrait o f horrific and coercive sexual
assaults against women perpetrated by members o f college fraternities. In what is called
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fraternity gang rape, several fraternity brothers “bond” with one another through the rape
and humiliation of young college women (see also Boswell and Spade 1996; Martin and
Hummer 1989). Sanday showed how some fraternities support and operate within a
culture that reinforces and even encourages such criminal behaviors. In this sense, they
are arguably the most explicitly patriarchal organization within the confines of college.
Sanday made note that colleges and universities do little to condemn, deter, or punish
such violent crimes. She presents cases where very lenient sentences are handed out to
the fraternities as well as to the individual men that are involved in the rapes. She notes
that fraternity members are usually privileged males that are well-off financially and their
fraternities receive large endowments from past alumni. This translates into economic
resources that can be used to defend the rapists in these cases. Thus, according to
Sanday, the educational institution works in unison with a very lax legal system along an
economic system of privileged men to create a haven for sexual predators to act with
almost complete impunity. Here the institutional overlap is overt between education,
polity, and the economy.
Individual patriarchal ideology is used by individual men in these fraternities.
The individual men within these organizations collectively engage in tactics that discredit
the female victims in these cases. They do this through the reaffirmation o f the ideology
of what an “ideal victim” is (i.e. reproducing and accepting rape myths). While the legal
system may have changed since Sanday’s original research in 1990 to where fraternities
and individual members are more likely to face criminal and institutional sanctions for
involvement in sexual assaults, not enough research has been done on the institutional
response to these crimes. One recent case suggests that while the institutional response
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may have progressively changed, individual ideologies trivializing rape persist. In
December 2011 at the University of Vermont, a survey handed out to fraternity pledge
members included the question, “If I could rape someone, who would it be?” The
fraternity was suspended by the university as well as by its national chapter. Also, a rally
of 200 students and an on-line petition were formed calling for the removal o f the
fraternity entirely from the university (Dorell and DiBlasio 2011). This example shows
the potential shifts in the institutional ideologies surrounding rape, but it also suggests
that individual men’s ideologies may lag in their progressive shifts. Unfortunately, few
academic studies have researched fraternities and gang rape in recent years to where we
would have a reliable understanding o f the exact institutional and individual patriarchal
ideology divergences.
These few examples should be seen as illustrations o f how patriarchy operates in
the dominant social institution of the economy through the subordinate institution of
education. While institutional patriarchy exists in the economy in various ways besides
the connections with education, these examples are used since the subsequent data
analyses are drawn from a sample of college students. Both the economy and education
reaffirm patriarchy through exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Thus, institutional
patriarchy in the economy operates in a manner that maintains women’s subordinate
positions in less prestigious positions and ensures that they earn less in jobs where they
do the equivalent amount o f work as men. Opportunity hoarding is seen when women
are excluded from prestigious positions in the economy and also when they are excluded
from prestigious fields of study that are traditionally male dominated. This occurs
despite the attempts through polity to gain equal access to education and jobs (e.g. Equal
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Pay Act, Title IX) because many of these policies are written in such a way that they
create more symbolic change rather than any real, systemic change.
Institutional Patriarchal Ideology. Gramsci’s (1971) concept o f hegemony has
great applicability here, but hegemony should not be reduced entirely to an ideology.
Historically, men dominated economic institutions through outright exclusion and
opportunity hoarding (i.e. direct control). But these tactics were eventually challenged
through legal reforms that were due in large part to feminist activism. Women’s
exclusion remains because the legal “equalizer” fails to acknowledge gender differentials
in the ability to obtain seniority or merit, which are accumulated over time. Women are
not likely to obtain seniority or merit if their work during that time is devalued since
“acting male” is considered an indicator of success. This devaluation is consistent with
the hegemony of male-dominated economic institutions that actively redefine the ideals
surrounding the characteristics of a worthy worker. Similarly, educational exclusion that
was at one point coercive in its exclusion has shifted as polity has become more
hegemonic. Specifics of hegemony might include the ideological production and
reproduction of “male” fields o f study as those most functional in the economy. In sum,
and in a very broad overview o f patriarchal ideology in the economy, gender inequality is
legitimated (and sustained) through large-scale ideologies imbedded into economic
organizations. These ideologies are centered on the premise that stratification is not the
result of exploitation or opportunity hoarding, but instead the result of unforgiving
economic systems and/or individual deficiencies (Acker 2006).
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Familial Patriarchy/Private Patriarchy
Familial patriarchy or private patriarchy is found within the family. The family is
defined here as either a heterosexual couple that lives together (Vaughan 2002) (married
or not, with or without children) as well as estranged couples that remain in contact
because they have children together. Homosexual couples can certainly form familial
institutions as well as have children, but are not included in this definition because the
current research focuses on men’s use of violence against former or current female
intimate partners. Patriarchy within the family is much more explicit in nature than
patriarchy within other social institutions. Whereas economic organizations may
commonly exclude women from jobs that they deem to be masculine, male patriarchs are
much more likely to have direct control over women and children through the means o f
physical force or the threat of force.
Socialist feminists have contributed greatly to helping understand the interactions
between the economy (production) and the family (reproduction) (polity too has
considerable overlap at the macro-level, but the economy plays a much larger role for
socialist feminists). Socialist feminists use traditional Marxian analysis to critique the
exploitive nature of capitalist economies but they fill the gaps left by Marxism’s neglect
of gender to include an analysis of reproduction in families (see Barrett 1988). Socialist
feminists see both institutions as mutually reinforcing, giving equal weight to both in
helping describe patriarchal capitalism (Andermahr, Lovell, and Wolkowitz 1997;
Danner 1991; Hartmann 1979; Messerschmidt 1986). Perhaps the overlap between the
dominant institutions and the family is best exemplified by Danner (1991:53), “The wellknown feminist phrase ‘the personal is political’ can be extended to better reflect socialist
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feminist analysis as: the personal is political and economic and the political and
economic is personal.”
The sexual division of labor in the economy that excludes women from positions
o f power and worth contributes to their economic dependence on men in the family. For
example, the aforementioned practice of devaluing women’s work while praising men’s
leaves few financial alternatives for women outside of marriage. This, of course, remains
even after the second wave of feminism (illustrated earlier by the gender-gap in earnings,
exploitation, and opportunity hoarding). Women often have to sacrifice in one avenue
over the other regarding work and the family, much more than men (Britton 2003; HesseBiber et al. 2000). This is reflected by the many women that work the “double shift” of
full-time employment (for less wages than men in equal positions) and full-time work in
the family (e.g. childrearing, housework, cooking). As previously mentioned, some
women do, on rare occasion, earn more than their male partners. Women in this situation
are still less likely to be involved in decision making within the family while also having
little control over familial finances (Tichenor 2005). The lack of autonomy in both the
family and the economy limits the autonomy of women, especially those in violent
relationships. In extreme cases, the constraining interactions of the family and the
economy create difficult choices regarding leaving these relationships because such
actions increase the likelihood of lethal violence (Campbell et al. 2003; DeKeseredy and
Schwartz 2009).
Polity also plays an important role regarding women’s marginalization in the
family. This is perhaps best highlighted through a discussion of the relationship between
the law and the criminal justice system’s response to violence against women. In Chapter
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1, the issues surrounding mandatory arrest, pro-arrest, and no-drop prosecution policies
were discussed. These policies look good on the surface but can neglect the fact that
many women have legitimate reasons for not pursuing prosecution4 (Ford 2003). Ptacek
(1999) has also revealed that women may experience a form of revictimization in the
courtroom, leading many to avoid using the courts in response to any subsequent
violence5. The failure by many to understand the complex realities o f women’s
victimization can lead to victim blaming regarding what is perceived as “irrational”
behavior like refusing to pursue charges against one’s male partner. Hence, polity has
been largely unsuccessful at social justice with both the liberal and welfare reforms o f the
law regarding domestic violence policies. Sorial (2011:30) summarizes these two models
of the law adequately in that:
[T]hey place the onus on women to assimilate to existing institutions that have
traditionally served the interests of men, but do little to challenge the nature o f the
institutions themselves. By treating men and women as the same, the liberal view
ignored genuine physical and social differences in a way that disadvantaged the
majority of women. By treating women as different, the welfare view risked
perpetuating the traditional stereotype of women as biologically domestic and
dependent. (Sorial 2011:30)

4 Reasons for not wanting to pursue prosecution can include fear o f backlash from the
perpetrator, loss of wages if the perpetrator is the primary breadwinner of the family, and
facing the embarrassment of reliving the violent experiences.
5 Fortunately, some research has found that state courts (i.e. domestic violence courts) are
not always patriarchal when they are progressively organized to benefit female victims of
domestic violence (Mirchandani 2006).
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Essentially Sorial is saying “equality” treatments of gender with liberal ideologies o f the
law fail to see structural gender inequalities, thus women’s shortcomings or failures are
explained as the failures of these individual women since the opportunities for their
success are assumed to be “equal” with those of men. Welfare views merely reinforce
the widespread ideology that women are dependent. In the area of violence against
women, many legal reforms that strive for “equal protection” (i.e. mandatory/pro-arrest
policies, no drop prosecution) ignore that broader institutions are gendered. Laws based
on mandatory arrest produce an overreliance on a gendered institution for “protection.”
More specifically, the criminal justice system does not define violence in gendered terms
and fails to relate to victims by ignoring their subordinated statuses in the family and the
economy (Ferraro 1993; Hearn and McKie 2010). Polity, in relation to the family,
reproduces power-dependent relationships with gender-blind policies aimed at “equality”
(Britton 2003; Vaughan 2002).
Many gender-blind domestic violence policies are rooted in philosophical
traditions regarding the public/private dichotomy. Kelly (2002) discusses the inherent
contradictions of many liberal theorists (mainly John Locke) that idealize the family (see
Acker 1992) as a source of individualism (and peace), free from public infiltration. At the
same time, the primary function o f the family is developing connections to the public
sphere (see also Fineman 2005). Kelly notes that domestic violence policy appears to
impede on women’s individualism/autonomy by requiring public infiltration from the
state. This occurs despite the fact that the state, she feels, is better suited to resolve
conflicts between people in the public (although informal social sanctions can also be
effective at resolving public crimes as well as domestic violence, see Sampson 2008;

Carmody and Williams 1987). Additionally, state intervention that relies so heavily on
the criminal justice system gives women only one real option for resisting the violenceleaving (Crocker 2010; Hearn and McKie 2008; Paterson 2009,2010). Yet, some women
may receive harsh criticisms for leaving because they are framed as failed wives for not
willing to “work it out” for the good of the family (see also Elshtain 1981). Furthermore,
gender norms typically frame individualism as a male characteristic and women that
leave these relationships are violating these norms. This is highly problematic for women
since notions o f individualism have grown tremendously over the last few decades.
Women’s identities are far less autonomous than men’s, being linked much more closely
to the family than men’s (see also Nicholson 1986; Pateman 1986; Raskin 2006).
Institutional Patriarchal Ideology and the Family. It was previously noted that
many institutional patriarchal ideologies o f the family contribute to violence against
women. One such institutional ideology is found in the construction of the family as
private. Thus, the overall cultural ideal that the family is autonomous from state
intervention is a patriarchal ideal when such ideologies create the opportunity for
violence and the illusion o f immunity for perpetrators of violence. Macro-level analysis
is needed to further expand on the connections between the family and the economy (see
the work of Vaughan 2002), but they are discussed here to briefly show how patriarchal
ideology is not solely the product of individuals.
Another common institutional patriarchal ideology related to the family is
reflected in ideologies about male patriarchs. The major ideology is that men are entitled
to be the “head o f the household” or head of the family. This authority can involve the
disciplining of children, decision-making, and the accepted use of violence when threats
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to such authority are challenged. Because the family is conceptualized as a subordinate
institution, the structural sources of institutional ideology often have tremendous overlap
with individual patriarchal ideology. It is important when trying to distinguish between
the two that one is aware of the overlap of the family with dominant social institutions.
The institutional overlap makes the embedded institutional patriarchal ideologies within
the family difficult to comprehend if one conceptualizes the family as isolated from other
institutions. For example, patriarchal ideologies about the family at the macro-level, such
as the ideology about women’s dependence, exist through a reciprocal relationship with
polity that serves to “support” women when they act in ways consistent with the
ideology.

CONCLUSION
This chapter provides clarification on two important macro-level concepts,
institutional patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideology. The dominant social
institution of the economy is where the exploitation of women and the opportunity
hoarding by men has had a tremendous impact on the autonomy o f women. The
subordinate institution of education also exploits women and limits their opportunities in
a way that directly impacts the broader institution o f the economy. The family is where
additional constraints on women’s autonomy are seen through idealized characteristics of
womanhood and manhood. These are similar to those idealized notions o f women and
men embedded within the economy. Polity, in theory, has the ability to act as a great
equalizer regarding women’s subordination. Yet many policies have failed to create
equality because they seek equality through gender-blind policies, thus failing to

recognize the patriarchal nature o f social institutions. Institutional patriarchal ideology
differs from the next chapter’s discussion on individual-level ideology in that it largely
centers on the ideologies of institutions embedded, produced (sometimes), and
maintained within these institutions. The next chapter examines patriarchal ideology at
the micro-level, and discusses its origins, manifestations, and changes.
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CHAPTER III
INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY

The discussion of patriarchy, thus far, has largely focused on institutional
manifestations of patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideology. Individual patriarchal
ideology exists at the micro-level, within individuals. Before discussing the
conceptualization of individual patriarchal ideology, this chapter reviews two areas o f
research regarding similar concepts: sex/gender role ideology and hegemonic
masculinities. Next, patriarchal ideology is conceptualized and past operationalizations
are discussed. Research that has empirically assessed patriarchal ideology in relation to
violence against women is then reviewed and critiqued. This leads to a final discussion
o f the need for more research concerning the etiological factors of individual patriarchal
ideology.
Two o f the main areas o f focus for this chapter revolve around sex/gender roles
and hegemonic masculinities. Much o f the research regarding these two concepts has
been empirically valid and reliable in a general sense. However, when explaining
violence against women, or ideologies regarding violence against women, these two
perspectives are fairly weak. The criticisms should not be seen as attacks on the concepts
in their totality but as critiques o f their relevance for a theory of patriarchy. Conceptual
clarity is needed since these terms overlap with individual patriarchal ideology.

SEX/GENDER ROLE IDEOLOGY
Sex is typically thought o f as the biological differences between men and women.
Sex roles are viewed as biologically-driven behaviors that are natural, fixed, and
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unchanging (Pleck 1987; Udry 2000). Common examples of biological sex roles are that
women are predetermined to be emotional, irrational, and nurturing whereas men are
predetermined to be rational, reasonable, and aggressive. Recognizing the nonexplanatory nature of this biological essentialism, feminist sociologists used the term
“gender roles” to help identify the social construction o f gender between men and women
in an effort to address structural gender inequality (Messerschmidt 2009; Messner 1998).
Sex roles and gender roles often get classified under the title “role-theory.” Sociologists
may use both terms interchangeably even if they describe the way roles are learned,
whereas psychologists are less likely to rule out biological factors that they believe may
determine roles (Lisak 2000). Therefore, psychological researchers may use “sex-role”
terminology more frequently than sociologists. Distinctions in the terms sex and gender
do not always translate into conceptual clarity regarding the terms sex roles and gender
roles. These distinctions are confounding, as Judith Lorber (1993) notes:
Neither sex nor gender are pure categories. Combinations of incongruous genes,
genitalia, and hormonal input are ignored in sex categorization, just as
combinations of incongruous physiology, identity, sexuality, appearance, and
behavior are ignored in the social construction o f gender statuses. (Lorber
1993:569-570)
Although sex role and gender role concepts may not always be distinct, within the
sociological research both describe the way in which males and females, men and
women, are socialized into accepting a given set o f traits in the creation of their
respective identities. This review of the literature will use the term “role analysis” in the
way that Komarovsky (1973) does, rather than “role theory” which implies a
manifestation within a formal theory regarding social roles. Keep in mind, prior
researchers and theorists have incorrectly used the terms sex and gender as if they were
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interchangeable (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2010). Since role analysts are guilty o f
doing this, this section reviewing their research uses the terms interchangeably, albeit
incorrectly, since the distinctions are often not drawn by many of these theorists.
Early role analysis on gender was heavily influenced by Talcott Parsons
(Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985; Kimmel 2000). Prior to this, gender differences and
gender inequality were largely accepted and justified as natural. Parsons (1947; see also
Parsons and Bales 1953) saw society divided into two major spheres: the economic (i.e.
“production”) and the family (i.e. “kinship”). In order for society to function properly,
people needed to be socialized into one o f two roles: instrumental roles and expressive
roles. He saw that these roles were socialized within the family and passed down through
generations. Thus, males fulfilled instrumental roles since economic functions were
assumed to require, “rationality, autonomy, and competitiveness” (Kimmel 2000:82).
Female roles were regarded as expressive, “which required tenderness and nurturing”
(Kimmel 2000:82). Parsons assumed that although these roles were learned in the
family, their etiology was natural. Role analysis eventually gave way to the androgyny
movement. Here, theorists acknowledged gender roles as learned and not biologically
determined. However, gender was conceptualized as an individual-level construct (i.e.
not socially constructed) and like Parson’s theory it was essentialist (Smiler 2004).
Nonetheless, role analysis dominated the historic sociological literature and later
psychological literature on sex and gender role ideology.
A slight divergence within the sex/gender roles framework emerged in the 1950s,
a byproduct of the early Parsonian sex role theory. With the early developments of
feminism, the 1950s brought about a time when men’s behaviors and attitudes were first
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critically assessed. This research highlighted “male role strain” l- mainly the difficulties
men faced in trying to live up to cultural ideals of being a male (Pleck 1981; 1995). Also,
“masculinity” was conceptualized by many under this framework as something inherent
and natural2. Many researchers, politicians, and activists at this time claimed that
feminism created a “crisis of masculinity” (for a review, see Whitehead 2002). These
men claimed to support the empowerment o f women while simultaneously arguing that
women’s liberation was detrimental to men. They speculated that women’s new roles
created many depressed, solitary men who found it difficult to cope with their newly
established roles (Whitehead 2002). Stephen Whitehead sums up this “crisis”:
That is, across many societies, most notably but not only in the Western world,
the idea that men are facing some nihilistic future, degraded, threatened and
marginalized by a combination o f women’s ‘successful’ liberation and wider
social and economic transformations has become a highly potent, almost
common-sense, if at times contested, understanding o f men at this point in
history. (Whitehead 2002:50-51)
Those that acknowledged the “crisis” use it as an explanation, if not justification, for the
backlash against feminism, a manifestation of the “men’s movement” (Beal 1997;
Dragiewicz 2008).

1 Similar concepts are still used in psychology such as: “gender role conflict” (Galligan et
al. 2010; O’Neil, Good, and Holmes 1995) and “masculine gender role stress” (Jakupcak,
Lisak, and Roemer 2002).
2 As recent as 2002 researchers still see this as physiological in explaining men’s violence
with their intimate partners as the result o f “higher levels of internal arousal” or increased
“heart reactivity” (Jakupcak, Lisak, and Roemer 2002).
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The major difference between sex/gender role-strain and sex/gender role-identity
is that strain theorists believe men’s behaviors are the result of structured socialization
(i.e. naturalistic responses to real or perceived social change created by the feminist
movement), whereas identity theorists believe m en’s behaviors are in their “masculine”
nature, irrespective to changing social conditions. Essentially, both explanations allow
men to neutralize their negative behaviors towards women by blaming women, biology,
or both.

Operationalizations o f Sex/Gender Role Ideology
Empirical measurements of sex/gender role ideologies are often highly variable
based on sex/gender role analysts’ differing conceptualizations of the term. As a result,
sex and gender roles are assessed in a variety of ways. One of the most common
measurements, at the individual level, is through questions regarding attitudes or beliefs
about appropriate roles for women and men. This is not to imply that any researcher
using a scale regarding sex or gender roles should be classified a role analyst or role
theorist in line with Parsons. However, as will be made clearer in the section regarding
individual patriarchal ideology, some o f these measurements share many o f the same
theoretical assumptions regarding gender as role theorists. The main measurement issue
that is detrimental to a theory o f patriarchy emerges when dynamics o f power,
domination, or inequality are not the primary measures (e.g. items from the General
Social Survey, see Ciabattari 2001; Mason and Lu 1988). Although some scales do have
useful indicators of patriarchal ideology, the totality of the scales often includes measures
inconsistent with the concept.
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A plethora of scales have been used or developed to measure ideologies o f or
attitudes about sex/gender roles. These scales include: “Attitudes Toward Gender Roles”
(Baxter and Kane 1995; Cassidy and Warren 1996), “Attitudes Toward Women”
(Spence, Helmreich, and Stapp 1973), “Attitudes Toward Women’s Roles” (Ciabattari
2001; Mason and Lu 1988; Wilkie 1993), “Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory”
(Mahalik et al. 2003), “Gender-Role Attitudes” (Carter, Corra, and Carter 2009; Dugger
1988; Rice and Coates 1995), “Gender Ideology” (Vespa 2009), “Hypermasculinity
Inventory” (Mosher and Sirkin 1984), “Liberal Attitudes Towards the Role of Women”
(Gibbins, Ponting, and Symons 1978), “Male Attitude Norms Inventory” (Luyt 2005),
“Sex-Role Egalitarianism” (Beere et al. 1984), “Sex Role Attitudes” (Ross 1987), “SexRole Inventory” (Bern 1974), “Sex-Role Ideology” (Kalin and Tilby, 1978), “Traditional
Male Ideology” (Wu et al. 2011) and “Traditionalism” (Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang
2005). It should be noted that some o f these scales share common names yet they can
have completely different measures from one another. For example, Carter et al. (2009)
and Rice and Coates (1995) each measure “Gender-Role Attitudes” but different
measures can be found in each scale. This list is provided to merely show the multitude
of scales attempting to measure attitudes or an ideology of “sex/gender roles”. This list is
not exhaustive as any search through the peer-reviewed social science literature will
return hundreds of different measurement scales o f sex/gender role behaviors as well as
attitudes/ideologies.
For illustrative purposes, Spence et al.’s (1973) “Attitudes toward Women Scale
(AWS)” is detailed since it is one of the more common measurement tools of patriarchy
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ideology when assessing its relation to domestic violence. Many indicators on this 25item scale could be used as reliable measures o f patriarchal ideology. A few o f these are:
Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for divorce.
Under modem economic conditions with women being active outside the home,
men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the
laundry.
It is insulting to women to have the “obey” clause remain in the marriage service.
There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promotion without
regard to sex.
A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.
Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to college than
daughters. (Spence et al. 1973:219)
These are all indicators that could be used in a measurement of patriarchal ideology
because they are all consistent with the current conceptualization o f individual patriarchal
ideology (see later in this chapter). Each indicator above either relates to power and
control and/or has a direct relationship to a social institution of power (i.e. the family, the
economy). However, other indicators within this scale include:
Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.
Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men.
A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to have the same
freedom of action as a man.
Women should be encouraged not to become sexually intimate with anyone
before marriage, even their fiances. (Spence et al. 1973:219-220)
The first indicator listed here this is not an appropriate indicator of patriarchal ideology
because it is not clear whether or not “masculine prerogative” is referring to a biological
condition of being male or a socialized property o f men. If an individual defines
“masculine” in a way that is similar with many sex/gender role analysts as a biological
characteristic, then this is problematic. That is, the very use of the word “masculine” as a
biological characteristic is essentialist, since behaviors that men overwhelmingly engage
in (i.e. telling dirty jokes) are seen as indicators o f “maleness” or “masculinity.” Thus,
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masculinity is conceived as a biological trait but operationalized with socially constructed
indicators (e.g. being aggressive, being independent, telling dirty jokes). Does
disagreeing with this statement mean one holds a negative attitude toward women or does
agreeing with this mean one considers this is an appropriate indicator of masculinity?
Additionally, the next statement about women’s intoxication is also inconsistent with
patriarchal ideology. It is unclear what this statement is trying to measure. One might
hold very pro-feminist views and think intoxication is worse for women because sociallyconstructed norms about drinking put women in difficult situations when they violate
these norms. Thus, it is unclear what is meant by the word “worse”. Worse in what
regard? The confusion concerning wording could also hold true for the third statement.
A pro-feminist individual may recognize that women should not expect the same
freedoms of men in social settings because they are aware o f public patriarchy.
Recognizing public patriarchy one would probably agree with this statement since they
recognize that women do not enjoy the same freedoms as men because o f gender
discrimination, not because they are not entitled to the same freedoms o f men. Finally,
the last statement may not provide an appropriate measure o f patriarchal ideology even
when the institution o f the family is noted. This is because many people may feel
strongly against sexual activity before marriage for both men and women. Whether it is
for religious reasons or concern over sexually transmitted diseases, there are many
reasons why people may support abstinence from sex before marriage for women, but
also for men. Not including a measure o f men’s pre-marital sexual activity makes it
unclear whether or not supporting this statement is related to a misogynistic identity. Yet
despite potential issues with the Spence et al. (1973) scale, this scale is still considered to
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be a measure of “patriarchal attitudes” by some (see Obeid, Chang, and Ginges 20103),
when its measures are more consistent with a more global concept of gender role
attitudes.
Clarity between ideologies about femininity and ideologies about feminism are
also important to discuss. Wilkinson (2004) measures “masculine gender-role beliefs”
and has an anti-femininity subscale. The anti-femininity scale has an item that states, “I
might find it a little silly or embarrassing if a male friend of mine cried over a sad love
scene in a movie” (Wilkinson 2004:124). In contrast to this, an item from a different
scale, the “attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement” contained a measure
regarding survey participant’s response to, “The women’s movement is too radical and
extreme in its views” (Fassinger 1994:395). Notice the difference between an anti
femininity measure and an anti-feminist measure. The former is often associated as a
role or trait and the latter is measuring attitudes about the political movement regarding
women’s equality, much more consistent with an individual patriarchal ideology scale.
The feminist movement itself is a political movement, therefore, attitudes about it are

3 These authors did include a dependent variable o f “Beliefs about wife beating”, which
included measures consistent with how patriarchal ideology should be measured.
However, the fact that these researchers considered patriarchal attitudes as a predictor of
beliefs about wife beating is problematic since patriarchal attitudes and ideology are
operationalized with measures of attitudes about violence against wives/partners (see
Smith 1990; later in this chapter).
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more appropriate than attitudes about femininity, which is more conceived as a biological
trait.
Before moving on, a brief mention of the potential relationship between one’s
gender-role identity and their attitudes towards women should be discussed. In other
words, if one agrees with the assumption that gender roles produce masculine or feminine
traits (which is best to think of as a continuum rather than a dichotomy) then it is possible
that one’s level of femininity or masculinity could predict their patriarchal ideology.
Suter and Toller (2006) found more feminine men and more masculine women were
more likely to self-identify as feminists and more likely to support the feminist
movement. This research demonstrates how self-identification with specific gender roles
can influence one’s attitudes towards women or the women’s movement (see also
Gallagher and Parrott 2011; Renzetti 1987). Rather than using a psychometric measure
o f gender role attitudes (which would need to include separate measures from patriarchal
attitudes), individual’s self-identification with a particular gender role may have
relevance in explaining individual patriarchal ideology.
The validity and reliability of many sex/gender role attitudinal scales such as
those used by Spence et al. (1973) appears to be strong. However, as the examples above
show, many sex/gender role attitudinal measures are invalid and unreliable as a measure
o f patriarchal ideology. This is due to inconsistencies between the concepts sex/gender
role ideology and patriarchal ideology. A discussion o f the major criticisms of
sex/gender role analysis will further help make the case for the salience o f patriarchal
ideology.
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Critiques o f Sex/Gender Role Ideologies
There are many obvious problems with the simplistic explanations o f gender
differences that come from role analysis. Such explanations: 1) ignore macro-level
power differentials by focusing too much on individuals, 2) normalize male roles in a
way that any male that is not middle-class, white, and heterosexual is considered deviant,
(i.e. ignoring multiple inequalities) and 3) assume these roles are static (Carrigan et al.
1985; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Kennedy and Lorber 2001; Kimmel 2000;
Komarovsky 1973; Messner 1998; Risman 2001).
The first and perhaps most important criticism is that role analysis fails to
acknowledge power differentials that exist outside of individual men and women (Stacey
and Thome 1985). The micro-level dynamics involved with the construction of male
identities (Pleck 1995) are meaningless without proper contextualization. Role analysis
ignores larger patriarchal institutions of power that could perpetuate gender inequalities
and gender differences. Thus, role analysis blindly accepts the socialization process that
occurs in the primary group of the family, while failing to critique the social institutions
that can structure the socialization processes. Families, after all, do not exist in a vacuum
separate from other social institutions. Along these same lines, role analysts fail to
discuss how individual agency can influence social structures (see Garfinkel 1967).
The second major criticism o f role analysis is that it takes for granted “multiple
inequalities” (Daly 1993; 1997). This is the acknowledgement that class-race-gender, or
“intersectionality”, are three interacting statuses related to stratification. Thus, role
analysis that classifies certain “traits” of being masculine or feminine ignore the “matrix
of domination” (Collins 2000) where gender roles intersect with other oppressive statuses
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(see also hooks 2000). Outside of race, role analysts also neglect the fact that
inequalities exist regarding class and sexual orientation.
The third important criticism o f role analysis is that it assumes individual’s sex
roles are static, or downplay potential change in them (Komarovsky 1973; Schilt and
Westbrook 2009). Even the more sociological gender socialization theories assume that
after around age five these roles are invariable to change (West and Zimmerman 1987).
Role analysts that refuse to acknowledge change in individual’s sex/gender roles are
assuming that these roles are identities for individuals. Towards the end of this chapter,
empirical research is cited that has shown how variations o f the concept patriarchal
ideology or gender role ideologies have not remained static.

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITIES
One perspective that has been especially critical of sex/gender role analysis is the
area known as hegemonic masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity theorists fill many o f
the gaps left by sex/gender role analysts in explaining gender inequalities. This concept
also notes the complex nature o f patriarchy as being more than just structural male
domination. It acknowledges the complexities of gender regarding masculinities and
femininities (Demetriou 2001).
The concept hegemonic masculinity emerged in response to role analysis in an
attempt to more accurately explain gender inequality. Raewyn Connell is the most
notable scholar that contributed to the development of this concept. She and her
colleagues state that hegemonic masculinity is, “a question o f how particular groups of
men inhabit positions of power and wealth, and how they legitimate and reproduce the
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social relationships that generate their dominance” (Carrigan et al. 1985:592).
Additionally, “culturally constructed relations are presented to appear natural to justify
present social positions” (Lusher and Robins 2009:388). Lastly, DeKeseredy and
Schwartz (2010) provide a solid overview of the main components o f hegemonic
masculinity as:
living up to the culturally defined role o f ‘breadwinner’ in heterosexual
marriage/cohabitation; avoiding things societally defined as feminine; severely
restricting emotions; showing toughness and aggression; exhibiting self-reliance;
striving for achievement and status; exhibiting non-relational attitudes toward
sexuality; and actively engaging in homophobia. (DeKeseredy and Schwartz
2010:159-160)
Hegemonic masculinities encourage and justify male dominance over women and operate
at individual and institutional levels (Connell 1995, 2002, 2008). This concept also
acknowledges that some men dominate not only women, but other men (e.g. homosexual
men, lower-class men, racial minorities). Hegemonic masculinity perspectives recognize
social institutions as settings for various masculinities. These perspectives note that
hierarchies of masculinities exist within different social institutions (see Carrigan et al.
1985; Connell 1995, 2008; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Donaldson 1993; Hearn
and Collinson 1994; Messerschmidt 2008).
An important emphasis made by Connell and colleagues is that hegemonic
masculinities are not individual-level traits that remain static (Connell 1995; Connell and
Messerschmidt 2005). The distinction is that hegemonic masculinities are relational
rather than attributes or character types. This is clarified in the work o f Lusher and
Robins (2009:390), “For example, concepts such as power and independence are
promoted as attributes of hegemonic masculinity that reside within the individual, when
both terms are better understood as relating to social relations between individuals.”
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They are seen as behaviors that are produced through structured social interaction
“associated with membership in particular social categories” (Daly 1997:37; see also
Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 1997).
Hegemonic masculinities are contextualized historically and institutionally, which
are both important components of an adequate theory of patriarchy (Hunnicutt 2009;
Walby 1990). They are also important for an adequate conceptualization o f patriarchy.
They are historically contextualized with an emphasis on individual-level change as well
as various macro-level historical shifts. Institutionally, hegemonic masculinities operate
primarily in most social institutions through “gender regimes” (Connell 2008).
Demetriou (2001) elaborates:
Within this framework, hegemonic masculinity is understood as a configuration
of practice but it is also seen as being institutionalized in large-scale gender
regimes, that is, as a process that involves both social structure and personal life.
Demetriou (2001:341)
Theoretical explanations for gender stratification in social institutions help explain how
micro-level relations contribute to the continued subordination of women within
dominant institutions. In this regard, hegemonic masculinity is based on “[...] actual
social practices rather than discussion of rhetoric and attitudes” (Carrigan et al.
1985:553). Similarly, West and Zimmerman (1987) developed the concept o f “doing
gender” to explain how gender is not based on rigid sex categories but is performed
through structured interaction. Using this same framework, researchers have argued that
when “doing masculinity”, the components o f hegemony related to masculinities involves
persuasion (mostly through gender stereotypes), the sexual division of labor, and the state
(Carrigan et al. 1985). To re-emphasize, role analysts completely ignore the fact that
actions can be structured or that individuals can shape larger institutions. In addition,
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some feminists have been so focused on structure that they reify patriarchy. Hegemonic
masculinity perspectives are instrumental in going beyond the dualistic agency/structure
dichotomy.

Operationalizations o f Hegemonic Masculinities
Hegemonic masculinities are often measured using qualitative methodologies.
Connell (1995) specifies ethnographies and ethnomethodologies as appropriate research
tools in the study of hegemonic masculinities. Also employing qualitative research
methods, Bird (1996) used in-depth interviews and field observations to examine how
hegemonic masculinities are sustained through the suppression of non-hegemonic
masculinities and femininities. While Connell (1995) never explicitly says “quantitative
methods”, she takes a strict stance against positivism. While Connell’s critiques of
positivism are noteworthy, it is a mistake to interpret this to mean hegemonic masculinity
(or individual patriarchal ideology) cannot be researched using quantitative methods,
which are not automatically “positivist” (see “Quantitative Analysis and Patriarchal
Ideology”). Few studies have measured hegemonic masculinities through quantitative
research designs (for exceptions see Lusher and Robins 2009; Wilkinson 2004).
Hegemonic masculinities are thought to be less essentialist than macro-level
patriarchal theories in that they specifically focus on the power of individual interaction.
The focus is not so much on patriarchal structures influencing behavior as it is on how
hegemonic masculinities are reproduced and legitimated through social interaction.
While behaviors may be influenced by ideologies and may sustain and reproduce
ideologies, it is unclear the exact importance of ideologies in the concept. Thus,
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empirical research regarding hegemonic masculinity focuses almost exclusively on
behaviors.

Critiques o f Hegemonic Masculinity
Various aspects of hegemonic masculinity aid in developing patriarchal ideology,
but the entirety of the concept may not always be useful in explaining violence against
women. This lies in the fact that hegemonic masculinity was developed to explain men’s
dominance over women and not strictly men’s violence against them (Connell and
Messerschmidt 2005). Thus, substituting hegemonic masculinities for patriarchal
ideology is problematic. The overlying theoretical perspectives have different
postulations and assumptions (see Gouldner 1970). There are four main reasons why
hegemonic masculinity cannot be incorporated directly in a theory o f violence against
women: 1) the lack o f conceptual clarity regarding behaviors and attitudes, 2) the fact
that hegemonic masculinity was originally conceived to explain broader forms of
women’s subordination rather than specific forms of oppression like violence against
women, 3) the failure to elaborate on the psycho-dynamics o f hegemonic masculinity,
and 4) weak discussions concerning the appropriate operationalization o f the term.
Perhaps the greatest criticism o f hegemonic masculinities is the conceptual
confusion between whether or not hegemonic masculinity is based on men’s behaviors
(“actual social practices”, Carrigan et al. 1985) or cultural ideals (“hegemonic
principles”) (Coles 2009; Hearn 2004; Howson 2008). As previously mentioned, the
original hegemonic masculinity theorists take a realist approach when they assert
hegemonic masculinities are based, “[...] on actual social practices rather than discussion

of rhetoric and attitudes” (Carrigan et al. 1985). Here, the theorists are trying to
differentiate the term from role analysts’ non-contextualized accounts of gender
identities. These identities largely involve men who hold attitudes about appropriate
gender roles. Yet the focus on agency was also used to avoid structural determinism in
showing the reciprocal relationship between structures and individuals. This is the notion
that structures constrain behaviors while at the same time behaviors serve to reproduce
structures (see Giddens 1984). While this reciprocal relationship is important for
understanding hegemonic masculinity, it does not make clear the role o f ideals.
The “hegemonic model” appears to “express widespread ideals, fantasies, and
desires” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:838), or what can simply be called cultural
ideals of what it means to be a man. With these ideas and beliefs, Connell and colleagues
do acknowledge that cultural constructions are an important factor in hegemonic
masculinities, particularly in addressing Collier’s (1998) critiques o f the concept. Collier
suggests that hegemonic masculinities are really cultural ideals and that the construction
of hegemonic masculinities cannot be solely relational. Responding to these criticisms,
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) note that research (although none is cited) has found
discrepancies between cultural ideals and actual practices in the daily lives of men and
boys. The authors argue that hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that are rarely
practiced by any real men, what they call complicit masculinities (Carrigan et al. 1985;
Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Confusion lies in whether or not the (in)action o f
men is a form of hegemonic masculinity since the authors insist hegemonic masculinity
must be based on men’s actual actions. The argument is also tautological in that the
authors are basically saying: hegemonic masculinities are sustained by complicit
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masculinities, which sustain hegemonic masculinities. The theorists, themselves, note the
overlap between the two can be expected, especially in social environments where
hegemony is effective (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). The failure o f the theorists to
make explicit cultural ideals in the theory is perhaps the reason why the authors believe
their apparent tautology is really just an “overlap” of two key concepts. Demetriou
(2001) concludes that complicit masculinities are cultural ideals since they are not based
on “actual social practices” that Connell and colleagues believe define hegemonic
masculinities. Overall, the lack o f conceptual clarity and the contradictions regarding
ideals and practice show why hegemonic masculinity is inappropriate to use as a theory
of violence against women in general or as a premise for patriarchal ideology
specifically.
Connell and colleagues make a valid point in that common cultural scripts of what
it means to “be a man” can produce a variety of different actions. There are problems,
however, in looking at cultural scripts as predictors of men’s behaviors. Such an
approach assumes that the cultural regimes are known by the men performing
masculinity. While social scientists have often noted that behaviors do not always
coincide with “cultural ideals”, perhaps these theorists should distinguish between
aggregate-level ideals and individual-level ideals. Chapter 2 discussed many different
institutional patriarchal ideologies, what hegemonic masculinity theorists would call
“gender regimes.” Whether or not social actions (which define hegemonic masculinities)
are determined by these gender regimes, or what I call institutional patriarchal ideology,
is never made explicit. At one point the gender regimes (e.g. cultural scripts, institutional
patriarchal ideology) are part o f hegemonic masculinity and at another they are not, since
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they are not based on actual social practices. Perhaps individual patriarchal ideology
explains social actions (or inaction) better than the links between aggregate gender
regimes and individual behaviors. The individual ideological components to hegemonic
masculinity, however, are not made explicit and at times the whole cultural scripts-tosocial actions link is contradictory. Additionally, the authors’ claim that masculinities
take on different meanings based on varying social structures have led some to claim the
concept is structurally deterministic (Whitehead 2002). Such conceptualization allows
any and all forms of men’s behaviors to be hegemonic masculinity, with institutions
determining what behaviors are or are not consistent with the concept.
The second major reason why hegemonic masculinity is not compatible with
patriarchal ideology is related to the first criticism in that hegemonic masculinities was
conceived in an attempt to explain men and masculinities and not specifically violence
against women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). When attempting to explain violence
against women, hegemonic masculinities appear essentialist. For example, men’s
violence towards intimate partners is explained as men “doing” masculinity. Yet most
men do not engage in violence or control tactics against their intimate partners.
Hegemonic masculinities are at play here for these non-violent men since they benefit
from other men’s use of violence in the broader patriarchal order. Essentially, violence
against women is a form of one type of masculinity that is maintained by a different type
o f masculinity- thus masculinity is used to explain all varieties of violence and non
violence against women. The issues here fall back on the theorists’ inability to
effectively establish the role of ideologies in relation to behaviors in their
conceptualization of hegemonic masculinities. This is essentialist in the same way many
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conceptualizations of masculinity are essentialist. All male behavior is seen as masculine
when masculinity (hegemonic or not) is supposed to “distinguish being masculine from
being a man” (Clatterbaugh 1998:39). If hegemonic masculinity differentiated between
ideals and actions (as well as between institutional ideals and individual ideals) it would
be a more viable concept for a theory o f violence against women.
The two components of hegemonic masculinity that may counter the claim that
hegemonic masculinity is not deterministic are individual psychologies and history. This
implies that individual psychologies are not fixed character types in the way role analysts
propose. To elaborate, examinations o f individual ideologies regarding hegemonic
masculinity or what it means for an individual to agree with broader cultural scripts about
“being a real man” do not assume that the men who hold these ideals are defined by
them- especially when analyzed over time. What is most problematic with hegemonic
masculinity theorists is that they assume men’s social actions that differentiate from
cultural scripts that define how they “should” act are not important to their theory. That
is, by focusing too much on social actions, cultural scripts (e.g. gender regimes,
institutional ideologies) and individual attitudes (i.e. individual patriarchal ideology)
become trivialized. This is perhaps the most reasonable explanation for why individuallevel empirical research showing specific attitudes regarding hegemonic masculinities
(even contextualized within institutions) is scarce (see Lusher and Robins 2009). Even
Connell (2002) discussed the importance of psychic dimensions of hegemonic
masculinity but she quickly reduced their importance by limiting the ways in which these
psychic dimensions can be operationalized. Connell notes that psycho-analytic positions
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should only be assessed with case-study methods. This leads into the overall myopic
treatment of research methodologies by Connell.
Connell (1995, 2002) limits the tools of any social scientist with her strict
adherence to qualitative methods. The main argument Connell makes is that positivistic
conceptualizations of gender assume that individuals do not change regarding their
masculinity. Basically, Connell believes positivism fails to see how “culture and context
actively shape how masculinity is performed and experienced” (Moller 2007:267). To
Connell, positivists that seek to describe different patterns o f men’s behaviors in a
particular setting and then go out and find these pre-defined patterns are reductionistic.
At the same time, these theorists are assuming, inaccurately, that these patterns they have
defined, and then found, are stable. They are assuming stability because they fail to
recognize that those behaviors are particular to that point in time and that particular
context. Additionally, like many post-structuralists (Hood-Williams and Harrison 1998;
Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Zimmerman 1987; Whitehead 2002), Connell is at
odds with positivistic definitions of masculinity that claim objectivity yet use “common
sense typologies o f gender [male/female dichotomies]” (1995: 69) when conceptualizing
gender.
Connell is right in that positivistic accounts of masculinity assume gender
relations are static when only looking at specific cultural contexts during specific time
periods. In a broader context, Connell might be right in that existing positivists do
assume traits and behaviors are static when they are conducting cross-sectional research.
However, Connell is wrong if she is closing the door on all quantitative methods because
she thinks they only focus on specific ideals at one point in time or that cross-sectional
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research is the only type of research quantitative methodologists conduct. Connell is
ignoring quantitative longitudinal research. Social scientists should use concepts that can
be measured, explored, and explained through any o f the scientific tools they have at their
disposal as long as the methodology is appropriate in regards to conceptualization.
Connell also disagrees with positivists’ conceptualizations o f masculinity. Moller
(2007:267) summarizes this criticism, “Masculinity is understood as referring to a
specific and already known set of qualities or attributes: for example, a greater access to
power, an exaggerated competitive ethos, etc.” Connell then argues that such definitions
lead to determinism since researchers define patterns o f masculinity and then “find” these
patterns in a deductive manner. Yet Connell’s theory has also been accused o f
determinism in that her theory also “sees” pre-defined patterns of masculinity (Moller
2007). The patterns that hegemonic masculinity theorists attempt to look for derive from
past research (from specific historical and cultural contexts) (Moller 2007). This shows
the contradictions in Connell’s own attacks against positivism since her
operationalizations of hegemonic masculinity follow many o f the same guidelines that
“positivist”, or really any deductive methodology does. It appears that a rigid resistance
towards non-qualitative methodologies makes hegemonic masculinities incompatible
with a theory of patriarchy for violence against women. After all, a variety o f reliable
methodologies are used by feminist researchers (DeKeseredy 201 la, 201 lb).

PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY
The focus on patriarchal ideology in this dissertation lies in the need to compile a
better understanding of patriarchy so that this concept can be utilized in a theory o f
violence against women. The argument is not that ideologies are any more important
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than behaviors in explaining violence against women or that individual patriarchal
ideology holds more significance than institutional patriarchal ideology. The reality is
many have failed to fully develop the concept patriarchal ideology. Researchers have
been myopic in past discussions of the topic. That is, many have reduced patriarchal
ideology’s importance to whether or not individual men that are violent towards female
partners have a strong patriarchal ideology. This section of the dissertation presents the
argument that individual patriarchal ideologies are important in explaining violence
against women, beyond their significance for individual perpetrators o f violence against
women. The conceptualization and operationalization of the concept is discussed, as well
as a brief review of past research examining patriarchal ideology in relation to violence
against women.

Ideologies, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs
Before moving on, it is important to discuss four concepts related to ideals about
patriarchy: ideologies, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Maio et al. (2003) compare and
contrast these concepts using perspectives from psychology. They state that attitudes are
“tendencies to evaluate an object positively or negatively” (2003:284). Values are
“abstract ideals that function as important guiding principles” (284). And, “ideologies
are systems of attitudes and values that are organized around an abstract theme” (284).
While beliefs are not a specific area o f focus, the researchers elude to beliefs the most
when discussing values. Essentially, attitudes and values are subcomponents of
ideologies. Using this framework, individual patriarchal ideology consists o f patriarchal
values like egalitarianism or misogyny. Patriarchal attitudes would be more specific and
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tangible such as attitudes towards the feminist movement or attitudes about the use o f
violence against a female intimate partner. Thus, it is important to note that while
patriarchal ideology is the broader concept of focus, the dimensions o f this concept
contain attitudes and values. Ultimately, researchers should obtain measures for both
dimensions, but because these concepts overlap considerably, not all operationalizations
need measures of both. Maio et al. (2003) summarize that all of these concepts are
individual biases, they can exist without individuals being aware o f them, and most
importantly, none exist separate from the other.
One of the few attempts to conceptualize patriarchal ideology in a practical
manner comes from Smith (1990). Smith conceptualizes patriarchal ideology in the same
way that Millett (1970; see also Dobash and Dobash 1977) did:
(a) a set of beliefs that legitimizes male power and authority over women in
marriage, or in a marriage-like arrangement, and (b) a set o f attitudes or norms
supportive of violence against wives who violate, or who are perceived as
violating the ideals of familial patriarchy. (Smith 1990:263)
“Marriage-like arrangements” could include cohabitating couples. Smith’s definition
should be expanded slightly. Ideologies about male power and authority over wives
and/or women in similar arrangements (e.g. fiances) should also include male power and
authority over women in dating arrangements. This inclusion provides a
conceptualization that is consistent with the conceptualization of violence against women
in this dissertation that includes dating relationships. Not surprisingly then, “(b)” in
Smith’s definition should include violence against not just wives, but girlfriends as well
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as former partners4. The inclusion o f former partners is important since violent
husbands/boyfriends may continue to stalk, harass, and/or physically assault former
partners.
Unlike gender-role ideology/attitudes that focus on attitudes about “natural” ways
o f doing things, patriarchal ideology is explicit in attitudes or beliefs about power and
control. Thus, it is assumed that many men hold fairly egalitarian attitudes about
women’s roles in the family and the economy. But with the focus placed on power in a
concept like patriarchal ideology, it is argued that this is far more important than simply
looking at ideologies about certain “roles.” For example, Cockbum (1991:73) states,
“Having more women in management, even women ‘doing things in womanly ways’ is
not the same thing as having feminists in control.” Cockbum further notes how
economic institutions are unlikely to change if women are placed in roles where they
have very little power and are merely tokens. This is relevant for the current study since
the argument being made is that institutional and individual power are what sustain

4 This creates a broader definition than Smith’s, meant to be inclusive of patriarchal
ideologies about men’s control of any intimate female partner, whether married or not.
Chapter 4 notes the methods in this study that use measures consistent with ideologies
about husband’s control of wives and Chapter 5 notes the methods that use measures
related to ideologies concerning rape of a dating partner. Keep in mind that an
individual’s patriarchal ideology about male control in marriage, relationships, or both
can exist regardless of one’s relationship status (although relationship status might
influence these ideologies).
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violence against women. If changing individual ideologies can indeed change the
broader culture and broader social institutions that support violence against women, then
they should hold far more relevance for a theory o f violence against women than
sex/gender roles that ignore power.

Direct Tests o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Feminist researchers have been at odds with many “gender symmetry” proponents
who claim empirical tests of the relationship between patriarchy and violence against
women is weak at best. Many researchers that support a “gender neutral” approach to
studying domestic violence frame the feminist perspective as: “patriarchy is a direct
cause of domestic violence” (e.g. Bell and Naugle 2008; Dixon and Graham-Kevan 2011;
Dutton 1994, 2006). The truth is, most feminist researchers did not and do not, say
patriarchy directly causes violence against women. Most agree that patriarchy creates the
environment that allows violence against women to occur and persist.
A handful of studies have looked at structural patriarchy (aggregate variables
related to women’s status in dominant institutions) and rates of domestic violence. For
example, Hunnicutt (2009:561-562) reviewed some 21 studies that analyzed the
relationship between structural patriarchy and rates of violence against women and
obtained mixed findings. Thus, as new research techniques and new theoretical insights
emerge, hopefully the structural relationships can reach more definitive conclusions.
Researchers like Dutton (1994, 2006) suggest feminist researchers are committing
the ecological fallacy since patriarchy is a structural variable that cannot predict
individual behaviors. Although Dutton is right in his interpretation of the ecological
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fallacy, he is wrong in his conceptualization of patriarchy, which makes his critique o f
feminist research unfounded5. More recently, Corvo and Johnson (2010:304-305)
discussed that many state-sponsored policies regarding domestic violence operate under
the assumption that patriarchy causes domestic violence and they even cite "The State o f
New York Standards fo r Interventions with Men Who Batter” to support this. Yet they go
on to read part of these state standards, “Domestic violence is rooted in a patriarchal and
sexist society that structurally and systematically discriminates against women based on
their gender, with the imbalance o f power between women and men as its foundation.”
Like Dutton, Corvo and Johnson are misinterpreting or misrepresenting the relationship
between patriarchy and woman abuse. By saying this policy is based on the simplistic
assumption- patriarchy causes domestic violence- these researchers are confusing
causality with context. Thus, saying the structure o f patriarchy allows for violence
against women or that violence against women is “rooted” in patriarchy is not the same

5 Dutton (1994) stood by this, even after reviewing Smith’s (1990) research, which he
gives little value to since more than half of Smith’s sample o f women reported that their
husbands were not patriarchal. He also discredited Smith’s research since he “only”
explained 20% o f the variance in his regression model for his study, whereas Dutton’s
own research (Dutton and Starzomski 1994) that included psychological variables
explained 50% o f the variance. Besides the fact that Dutton is placing far too much
weight on variance explained (see Lieberson 1985), comparing the amount of variance
different variables are capable of explaining holds little value when the research is from
entirely different data.
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as saying it directly causes it. Corvo and Johnson note that researchers are “often”
confused as to the exact definition o f patriarchy. Ironically this is something that
confuses these researchers since they assume patriarchy as a contextual factor in domestic
violence is the same thing as a causal factor.
This dissertation has consistently referenced empirical research that
conceptualizes patriarchy as a multi-level concept, existing structurally, ideologically,
and individually. This conceptualization is consistent with numerous researchers’
conceptualizations used in the past (see DeKeseredy 201 la, 201 lb; DeKeseredy and
Schwartz 1993; Dobash and Dobash 1977, 1979, 1992; Hunnicutt 2009; Millet 1970;
Ogle and Batton 2009; Smith 1990). While patriarchy may be a contributing factor to
men’s violence against women, feminist researchers do not assume patriarchy causes
violence against women. Even at the individual level, it is not assumed that individual
patriarchal ideology causes domestic violence, but instead they are seen as motivating
factors, risk factors, or correlates of men’s violence. Causal relationships are often very
difficult (if not impossible) to determine in the social sciences. However, a criterion for
any causal analysis is that there must first be a correlation. Additionally, causal
relationships may hold true for less than half of all individuals from a sample. That is, a
causal relationship can exist when there are exceptional cases, even when the number o f
exceptional cases (non-causal cases) makes them the norm. Because o f these two
important requirements of causality, it is important to review past research that has used
both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques assessing individual patriarchal
ideology as a predictor of men’s violence.
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Literature Reviews Assessing the Relationship between Patriarchal Ideology and Female
Partner Assault
There are four major systematic reviews that have assessed the empirical
literature’s findings regarding numerous variables as predictors of men’s use o f violence
against a female partner. In chronological order, the reviews are: Hotaling and Sugarman
(1986), Sugarman and Frankel (1996), Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997), and Stith et al.
(2004). Each of these has a section regarding the significance of patriarchal ideology6 as
a predictor of male-perpetrated partner violence. Table 3.1 provides a summary o f the
research reviewed within all four of these reviews. As the table shows, some o f the
research in these reviews overlaps and appears in multiple reviews. Overall, 29 studies
have examined the relationship between patriarchal ideology and men’s violence. Table
3.1 shows each o f the 4 systematic reviews’ overall findings regarding the key concepts
related to patriarchal ideology and men’s use of violence. These numbers are explained
more fully when discussing each individual review below.

6 Each review is different but often the concept “patriarchal ideology” is used
interchangeably with concepts like “gender-role attitudes.” In the ensuing paragraphs
discussing each individual review, the exact concept used by the reviewers is noted.

Table 3.1. Aggregate Results of 4 Major Systematic Reviews Assessing the Relationship between Men’s “Patriarchal Ideology” and
Violence against Women

Review

Hotaling and
Sugarman
(1986)

Sugarman
and Frankel
(1996)

HoltzworthMunroe
(1997)

Stith et al.
(2004)

Concept Reviewed
(Number o f Studies)
Traditional Sex-Role
Expectations (8)

Studies
finding
Significant
Relationship
with VAWe
2/8 = 25%

Author’s Conclusion
The only consistent non-risk
marker

Peer-Reviewed
Studies
3/8

Peer-Reviewed
Studies Actually
Measuring
Patriarchal
Ideology
0/3

Peer-Reviewed,
Measuring Patriarchal
Ideology and
Significant with
VAWe?
N/A

Acceptance of
Violence Toward
Women (2)
Violence Attitudes (5)

1/2 = 50%

Insufficient data

1/2

0/1

N/A

3/5 = 60%

Abusive men more likely to
have violent attitudes

3/5

3/3

3/3 = 100%

Gender Attitudes (10)

3/10 = 30%

Mixed findings

7/10

1/7“

1/1 = 100%

Attitude Toward
Women/Sex-Role
Attitudes (8)

5/8 = 63%

Mixed findings

8/8

2/8b

1/2 = 50%

Attitudes Toward
Violence (5)
Attitudes Condoning
Violence (5)

5/5 = 100%

5/5

2/5

2/2 = 100%

4/5 = 80%

Significant relationship with
VAWe
Strong effect sizes

5/5

4/5

3/4 = 75%

5/7 = 71%

Moderate effect sizes

7/7

l/7d

1/1 = 100%

Traditional Sex Role
Ideology (7)

Notes: “There were 5 studies that included consistent items with patriarchal ideology but combined these with items inconsistent with patriarchal
ideology. 'There were 2 studies that had patriarchal ideology items but combined these with items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. There
was 1 study that had patriarchal ideology items combined with other items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. Tour studies had patriarchal
ideology items combined with other items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology and 1 study had behavioral items that could be considered
patriarchal, but not consistent with patriarchal ideology.eVAW = violence against women.
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Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) provided the first study that systematically
reviewed the research on bivariate associations related to domestic violence. This study
assessed a wide-variety o f variables related to domestic violence, which was feasible
since empirical research on domestic violence was still in its infancy during the time this
study was published. The two most relevant predictors for the current research are
“traditional sex-role expectations” and “acceptance of violence toward women.” Overall,
2 out of 8 studies found “traditional sex role expectations” were predictive of wife
assault. Hotaling and Sugarman concluded that this was, “the only consistent nonrisk
marker among male characteristics” (114). In other words, 75% o f the reviewed studies
found “traditional sex role expectations” were not predictive of men’s use o f violence.
Hotaling and Sugarman’s research is actually the weakest o f the 3 reviews. Taking out
the non-peer reviewed research, just three studies assessed the correlation o f “traditional
sex role expectations” with men’s partner violence perpetration. O f these, one showed a
measure entirely consistent with sex-roles (Coleman, Weinman, and Hsi 1980). Another
study combined measures of patriarchal ideology and gender roles into the same
dimension (Rosenbaum and O’Leary 1981). The last of the three used original measures
to form their “Sex-Role-Stereotype Scale”, but never disclosed the individual items that
make up the scale. Since not one of the three peer-reviewed studies actually looked at a
concept of patriarchal ideology, it is not possible to determine whether or not this is
significantly related to men’s use o f violence.
There were just two studies in the Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) review that
assessed “acceptance of violence toward women” as a significant variable related to
men’s use of violence. This concept might appear to represent patriarchal
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attitudes/beliefs better than “traditional sex-role expectations”, but it too is undefined.
One of the two studies, by Browning (1983), was not from published research. The
second study that assessed the acceptance of violence toward women (Dibble and Straus
1980:73) had an item that referred “to respondent’s attitude towards couples slapping
each other.” This measure, however, was not consistent with patriarchal ideology.
The biggest inconsistency with these measures is the lack o f identification as to
who in the relationship is the primary aggressor. It is o f the utmost importance in
measuring patriarchal ideology one’s agreement or disagreement with men's violence
against a partner is present. While one’s acceptance of other forms o f violence may also
be important including female perpetrated violence, an approach that is non-gendered is
likely to have weak or null findings with gendered concepts (i.e. domestic violence). On
a lesser note, it is important that measures that ask about the approval o f violence note
situations where it may or may not be acceptable. If the violence was in response to a
woman violating her “traditional role”, then this would be consistent with patriarchal
ideology. If it was more vague, such as Kantor, Jasinski, and Aldarondo’s measure
(1994:212), “Are there situations that you can imagine in which you would approve o f a
husband slapping his wife?” then it would not be less-consistent with patriarchal ideology
due to a lack in precision (i.e. context). Hence, one could justify violence for any
situation against any person. Specificity is needed to assess the context for the assault o f
an intimate partner.
In short, this systematic review o f “52-case comparison studies” (Hotaling and
Sugarman 1986:101), when examined closely, only contained three studies that assessed
“traditional sex role expectations” in relation to men’s use o f intimate partner violence.
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O f these, none included measures consistent with patriarchal ideology/attitudes.
Regarding “acceptance o f violence toward women”, only one of two studies were from
published research and it included measures inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. In
fairness to Hotaling and Sugarman (1986), the inclusion of fairly weak or unreliable
research was most likely a reflection of the year the review was conducted, since
domestic violence research was really just starting to get underway in the early to mid1980s. However, these researchers failed to acknowledge the weakness o f using non
peer-reviewed research in their review and failed to differentiate conceptual discrepancies
between their concepts and between each reviewed study. In short, not a single study
reviewed by Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) could conclude anything about the
relationship between patriarchal ideology and m en’s use o f violence. The basic criteria
of a study that should be included in such a review is that it should be: 1) peer-reviewed
and 2) it should include items actually consistent with patriarchal ideology. Related to
the second criterion, these studies need to not combine measures of patriarchal ideology
with concepts containing clear distinctions (i.e. Rosenbaum and O’Leary 1981).
Hotaling and Sugarman (1986:119) equated “sex role inequality” with
“patriarchal beliefs” as well as the desire for “power and control.” While they reviewed
research that lacked measures o f attitudes or beliefs specific to patriarchy, the researchers
still used these terms interchangeably. The equal status given to patriarchy beliefs and
sex roles is problematic. For example, Bell and Naugle (2008) failed to critically assess
this review when they cited Hotaling and Sugarman as empirical evidence against
feminist theories of domestic violence. The failure to acknowledge that Hotaling and
Sugarman’s research was dated, used a majority of non-published research, and failed to
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include any studies that even measured patriarchal ideology, are points that are clearly
overlooked by Bell and Naugle. Epistemological progression for the domestic violence
field is likely to fall to the wayside if researchers blindly accept the current state of
knowledge in this field.
A decade after the Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) review was published, a more
rigorous review (i.e. meta-analysis) was conducted by Sugarman and Frankel (1996).
This review was directly related to the current topic as evidenced in its title, “Patriarchal
Ideology and Wife-Assault: A Meta-Analytic Review.” These researchers noted, “Three
distinct sets o f measures are used to assess patriarchy ideology: attitudes toward violence,
gender attitudes, and measures of gender schema” (15). Overall, they found that men’s
attitudes toward violence were strongly and significantly related to men’s violence in 3
out of 5 studies. However, if one were to look at just the peer-reviewed studies (3), 3 out
o f 3 peer-reviewed studies had measures consistent with patriarchal ideology and all 3 of
these found patriarchal ideology to be significantly related to VAW. The significant
relationships were found in: Eisikovitz et al. (1991), Saunders et al. (1987), and Smith
(1990)7.
Regarding what they called “gender attitudes”, only 1 of 10 studies measured a
concept with items strictly related to patriarchal attitudes, which was the research from
Smith (1990)8. Seven studies that were reviewed under the rubric “gender attitudes” used
broader measures of gender-role attitudes that had some specific items consistent with

7 Smith’s patriarchal beliefs dimension.
8 Smith’s patriarchal attitudes dimension.
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patriarchal ideology, but these items were combined other items that were not consistent
with patriarchal ideology. A study that contained items entirely inconsistent with
patriarchal ideology was from Crossman, Stith, and Bender (1990). The review, overall,
had the same issue as Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) in that it included non-peer
reviewed research (i.e. conference presentations, doctoral dissertations). This made it
difficult to know the exact measures and/or specific findings from each. The last
concept, gender schema, was focused on individuals’ gender identities, something that
has been shown to be inconsistent with the current conceptualization o f patriarchy
(because of this, the studies they reviewed specific to this concept are excluded from
Table 3.1 and are not discussed).
Regarding attitudes towards violence, three studies (Eisikovits et al. 1991;
Saunders et al. 1987; Smith 1990)9 included measures consistent with patriarchal
ideology and all three showed these were predictive of violence against one’s female
partner. Thus, the most direct and consistent measure o f patriarchal ideology appears to
be a significant predictor of men’s use o f violence against a female partner. It appears
Sugarman and Frankel’s research, during the time of its publication, was able to
determine that research up until that point had shown little support for gender attitudes as
a predictor of men’s violence. However, the research these authors reviewed was not
appropriate for making determinations about patriarchal ideology. O f the few studies that

9 Two other studies were included that assessed “violence attitudes”, however, these two
studies (Browning 1983, had two separate dimensions o f violence attitudes) are from
unpublished sources so the specific measures and outcomes are unknown.
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did reflect patriarchal ideology, all suggested that patriarchal ideology was a significant
predictor of men’s use of violence.
A third major review o f the literature comes from Holtzworth-Munroe et al.
(1997), who summarized the “empirical correlates of marital violence.” Although they
did not conduct a meta-analysis like Sugarman and Frankel (1996), they did benefit from
the strength of only including published research. Specific to the current study, Table 3.1
summarizes the two major concepts they reviewed- attitudes toward women/sex-role
attitudes and attitudes toward violence. The first o f these, attitudes toward women/sexrole attitudes, contained many studies already reviewed by Sugarman and Frankel as part
of their concept “gender attitudes.” The findings on this first concept reviewed were
mixed as well (as were their measures’ consistency with patriarchal ideology).
Additionally, attitudes toward violence were also mixed and contradictory.
Holtzworth-Munroe share many similarities with other studies reviewed in this
section. For starters, the attitudes toward women/sex-role attitudes are, in general, not a
conceptual term that should be equated with patriarchal ideology. Indeed, after reviewing
these studies, the authors labeled this concept “conservative sex role belief’ (where some
studies measured entirely sex-role attitudes, others patriarchal attitudes, and others
included a combination of each). Unlike some studies that measured “sex-role attitudes”,
yet called them “patriarchal beliefs” (e.g. Hotaling and Sugarman 1986), HoltzworthMunroe et al. did not make this mistake. They did, however, fail to acknowledge that
many different concepts were being measured in their category of “conservative sex role
belief.” Attitudes toward violence were also highly variable throughout this review.
Although all five studies that included this concept were predictive o f attitudes toward
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violence, in fairness, only two (Saunders et al. 1987; Stith 1990) were consistent with
patriarchal attitudes.
In a more recent and more rigorous meta-analysis, Stith et al. (2004) discovered
that attitudes condoning violence and traditional sex-role ideology were both significant
predictors of violence against a female partner. Table 3.2 shows, how, much like the
previous reviews discussed, the “sex-role ideology” concept had a wide-variety o f
operational definitions and was not as robust of a predictor as attitudes condoning
violence.
Despite the more rigorous and more recent review from Stith et al. (2004), some
“gender symmetry” proponents (e.g. Bell and Naugle 2008; Dutton 1994, 2006; Scott
2004), cite these systematic reviews as evidence that patriarchal attitudes, and patriarchy
in general, does not adequately explain domestic violence. Others suggest that because
the evidence is mixed and because patriarchal attitudes are not the most salient predictor
of men’s violence, the feminist approach to researching “partner abuse” has little basis
(Dixon and Graham-Kevan 2011). These conclusions are also drawn because these
researchers are misrepresenting correlation analyses with causal analyses. Discounting
feminist arguments because empirical research shows patriarchy does not cause violence
against women is misleading since feminists do not argue causality and data assessing
associations/correlations cannot determine causality. These inaccurate conclusions are
drawn because these researchers have also uncritically accepted measures o f sex/gender
role attitudes as indicators of patriarchal ideology.

Table 3.2. Research Studies from Four Major Systematic Reviews Looking at Patriarchal Ideology as a Predictor of Violence against
Women

PeerReviewed
Publication?

Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997)
D. Stith et al. (2004)

Noa

B

Nob

A, B

Nob

A, B

Nob
Noa

A, B
A

Carrillo (1984)
Coleman, Weinman,
and Hsi (1980)

Noa
Yes

B
A

Crossman et al. (1990)

Yes

B, C

Dewhurst et al. (1992)
Dibble and Straus
(1980)

Yes

D

Yes

A, C

Dutton (1995)

Yes

D

Research
Barnett and Sweet
(1986)

Browning (1983)

Caesar (1985)

Measures Consistent
with Patriarchal
Ideology?

Predictor o f VAWd?

Original Measures
Adversarial Sexual Belief
Scale (Burt 1980)
Approval o f Violence
Scale (Burt 1980)
Sex-Role Stereotyping
Scale (Burt 1980)
Unknown
Attitudes Toward Marital
Violence (Saunders 1979)
Sex-Role Inventory (Bern
1974)
Sex-Role Egalitarianism
Scale (Beere et al. 1984)
Acceptance of
Interpersonal Violence
Scale (B urt 1980)

No

Unknown

No

Unknown

Yes

Unknown

Mixed
Unknown

Unknown
Yes

Mixed
No

Unknown
No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Original Measure
Psychological
Maltreatment o f Women
Inventory (Tolman 1989)c

No

Yes

No

Yes

Measures

00
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Research

PeerReviewed
Publication?

Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997)
D. Stith et al. (2004)

Eisikovitz et al. (1991)
Hampton and Gelles
(1994)
Hanson et al. (1997)

Yes

B

Yes
Yes

D
D

Hurlbert et al. (1991)
Johnston (1984)

Yes
Noa

D
A

Johnston (1988)

Yes

B

K antoretal. (1994)

Yes

C

La Violette et al. (1985)

No*

B

Margolin (1988)
Neff et al. (1995)

Yes
Yes

B
C

Neidig et al. (1984)

No*

A

Measures

Measures Consistent
with Patriarchal
Ideology?

Predictor o f VAWd?

Inventory of Beliefs
about Wife Beating
(Saunders et al. 1987)

Yes

Yes

Mixed
Yes

Yes
Yes

Mixed
Unknown

Yes
No

Mixed

No

No

Yes

Unknown

Unknown

Mixed
Yes

No
No

Unknown

No

Original Measures
Original Measures
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)
Unknown
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)
President’s Commission
on the Causes and
Prevention o f Violence
(Owens and Straus 1975)
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)
Sex-Role Attitudes
(Mason 1975)a
Traditional Sex-Role
Orientation (Markides
and Vernon 1984)
Unknown
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Research

PeerReviewed
Publication?

Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997)
D. Stith et al. (2004)

Neidig et al. (1986)
Rosenbaum and
O ’Leary (1981)
Rouse (1984)

Yes

B, C

Yes
Noa

B, C, D
A

Saunders et al. (1987)

Yes

B, C

Yes

B, C, D

Yes

C

Yes

C, D

Smith (1990)

Stith and Farley
(1993)

Yes

C, D

Telch and Lindquist
(1984)

Yes

A, C

Walker (1984)

Yes

B

Measures
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)
Unknown
Inventory of Beliefs
about Wife Beating
(Saunders et al. 1987)
Original Measures
Sex-Role Egalitarianism
Scale (Beere et al. 1984)
Inventory of Beliefs
about Wife Beating
(Saunders et al. 1987)
Sex-Role Egalitarianism
Scale (Beere et al. 1984)
Original Measures
Attitude Toward Women
Scale (Spence et al. 1973)

Measures Consistent
with Patriarchal
Ideology?

Predictor of VAWd?

Mixed

Mixed

Mixed
Unknown

No
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Unknown

Yes

Mixed

Yes

Notes: Studies in bold reflect research that was published in a peer-reviewed publication and had measures consistent with patriarchal
ideology. aconference presentation (as cited in Sugarman and Frankel 1996). bdoctoral dissertation. cbehavioral measure of emotional
abuse and the only behavioral measure among the studies in this table. dVAW = violence against women
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These conclusions stem in large part from a poor understanding o f patriarchy.
“Gender-neutral” approaches, such as these, often fail to understand that patriarchy is
conceptualized as having micro and macro components. Additionally, these researchers
have a poor understanding of feminist theories of violence against women. Feminist
researchers in the domestic violence field do not hold on to this mythic notion that
patriarchy is the only viable explanation for men’s use o f violence against current or
former intimate partners. For example, DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz (2007:877-878),
note that, “unemployment, globalization, deindustrialization, life events stress, intimate
relationship status, familial and societal patriarchy, substance use, male peer support,
and other factors” [emphasis added] contribute to violence against women.
Besides ignoring the micro and macro components o f patriarchy, past research has
also made the mistake of equating patriarchal ideology with many concepts that have far
different definitions. The conceptual murkiness exists in past research trying to
differentiate between a plethora of closely related (but different) concepts such as: gender
attitudes, sexist attitudes, traditional sex-role attitudes, conformity towards masculinity
roles, etc. Separating out the different dimensions o f global concepts like gender
ideology is an important task (Mumen, Wright, and Kaluzny 2002). The reviews that
combine all of these concepts together to get a broad overview of “gender ideology” are
losing the complexities of more specific concepts like patriarchal ideology. This is an
important point that has been completely ignored by gender-neutral approaches, such as
Straus (2009:257) who states, “evidence linking sexism (i.e., holding traditional attitudes
toward women) to partner violence in general is weak (Moore and Stuart 2005; Sugarman
and Frankel 1996).” The work Straus is citing from Moore and Stuart (2005) reviews

89
research measuring “masculine gender roles” (2005:56) (not consistent with patriarchal
ideology). The second citation is from the aforementioned Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
review that includes far more studies measuring “gender attitudes” with very few studies
that measured patriarchal attitudes. Straus, however, is not the only researcher that has
accepted the Sugarman and Frankel (1996) study as evidence against treating domestic
violence as a gendered phenomenon.
Scott (2004:267) notes, “Despite the strong influence of feminist ideas on batterer
programs, cross-sectional and longitudinal research has provided, at best, mixed evidence
for the importance of men’s patriarchal attitudes for predicting abusiveness.” She goes
on to cite some research showing a relationship between patriarchal attitudes and
violence perpetration. But, she quickly attempts to discredit them. She states, “[...]
Sugarman and Frankel (1996) concluded that adult batterers could not be differentiated
from nonabusive men on the basis of traditional gender attitudes (i.e., sexism) or gender
schemas (i.e., masculinity).” Like many uncritical researchers, Scott blindly accepts the
meta-analysis from Sugarman and Frankel (1996). A critical or feminist framework
shows what Table 3.1 does in that o f the ten studies assessing this relationship; just one
actually includes a consistent measure of patriarchal ideology (i.e. Smith 1990, which
does show a significant relationship). Her poor understanding of patriarchy is shown in
how quickly she goes from “traditional gender attitudes” (largely consistent with
patriarchal ideology) to equate this to “sexism”, “gender schemas”, and “masculinity”
(which are conceptualized differently from patriarchal ideology). Sexism involves
negative attitudes about women, but not always in relation to power and control. Also,
masculinity and gender schemas are often conceptualized as biological traits. Perhaps

90
Scott is unaware about the differences between sex and gender and especially gender as it
relates to power and control (i.e. patriarchy).
In short, the research looking at patriarchal ideology as a predictor o f violence
against women has rarely measured patriarchal ideology in an appropriate way. It is
important to use operationalizations of patriarchal ideology consistent with this term.
Examination of the relationship between these ideologies and men’s use of violence is
important since so few studies in the past have done this in a way that properly measures
individual patriarchal ideology. It is important to note, however, that while some of the
later data analyses do include violence as an outcome variable, others treat patriarchal
ideology as the dependent variable. The argument here, as made earlier, is that in
research concerning violence against women, patriarchal ideology is important because
its presence alone can create an environment that conducive to violence against women.
The etiology of individual patriarchal ideology is essential in order to take proactive
approaches that seek to change the cultural environment that condones, promotes, and
encourages men’s patriarchal control of women.

Operationalization o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology: Relevant Measures from Past
Research
Mumen et al. (2002) conducted a meta-analysis reviewing research that examined
“masculine ideology” in relation to sexual aggression. Although this concept sounds
consistent with conceptualizations of masculinity that are usually centered on biological
roles, they discussed specific, key concepts consistent with patriarchal ideology. While
the outcome variable in the research in this meta-analysis was not necessarily domestic or
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relationship violence against women, the 39 studies reviewed included more relevant
measures for patriarchal ideology than those coming from past research looking at
gender/sex roles as predictors of domestic violence. The measures most relevant are:
dominance/power over women, hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, and
acceptance of violence against women. Overall, these four concepts from past research
include items consistent with the current conceptualization of patriarchal ideology.
Dominance/Power over Women. This first component of patriarchal ideology in
Mumen et al.’s (2002) review includes two measurement scales from past research.
Malamuth (1986) conceptualized “dominance as sexual motive” to include items given to
a male sample regarding, “the degree feelings of control over one’s partner motivate
sexuality” (956). Also, Lisak and Roth’s (1988) scale measured “underlying power” or
“the need to assert” (797) one’s self on a woman. Similar items can be used when
operationalizing patriarchal ideology since these measures include items that make either
dominance or power over women explicit.
Hostile Masculinity. Mumen et al. (2002) define the term hostile masculinity as
similar to “hostility toward women” (Check et al. 1985; Malamuth et al. 1991)10. More

10 Mumen et al. (2002) also mention the term “hypermasculinity” (see Mosher and Sirkin
1984; Mosher and Tomkins 1988) but unfortunately this concept is too inclusive. It has
three major dimensions: calloused sex attitudes towards women, violence being seen as
“manly”, and danger as exciting. The first of these is relevant, but the second is not in
regards to violence towards women and the last measure, in general, is consistent with
psychological constructions of masculinity.
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specifically, this concept is defined by Malamuth et al. (1995) as containing, “a) an
insecure, defensive, hypersensitive, and hostile-distrustful orientation, particularly
toward women, and b) gratification from controlling or dominating women” [emphasis
added] (354). The second part of this obviously overlaps with the previous concept o f
dominance/power over women, but the first has tremendous use in measuring patriarchal
ideology because it notes specific hostility towards women. A role theorist might look at
one’s “attitudes towards women” (e.g. Spence et al. 1973), but the “hostility” or anger
that is specifically aimed at women in this sense is consistent with patriarchal ideology.
It makes explicit the gendered dynamic o f the attitude (i.e. the respondent does not just
possess a personality trait that makes them have negative or positive attitudes about
people in general).
Rape Myth Acceptance. The acceptance of rape myths has tremendous overlap
with power and control, as rape itself is an extreme, direct form of power and control.
Rape myths typically involve the following: women lie about being raped, women that
are raped deserve it (e.g. appearance, actions), men that do rape are acting on biological
drives, and/or men that do rape suffer from mental deficiencies (Allison and Wrightsman
1993). There is also considerable overlap between rape myths and “attitudes about
violence against women” since rape is a form o f violence (at times called “sexual
violence”). Numerous studies have used reliable measures o f “attitudes toward rape and
sexual coercion” (Patton and Mannison 1995), such as the “Rape Myth Acceptance
Scale” (Burt 1980), or “Acceptance of Modem Myths about Sexual Aggression Scale”
(Eyssel and Bohner 2008). An example of an item in these measures consistent with
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patriarchal ideology would be “If a girl consents to making out and she lets things get out
of hand, it is her own fault if her partner forces sex on her” (Burt 1980: 223).
Acceptance o f Violence against Women. This concept is not explicit in the
Mumen et al. (2002) review, but is a major component to the current operationalization
o f patriarchal ideology borrowed from Smith (1990). As discussed earlier, this term has
considerable overlap with rape myth acceptance since rape is a type of violence against
women. The argument is not being made that these two types of violence must be
operationalized as separate dimensions of patriarchal ideology. One o f the first
“Acceptance of Interpersonal Violence Scales” (AIV) used a one-factor solution (Burt
1980; see also Koss and Dinero 1988). However, Ogle, Noel, and Maisto (2009) found
that a two-factor solution with one factor related to intimate partner violence and another
about attitudes of sexual violence were more reliable than the single-factor
operationalization (see also Saunders et al. 1987). Unfortunately, this current research is
limited because it does not have enough indicators to operationalize acceptance o f
violence and rape acceptance/rape myth acceptance separately. Future
operationalizations of patriarchal ideology should consider multi-factor latent variables
for these and the other two potential dimensions o f patriarchal ideology. As Chapter 4
will show, they are currently considered as part o f the same dimension.
Power and Control. Before moving on, it is wise to provide more conceptual
clarity regarding power and control in relation to patriarchal ideology. Thus, while the
definition of patriarchy emphasizes men’s control over women in the family, among
other institutions, this does not mean that every abusive man is powerful and dominant in
his intimate relationships. Contrarily, violent men are often responding to a lack o f power
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in the family or other institutions (Websdale 2010). Whether or not power and control
are obtained does not negate the importance of these concepts if they are motivating
factors for violence. Thus, supporting the use o f violence against a female intimate
partner is consistent with patriarchal ideology because the violence is used as an attempt
to gain or reinforce power or control. The current conceptualization o f patriarchal
ideology is therefore appropriate since it rests on ideals that support the patriarchal
system and on ideals that support the use o f violence against women, regardless of
whether or not the violence reflects the perpetrator’s success at obtaining power or
control.

Potential Sources o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Past research has found that male peer support approving violence against
intimate partners is related to individual patriarchal ideology (DeKeseredy and Schwartz
1993; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997; Smith 1991), while also relating to sexual
aggression (Malamuth et al. 1991). More specifically, this means men that have strong
patriarchal ideologies influence their male friends’ ideologies by condoning physical and
sexual abuse of women. DeKeseredy’s (1988) original model of male peer-support
suggested that men in dating relationships would seek out male peers for relationship
advice. While the male peer-support model has been elaborated to include other
predictors of violence against women (see DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993), the salience
o f male peers remains (see also Schwartz and DeKeseredy 2000). Thus, any theoretical
assessment of individual patriarchal ideology should include measures o f male peer
support for violence against women.
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Discussions concerning the influence o f peers on attitudes and behaviors in the
criminological literature reveal considerable disagreement about the appropriate causal
order for an appropriate predictive model. In general, there have been debates within
criminology about the direction of peer influence on attitudes and/or behaviors. One side
of the debate centers heavily on social learning perspectives in that individuals with
“normal” ideals obtain negative definitions/attitudes from associating with peer groups
that hold negative ideals (Akers 2009). Others believe individuals with negative
definitions are first drawn to other individuals with negative definitions and they then
form groups that hold similar views with themselves (Costello and Vowell 1999;
Matsueda and Anderson 1998). Specifically focusing on male peer’s support for negative
definitions about women, past research has found that men that have negative definitions
or have engaged in violence against women are more likely to seek out peer groups that
support these actions, which subsequently would lead to a stronger male peer group
reinforcement of these attitudes (Kanin 1967; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). Thus,
there is more support suggesting negative attitudes about women are present before one
forms a male peer group that reinforces these negative beliefs about women. This
suggests that development of reliable measures o f patriarchal ideology must include an
adequate theoretical model that reflects the appropriate causal order of male peers and
patriarchal ideology.
Individual patriarchal ideology is believed to develop primarily in the family,
what was previously referred to as familial patriarchy (DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b;
Dobash and Dobash 1979; Millet 1970). The family is the primary location where many
male children learn to legitimize male power. They may learn that domestic work is for
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women, husbands should dominate wives, fathers should dominate children, and women
should serve men (Johnson 1997; Messerschmidt 2000; Pateman 1988). The previously
discussed conceptualization of patriarchal ideology by Smith (1990) focused on familial
patriarchal ideology. Smith’s research found that lower income men, men with little
education, and men in low-status jobs were more likely than males that scored higher in
these three areas to have strong ideologies regarding familial patriarchy. It is likely that
children that witness domestic violence or are themselves victims of child abuse develop
strong patriarchal ideologies. That is, since most children that witness domestic violence
or are abused themselves do not become abusive, they may, alternatively, develop strong
patriarchal ideologies associated with the family.
DeKeseredy and Kelly (1993b) found that men with strong ideologies o f familial
patriarchy were more likely to be abusive o f their female dating partners when these
ideologies were supported by male peers. These findings highlight the importance o f
male peer support, but they also suggest that the direct effect of familial patriarchal
ideology on violence is mediated by supportive male peer groups. Thus, a theoretical
model of these relationships might start with early childhood experiences with familial
patriarchy directly influencing patriarchal ideology, which influences male peer support,
which then predicts adulthood relationship violence (then feeding back to patriarchal
ideology).
Past research has also found familial patriarchy may be influenced by religion.
Reviewing research looking at individual identification of Christian denominations,
Davis and Greenstein (2009) found that conservative Protestants are the least supportive
of gender egalitarianism, with Catholics and moderate Protestants in-between, followed
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by Jewish individuals as the most egalitarian. Although this research was reviewing the
use of more global measures of “gender ideology”, rather than patriarchal ideology, the
overlap of both concepts (as previously discussed) suggests that religiosity may be an
important variable to consider when assessing the etiology o f patriarchal ideology. As a
social institution, many religious institutions are based on patriarchal doctrines (Holland
2006). Since the current focus is on individual patriarchal ideology, the focus will remain
on individual-religiosity rather than specific individual’s religious denominations.

Operationalizations o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology over Time
Many studies assess some broader form of “gender ideologies”, “attitudes toward
the family provider role” or “gender role attitudes” 11 over time using the General Social
Survey (GSS) (e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Carter et al. 2009; Ciabattari 2001; Liao
and Cai 1995; Mason and Lu 1988; Rice and Coates 1995; Wilkie 1993). These studies
are primarily concerned with comparing change in gender role attitudes among men and
women or among specific birth cohorts. Unfortunately, these studies use measures from
the GSS that do not emphasize power regarding gender attitudes (e.g. Mason and Lu
1988; Ciabattari 2001). In other words, the measures are largely inconsistent with the
previously conceptualized patriarchal ideology. Another problem with the research using

11 These studies typically assess changing attitudes about both women’s roles in the
economy and women’s roles in the family. Fan and Marini’s review (2000) notes that
over time, there have been more accepting attitudes towards women regarding their roles
in the economy than in the family.
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the GSS to assess the changes in these attitudes over time is that these studies are not able
to assess individual-level change longitudinally because each year the GSS samples
different respondents. Also known as a trend study, these research designs are often
considered cross-sectional since they cannot account for individual-level change, just
aggregate trends over time.
Past research assessing individual patriarchal ideology over time often includes
measures inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. Fan and Marini (2000), Vespa (2009),
and Davis (2007) each used measures from the National Longitudinal Survey o f Youth
(NLSY), which were consistent with gender role-attitudes, not patriarchal
ideology/attitudes (e.g. power not made explicit, no measures regarding the acceptance of
violence against women). Similarly, Cunningham et al. (2005) used data from the
Intergenerational Panel Study of Parents and Children (IPSPC), which included 8 items
assessing “gendered roles” that were inconsistent with patriarchal ideology.
Almost no research exists that has used longitudinal research designs treating
individual patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable. Malamuth et al. (1995) did look
at the direct effects of attitudes supporting violence against women (a proxy measure o f
patriarchal ideology) on hostile masculinity. The former, however, is much more
consistent with the current conceptualization of patriarchal ideology, than the items that
compose hostile masculinity. Thus, whether it is longitudinal or not, many researchers
have failed to explore the etiology o f patriarchal ideology (e.g. Malamuth et al. 1991; Wu
et al. 2011). This appears to be true for broader measures o f gender ideology as well
(Davis and Greenstein 2009), suggesting ideologies about gender, in general, are often
taken for granted.
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Quantitative Analysis and Patriarchal Ideology
This study utilizes quantitative measurements and analyses o f individual
patriarchal ideology. Barkan (2009) called out critical criminologists for doing the field a
disservice in discrediting the value of quantitative research. This same criticism applies
to feminist researchers that try to discredit quantitative methodologies about gender and
more specifically about violence against women (e.g. Dobash and Dobash 1979) because
they feel qualitative methods are “more feminist” (DeVault 1996:35). The reality is
feminist theory and feminist inquiries do not require a distinct methodological orientation
(Hughes and Cohen 2010; Risman 1993). Many feminist researchers do employ
quantitative methodologies (e.g. Chafetz 2004; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1998; Hester,
Donovan, and Fahmy 2010; Katz 2000; Saunders 1990; Smith 1990; Yllo 1990) and
qualitative methodologies (Campbell and Wasco 2000; DeKeseredy 201 la; Hughes and
Cohen 2010). One of the mainstays o f domestic violence research, the “gender
symmetry” argument, has been exposed using quantitative methods (e.g. DeKeseredy and
Schwartz 1998; Rennison and Welchans 2000; Russell 1990; Tjaden and Thoennes 2000)
as well as qualitative methods (e.g. Browne 1987; Dobash and Dobash 1979; Kelly
1990). The current research is quantitative and feminist in three major ways: 1) it does
not conform to unrealistic notions from many positivists, 2) the variables and theoretical
models are obtained and constructed from past feminist research, and 3) feminist insights
are used to interpret the data analyses.
Doing quantitative research is not synonymous with “doing positivism.” In fact,
reducing quantitative methods to positivism is simplistic (see Undurraga 2010). Whereas
a positivist believes a causal model should reflect reality or “truth” with zero
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measurement error, quantitative methodologists are often aware that models are not truth,
but are “specified” and parameters are “observed” (see Ulmer and Spencer 1999). For a
quantitative researcher, measurement error is acknowledged and considered to be one of
the difficulties in trying to quantify social realities, whereas a positivist sees measurement
error as a shortcoming of the researcher’s methodological techniques. Quantitative
methodologists attempt to obtain and analyze data in an objective manner while
recognizing that they have their own worldview that may influence how they do this.
Positivists, on the other hand, believe “real-science” is completely value-free, largely
ignoring the human element to data collection and data analysis. These assumptions are
shown to be myopic below, but it is important to repeat that quantitative methods should
not be reduced to positivism.
The quantitative methods and analyses that follow this chapter use variables
obtained largely from feminist research. For example, the proxy measures o f male peers
are based on the empirical findings of feminist researchers Schwartz and DeKeseredy
(1997) (see also DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993).
Another example is seen in the fact that the operationalization of patriarchal ideology is
based on the quantitative work o f another feminist (Smith 1990).
The quantitative analyses avoid what Mills (1959) called “abstracted empiricism.”
That is, feminist insights are used to interpret the findings in a way that contextualizes the
research historically (through an understanding o f the time periods in which the data were
collected) and structurally (through an understanding o f the social structure in which the
individual data were obtained). The current research is not trying to present itself as
“value-free” simply because it is quantitative. Risman (2001:610) claimed, “Feminist
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scholarship expresses a commitment to science with and from a value position.” Despite
some researcher’s claims, no research is “value-free” (see Becker 1967; Griffin and
Phoenix 1994). An example o f how a feminist standpoint is being utilized is seen when
drawing on the previously reviewed research looking at the relationship between
individual men’s patriarchal ideology and its relationship with woman abuse.
Researchers with non-feminist, non-critical standpoints that try to assess these
relationships come the conclusion that there either is or is not a relationship between the
two and leave it at that. Most feminist-oriented researchers, however, would recognize
that the direct relationship of patriarchal ideology with violence is probably not very
strong in samples derived from the general population considering violence is not typical
of most men. Feminist positions would recognize that the ideologies play a bigger role in
violence against women. They would recognize that there are variations in these
ideologies, along a continuum, and that the ideologies are probably normalized. To
borrow from Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), most men have a complicit masculinity.
The dismissal of individual patriarchal ideology by many psychologists is a reflection of
both their non-feminist standpoint and their own value positions. In relation to the latter
of these two, one might find it regressive for different researchers’ value positions to
debate the appropriate way of interpreting empirical realities. However, pretending to be
“value free” and “gender-blind” when assessing intimate partner violence is a bias in and
of itself, which values the status quo and is blind to inequality. While one may
understand that those that come from the establishment want to preserve their positions of
power with their worldviews, I choose to take the side o f the subordinate in the way
Howard Becker (1967) proposed. The subsequent data analyses stick to the tenets o f
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unbiased statistical data techniques. However, the interpretations of this data through a
feminist lens, most certainly is biased. This “bias” is far more likely to see the empirical
realities regarding concepts related to patriarchy, since mainstream (i.e. gender-neutral)
approaches have historically failed to.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a clear conceptualization o f individual patriarchal
ideology by differentiating it from the similar concepts: sex/gender role ideology and
hegemonic masculinities. Individual patriarchal ideology differs from role analysts’
accounts of gender/sex role ideology in three major ways: prioritizing power,
acknowledging change, and getting away from identity and personality traits that define
individuals. Patriarchal ideology is centered on power, whereas gender ideologies are
centered on gender identities or roles. The emphasis on power was the strength of the
hegemonic masculinities research and is extremely useful in defining individual
patriarchal ideology. The conceptual uncertainty regarding hegemonic masculinity as
either an ideological or behavioral mechanism makes it difficult to use in a theory of
violence against women that gives so much importance to patriarchal ideology
(Hunnicutt 2009). The operationalization o f patriarchal ideology in past research using
this term, or closely related concepts, are discussed to show the necessary measures when
researching patriarchal ideology. Few researchers have assessed the predictive variables
of patriarchal ideology and have only considered the ideology as important in assessing
its own direct influence on men’s use o f violence. The few research studies that have
considered the predictive variables o f patriarchal ideology (or similar concepts) have
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helped in building the theoretical model of individual patriarchal ideology used in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME
USING ATTITUDINAL MEASURES FROM A TEST/RETEST PANEL DESIGN

Before describing the methods used for the first major data analysis, it is
important to discuss the overall framework regarding the data analyses in this
dissertation. The current chapter, Chapter 4, presents the methodology regarding the use
of a two-wave panel design assessing relationship violence and patriarchal ideology.
This is followed immediately by Chapter 5, which includes the results of these analyses.
Chapter 6 presents the methodology regarding the use of latent growth-curve modeling
assessing relationship violence and patriarchal ideology over time. This is followed
immediately by Chapter 7, which includes the results of the methods discussed in Chapter
6. Because this dissertation fills gaps in the research regarding the assessment of
patriarchal ideology in fairly unique ways, the results o f each chapter are discussed
inclusively in Chapter 8. This is done primarily for two reasons: 1) some of the
methodological/data shortcomings in one analysis are accounted for in the other and 2)
both analyses provide an empirical and holistic understanding of patriarchal ideology in
ways that can further develop this concept as a theoretical tool in understanding violence
against women.
As discussed below, both analyses come from the same larger longitudinal
dataset, but because the key variables o f interest were not present at each wave o f data
collection, the analyses had to be mutually exclusive. The current chapter describes the
data used as a test/retest panel design. The key variable of interest, patriarchal ideology,
was measured using attitudinal measures and because this differs from the analyses in
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Chapter 6, patriarchal ideology will be referred to in this chapter and Chapter 5 as
patriarchal attitudes as a way to distinguish these measures from later analyses.

DATA AND SAMPLE
The data comes from the Longitudinal Study o f Violence against Women:
Victimization and Perpetration among College Students in a State-Supported University
in the United States, 1990-1995 (White, Smith, and Humphrey 2001; for a full Technical
Report see White and Smith 2001). The research was funded by a National Institute of
Health (NIH) grant to study the risk o f sexual and physical assault among college
students. Incoming college students were surveyed during student orientations and were
integrated into student orientation activities so that almost every student that attended
orientation (about 50% of incoming freshmen) would participate. Phone surveys were
administered to the remaining students that did not attend orientation. This led to roughly
83% of the population of incoming students being included.
Respondents were told o f the study’s purpose and consent forms were completed
prior to survey distribution. Identifying information was obtained for each respondent so
that they could be contacted for each follow-up survey. In order to ensure confidentiality,
each of the sheets that contained identifiers were assigned a random number. This
number appeared on each answer sheet rather than the individual contact information in
order to maintain confidentiality.
After the initial wave of data were collected prior to starting the first year o f
college, subsequent waves of data were obtained around the end of each spring semester.
Thus, from Wave 1 (pre-college) to Wave 2 (end o f the first year of college) is sometimes
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referred to as a “year” follow-up point, but is technically referring to academic school
year as the appropriate time metric. Various methods of contact were used to remind
students about their voluntary participation in the study. Students that were no longer
attending the university were contacted and invited to complete the survey through the
mail. Students were paid $15 for their participation in the survey for each follow-up.
Although both males and females were surveyed, this current study is only
concerned with the sample of males regarding their individual patriarchal ideology.
Overall, three cohorts of college men were surveyed over five waves of data using an
accelerated/cohort-sequential longitudinal design. The cohorts were all combined into
one data set (as the original researchers did, see White et al. 2002; White and Smith
2009). For reasons discussed below, just Waves 1 and 2 were used for this chapter and
Chapter 5. Overall, Cohort 1 (1990 incoming year) had a sample size of 336, Cohort 2
(1991 incoming year) had a sample size of 311, and Cohort 3 (1992 incoming year) had a
sample size of 204. Thus, the total sample size at Wave 1 was initially 851. These were
the full numbers from each cohort, prior to sifting through cases that had useable data
(discussed below) and this is why Table 4.1 differs from these values. Combining
cohorts allowed the primary metric o f time for assessing change to be years in college
(pre-college, end o f freshman year). It was hypothesized that no cohort interactions
would exist due to the closeness in years between each (i.e. drawn from the same sample
o f incoming college students), however, sensitivity analyses did check for potential
interactions.

Table 4.1. Sample Size for Valid Responses for each Data Point for Cohorts 1 and 2
Wave 1
Pre-College

Wave 2
End of 1st
Year

Retention
Percentage

Cohort 1

332 (1990)

245 (1991)

74%

Cohort 2

304(1991)

241 (1992)

79%

636

486

76%

Combined Cohorts 1 & 2
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Missing Data
Like most longitudinal research, attrition occurred. For the entire study, the
yearly retention average was 71% (White and Smith 2001:40). There were missing
responses that presented some confounding issues. Mainly, they centered on the removal
of the key dependent variable from the surveys after the third year, not the third wave*.
In other words, in 1992, these items appeared for the last time. So, three waves o f data
were collected, but Cohort 1 (1990, 1991, 1992) was the only one that had data points for
all three waves, with Cohort 2 having two data points (1991 and 1992), and Cohort 3 with
only 1 data point (1992). Due to the fact that change values would have been either
completely estimated or imputed, Cohort 3 was not included in the panel design analyses.
Also, because of the large amount o f “missing” (i.e. missing by design) cases at Wave 3,
this data point was deleted. While change could be analyzed for at least one cohort, this
is difficult for two major reasons: a small sample size at Wave 3 for Cohort 1 due to
attrition (n = 178) and unreliable measures of patriarchal ideology2. Additionally, 10

1 In the original study, the items used to assess patriarchal ideology were dropped
because “current research” (current during the time of data collection) had found that
patriarchal ideology was not a significant predictor of sexual coercion, the main outcome
variable for the original researchers. (Jackie White, email correspondence, November 11,
2011 ).

2 The items that made up the patriarchal ideology attitudinal measures had unreliable a
values at Wave 3 (a - .301). Various checks were assessed (e.g. coding o f items, inter
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cases had item non-response for the key dependent variable at both waves and were
deleted. Thus, the total sample at Wave 1 was 636 and at Wave 2 it was 486. O f the total
number of cases, less than 5% of respondents provided just 1 response to the dependent
variable at either wave (operationalized with 4 items per wave). These cases remained
since it was assumed that they were missing completely at random (MCAR) (see Little
and Rubin 1989). The remaining cases that were lost due to attrition were assumed to be
MCAR as well, thus not related to the outcome variable3.
MEASURES
All of the variables used in various analyses are described in this section. Every
variable name is the same for Wave 1 and Wave 2, with the number 1 or 2 after the label
to indicate the data point. When referring to the variables in general (or in hypothesized
figures) they are presented without the 1 or 2 at the end of the label.

Patriarchal Ideology
The operational definition of patriarchal ideology was similar to Smith’s (1990) in
that it included attitudinal items regarding an agreement or disagreement with a set o f

item correlations, looking at just the 178 cases) to determine the nature o f this, but no
reasonable explanation could be determined.
3 To support this assumption, an independent samples t-test was performed comparing
mean differences in the key outcome variable (i.e. patriarchal attitudes) between those
that dropped out of the study and those that were present for both waves. Results
indicated there were no significant differences between the two.
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items that legitimate male power and authority over women and/or a set o f attitudes or
norms supportive of violence against women. The items were four questions measuring
“Acceptance of Male Heterosexual Violence”, a subscale o f a broader “gender attitude
inventory” (26 total items) from unpublished research (Ashmore and DelBoca 1987, as
cited in White and Smith 2001). Because these items were drawn from an unpublished
study and the original researchers collecting the data did not address the specific
questions for this subscale, these measures were not directly known. Thus, the
descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 include the 4 questions that were most consistent with
patriarchal ideology4. The second item listed in the table, “A man is sometimes justified
in hitting his wife,” was discussed in Chapter 3 regarding these types of items as being
fairly inconsistent with the operational definition of patriarchal ideology. This measure
did not make the mistake of using gender symmetry and wording the violence as “a
partner” hitting the other (see Chapter 3 for more). However, it did not provide the
context for the violence. Despite this, because gender was made explicit, the decision
was made to keep this item as an indicator o f patriarchal ideology, although it was less

4 There were 5 items, but one was not reliable when combined with the others (Wave 1 a
= .601, Wave 2 a = .573) and was excluded. This item was “In forcible rape, the victim
never causes the crime.” The unreliability o f this item was found after it was reverse
coded to remain consistent with the other responses in the scale. It was unclear why this
specific measure reduced the scale’s reliability.
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specific than preferred. The variable labels for these at Wave 1 were: hitwife, askforit,
herfault, and crywolf. At Wave 2 they were: hitwifel, ask4it2, herfaull, and crywolfl.
Regarding normality, two of the indicators at Wave 1 had a positive skew and one
o f the indicators at Wave 2 had a positive skew. These items were not transformed
whenever patriarchal attitudes was modeled as a latent variable. This was because the
two indicators with normal distributions at Wave 1 were thought to “even out”, in a
sense, as indicators o f a latent construct, because half (Wave 1) and more than half
(Wave 2) of the other items were normally distributed. At times, due to the complexity
of some analyses, a composite measure of patriarchal attitudes was used. The composite
measure was non-normal for each data point, so the decision was made to take the In
function of this variable to induce normality. The composite measure is presented in all
figures and tables as “Patriarchal Attitudes” (“Pattitudes” when space limitations are
present). All analyses involving the composite measure are the normalized In version of
this scale. The latent variable for patriarchal attitudes uses the same label, and in all
relevant structural equation models where it is a latent construct, it is clearly modeled
with an ellipse, indicating it as such.

Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Patriarchal Attitudes
Wave 1 (Pre-College)
Survey Item3

Variable

n

In most cases, when a woman gets
raped she was asking for it.

askforit

613

1.96

1.00

A man is sometimes justified in
hitting his wife.

hitwife

610

1.72

If a woman is making out and she
lets things get out o f hand, it’s her
own fault if the man forces sex on
her.

herfault

615

Most charges of “wife beating” are
made up by the woman to get back
at her husband.

crywolf

Composite o f all 4 itemsb

Patriarchal
Attitudes 1

Mean

Wave 2 (End of Freshman Year)
skew

a

SD

Variable

n

Mean

1.08

askforit2

489

2.62***

1.29

-0.33

1.05

1.40

hitwife2

487

1.91***

1.08

-1.23

2.33

1.02

0.52

herfault2

489

2.64***

1.10

-0.21

614

2.34

0.97

0.45

crywolf2

488

3.08***

1.23

-0.03

608

8.33

3.02

0.81

Patriarchal
Attitudes2

486

10.26***

3.45

-0.07

SD

.737

skew

a

.695

*** Paired Samples t-test indicates statistically significant difference in means from Wave 1 to Wave 2 p < .001.
Notes:a Responses were reverse coded from their original codes so higher scores would reflect more patriarchal responses. Recoded
responses ranged from “ 1- Disagree Strongly” to “5- Agree Strongly”. Composite scales ranged from 4- lowest level of patriarchal
ideology (i.e. more egalitarian) to 20- highest level of patriarchal ideology (i.e. more patriarchal).b Listwise deletion was used for the
creation of each composite scale, however, full sample size is shown since later analyses used maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation
for missing values.
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Constant Variables/Time-Invariant Measures
Three dichotomous variables were treated as constants or time-invariant
measures: race, witnessing domestic violence as a child, and religiosity. Frequencies for
these items can be found in Table 4.3.
White. Race was obviously a constant variable. As seen in Table 4.3, the
majority of the sample was white. Although there were other racial groups identified in
the original research, so few respondents identified as being non-white that these
individuals were grouped together5. Because whites were coded 1, the variable label for
race was “White.”
WitnessDV. Whether or not the respondent ever witnessed domestic violence
between their parents while growing up was included, called Witness Domestic Violence
(or WitnessDV when space limitations are present). This measure was assessed at Wave
1 with the item, “For an average month, indicate how often one of your parents or
stepparents delivered physical blows to the other.” Response options were: 1- Never, 2One to five times, 3- Six to ten times, 4- 11 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. Because o f the
ordinal nature of this variable and because so few respondents had witnessed domestic
violence, this variable was dichotomized (0- No, 1- Yes witnessed domestic violence
growing up).

5 The available data had three race categories (i.e. white, black, other). Black was the
second most frequent racial group (roughly 8% o f the sample), but because this number
was still too small in regards to statistical power, the decision was made to group black
and other racial group (less than 6% o f the total sample) together as “non-white.”
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Religious. The last constant variable measured whether or not the respondent was
religious. This was initially captured by asking, “How much of an influence would you
say religion has on the way you choose to spend your time each day?” Response options
were: 1- No influence, 2- Some Influence, 3- Fair amount o f influence, 4- A great deal of
influence. Because responses were skewed, the item was dichotomized into: 0- not
religious, 1- religious. Admittedly, a single, dichotomous item to represent a concept like
religiosity is not as robust as multiple indicators or ordinal responses. For these reasons,
religiosity might best be thought of as a proxy measure. Although religiosity was
measured at both waves o f data, there was so little variation from Wave 1 to Wave 2 the
decision was made to treat this as a time-invariant measure, using responses from Wave 1
only. This measure is presented simply as “Religious.”

Time Variable Measures
In addition to the control variables listed above, Table 4.3 gives the frequencies
for the other independent variables in the theoretical model(s). Below is a brief
discussion of each.
Sexual Assault Program Attendance. A question was asked regarding whether or
not the participant had ever attended a sexual assault awareness program. This variable
was labeled SAP and was dichotomized (0- No, 1- Yes). This was the only item that
could be considered both time variable and time invariable. That is, respondents that said
yes at Wave 1 could not undo the fact that they attended a sexual assault program. Since
later analyses will use maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation for missing values, it is not
necessary to impute values for the 147 missing cases at Wave 2 due to attrition.
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However, the wording of this question allowed values to be implemented for 19 o f the
147 cases lost to attrition because these respondents said “1- Yes” to this question at
Wave 1. Since a yes response is constant, these 19 values were manually changed since
they were a much more reliable value at Wave 2 than later ML estimates. When space
limitations are present, this variable is presented as “Sex Assault Program” or “SAP”.
Interestingly, 54 respondents said in Wave 1 that they had attended a sexual
assault awareness program, but at Wave 2 they said they had not. Two potential options
are presented here: (1) leave the Wave 2 responses alone or (2) re-code Wave 2 responses
to a Yes. The first of these would assume that respondents had a better understanding of
what a sexual assault awareness program was after their first year of college and realized
that they were mistaken at Wave 1. The second option assumes that respondents at Wave
2 misunderstood the question to ask “during the past year...” whether or not they had
attended a sexual assault program and re-coding no responses to a yes accurately reflects
if they have ever (in a lifetime) attended a sexual assault program. The choice was made
to go with the second option o f re-coding Wave 2 “No” responses that were a “Yes” at
Wave 1 to a “Yes” at Wave 2.
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Table 4.3. Frequency Distributions of Independent Variables

Variable
Constants (Time-Invariant)
White
0- Other
1-White
Witness Domestic Violence
0- Never
1-Yes
Religious
0- Not Religious
1- Religious
Time-Variant
Sexual Assault Program
Attendance
0- Never
1-Yes
Single
0-No
1-Yes
Frequent Dater
0- Almost never/Occasionally
dated
1- Frequent Dater

Wave 1 (Pre-College)
n
Percentage

Wave2 (End of
Freshman Year)
n
Percentage

84
524

13.8
86.2

561
51

91.7
8.3

242
392

38.2
61.8

480
110

81.4
18.6

319
171

65.1
34.9

88
548

13.8
86.2

163
323

33.5
66.5

249

39.5

51.0

378

59.9

248
237

48.8

59

51

10.5

90

18.4

Patriarchal Peers
1-Never
2- A few times a year

101

9.3
15.7

3- Monthly

101

15.8

71

14.5

4- Weekly

219

34.9

130

26.6

5- Daily

154

24.2

146

29.9

Note: Percentages not equal to 100 are due to rounding.
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Single. Regarding relationship status, this variable was originally nominal6. It
was re-coded to a dichotomized variable since the majority o f respondents were single.
Thus, relationship status was reflected in the dichotomized variable called Single (0- NotSingle, 1- Single).
Frequent Dater. An ordinal variable measured how often the respondent dated in
high school (Wave 1) and during the last school year (Wave 2). Both Wave 1 and Wave
2 items were followed by the statement, “By a date we mean a planned activity with a
specific person.” Responses were: 1- Almost never dated (a few times a year), 2Occasionally dated (about once a month), and 3- Dated frequently (more than once a
month). This question remained for Cohort 2, but the response items differed: 0- No
Response, 1- Less than once a month, 2- Once a month, 3- 2-3 times a month, 4- About
once a week, 5- More than once a week. In order to appropriately combine these two
items for all respondents, the second set o f responses was re-coded to fit the original
criteria (thus 3-5, was re-coded 3 and items 1 and 2 remained the same). So the answers:
1- Almost never dated (a few times a year), 2- Occasionally dated (about once a month),
3- Dated frequently (more than once a month) reflect the re-coded range in responses.
The variable about dating behavior in the past year had one category added to it called
“Never Dated.” This response was given by just 4% o f the sample at Wave 2 so in order
to have consistency with the original response categories, these respondents were
combined with those that said “Almost never dated (a few times a year).” Although this

6 Respondents were asked to: “Indicate your current relationship status.” Original
response options were: Single, Engaged, Married, Divorced/Separated/Widowed.

118
decreased variation, it was preferred rather than choosing one of the questions over the
other and having missing cases for almost half the sample or simply leaving out this
potentially important variable. To imply the positive direction in coding for someone that
was a frequent dater, this variable is labeled “Frequent Dater” or when space limitations
are present, “FDater”
Patriarchal Male Peer Support. While there are multiple dimensions to male
peer support (see DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b), this data had no measures consistent
with any of the previously cited research (e.g. DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993).
However, a proxy measure for male peer support was obtained from the question,
“Currently, when you are with your friends, how often do you hear talk that speculates
‘How a particular woman would be in bed?’”. Response options were: 1- Never, 2- A
few times a year, 3- Monthly, 4- Weekly, 5- Daily. This item was more inclusive than
past research, which has focused more on the behaviors of male peers regarding their use
of violence against female partners and their support o f this violence in general. Thus,
the weakness here was that this was most likely a measure o f “male peers’ sexist
behaviors/attitudes” rather than the more direct, “male peers’ support of violence against
women.” This variable was ordinal, so the time points between each interval were not
equal. Despite this, the variable was normally distributed and was treated as continuous
since male peer’s level of sexist behaviors can be thought of as continuous in nature.
Higher values indicated a greater degree of these behaviors from respondent’s male
peers. This variable was called “Patriarchal Peers 1” and “Patriarchal Peers2” for each
respective time point or when space limitations were present, “Pat Peers 1” and “Pat
Peers2.”
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In the previous chapter the causal ordering of male peer support was discussed.
Recall that past research found that male peers that engaged in relationship violence
increased the chance that an individual might perpetrate violence against a female. Some
have found that negative attitudes about women in college are preceded by negative
attitudes during high school (DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993a; DeKeseredy and Schwartz
1998). Due to the wording of these items and limitations in the amount of data points,
male peers was treated as an independent, rather than a mediating variable. Treating this
variable as a mediating cause of relationship violence or mediating cause o f patriarchal
ideology was not feasible with this data.
Scaled Variables fo r Relationship Violence Experiences. Borrowing from the
Conflict Tactics Seale (CTS) (Straus and Gelles 1990), there were 9 total questions (5
measures of verbal aggression, 4 o f physical aggression) assessing men’s experiences
with relationship violence in high school (Wave 1) as well as during their first year o f
college (Wave 2). Participants responded to the question, “How often have these things
happened during high school?” (same question substituting high school with “during the
last year” for Wave 2), with these potential responses: 0- 0 times, 1- Once, 2- 2-5 times,
3- 6-10 times, 4- more than 10 times7.

7 These responses reflect the current coding scheme. They were re-coded from the
original responses of 0- No Response, 1- 0, 2- Once, 3- 2-5 times, 4- 6-10, 5- More than
10 times. They were re-coded for ease in interpretation so that 0 would reflect never, 1
would reflect 1, and then the subsequent numeric values would represent the respective
categories.
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Osgood, McMorris, and Potenza (2002) discuss the many issues in combining
multiple indicators in self-reported delinquency items that are ordinal. For one, if the
choice was made to ignore their ordinal nature and sum all the items into a composite
score this would make the incorrect assumption o f equality between each interval. A
composite, scaled score also produces highly skewed variables. The authors further
mention how self-report items tend to overemphasize less serious offenses. In the present
case, if the subject stomped out of the room “ 1-time”, yelled at a partner “ 1-time”, and
sulked “1-time” and never engaged in any other behaviors they would receive a score for
domestic violence perpetration equal to 3. Yet this person would be considered “more
serious” than someone that never engaged in any of the other 8 items but they hit their
partner “ 1-time” (a score of 1). Not only would the first respondent be considered more
serious, but they would be more serious by two whole units. Osgood et al. (2002) cite
Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981) who tested multiple techniques for dealing with
issues such as these with ordinal self-reported delinquency measures. Ultimately,
Hindelang et al. found one technique to be the most reliable. This was to recode their
self-reported delinquency items into dichotomous (0- Never, 1- Ever) variables. These
items were then summed into a composite variable. This technique produced a significant
decline in the summed item’s skew, produced a measure where higher values better
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reflected the most serious cases, and it avoided the difficult task of assigning metric
values to ordinal categories (see Osgood et al. 2002 for more)8.
These insights are extremely beneficial to the current study for the reasons
mentioned above, but also because structural equation modeling (SEM) is designed to
work best with continuous outcomes/mediators. Early exploratory models that modeled
relationship violence measures as latent, ordinal variables created complex models with
poor model fit. This was most likely because they were covarying with other control
variables, which were manifest variables. In other words, SEM prefers that manifest
measures covary with other manifest measures, not latent ones. Also, while dummy
variables were an option, there was no theoretical cut-off point for each group that
seemed to coincide with the data. For these reasons, they were combined using the
aforementioned technique from Hindelang et al. (1981) into a manifest variable.
The 9 item scales for relationship violence perpetration that were dichotomized
and then summed for each respective time point are called: “Relationship Violence
Perpetration 1” (shortened to RVP1 where space limitations occur) and “Relationship
Violence Perpetration2” (shortened to RVP2 where space limitations occur). The range

8 Osgood et al. (2002) went on to discuss a more systematic approach than the Hindelang
et al. (1981) technique by using item-response theory (IRT) with tobit regression. Since
the items on relationship violence are used primarily as independent variables, these
techniques are not employed. That is, tobit regression is not based on linear outcome
variables, and is used when the outcome variable o f interest is censored (i.e. rankordered).

122
for these two scales was 0-9. The 9-item scale at Wave 1 formed a reliable scale (a =
.81). The mean at Wave 1 was 2.35 (SD = 2.26, skew = .92). The 9-item scale was also
reliable at Wave 2 (a = .79). The mean at Wave 2 was 1.77 (SD = 2.02, skew = 1.34).
Two other variables were created in similar ways which measured the
participants’ experiences as victims o f verbal and physical relationship aggression. These
were the same 9 items across Waves 1 and 2 for perpetration, but instead asked how often
their “partner did this” to them. These variables were called: “Relationship Violence
Victimization 1” (shortened to RVV1 when necessary due to space limitations) and
“Relationship Violence Victim ization” (shortened for the same reasons to RVV2). The
9-item scale at Wave 1 indicated a reliable construct (a = .85). These Wave 1 measures
had a mean o f 2.71 (SD = 2.58, skew = .82). The 9-item scale at Wave 2 also had strong
reliability (a = .85). The Wave 2 scale also had a mean o f 2.13 (SD = 2.40, skew =
1.16). A paired samples t-test (listwise deletion) indicated that there were statistically
significant (p < .001) differences in mean scores for both relationship violence
perpetration and victimization from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

ANALYSES

Structural Equation Modeling
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was the primary statistical technique used for
all data analyses (for all analyses in this dissertation). AMOS 21 for Windows was used
for all SEM models. SEM has several advantages over traditional linear regression.
SEM allows researchers to control for measurement error (for reviews see Byrne 2010;
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Kline 2011). Additionally SEM appropriately assesses structural models over time, even
in pretest/posttest designs (Raykov 1992). SEM also allows one to hypothesize and
model non-recursive relationships (Berry 1984; Kline 2011). Finally, due to sample
attrition, the sample lost 150 cases at Wave 2. SEM uses the maximum-likelihood (ML)
function for estimating missing cases (MCAR). While most researchers are likely aware
of the various data imputation techniques for missing data (e.g. mean substitution), ML is
not a form of data imputation and instead, “[...] searches over different possible
population values, finally selecting parameter estimates that are most likely (have the
‘maximum likelihood’) to be true, given the sample observations,” (Lewis-Beck 1993: v).
The ML function was preferred for handling missing cases because it did not bias the
sample in ways that data imputation or data deletion techniques can in standard OLS
regression (Arbuckle 1996, 2012; Wiggins and Sacker 2002). Descriptive statistics and
bivariate statistics were assessed using SPSS 21 for Windows.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN DATA ANALYSES
The current analysis addresses the following six questions:
Q1: Are the patriarchal attitudes measures reliable?
Q2: Are the patriarchal attitudes measures reliable over time (i.e. longitudinal
measurement invariance)?
Q3: What are the predictors of patriarchal ideology before college and what are
the predictors at the end of the first year o f college?
Q4: Does patriarchal ideology change from pre-college to the end o f one’s
freshman year?
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Q5: What accounts for the change or stability in patriarchal attitudes from pre
college to the end of one’s freshman year?
Q6: What are the reciprocal effects of patriarchal attitudes and involvement in
relationship violence?

Ql: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f Patriarchal Ideology Reliable?
The first research question was addressed using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) within the SEM framework. Unlike traditional exploratory factor analysis (EFA),
the CFA controls for measurement error, can use ML to assess missing cases lost due to
attrition, and these measurement models can later be expanded into full structural models
that include manifest and latent variables. All of these strengths of the CFA approach
make this a much more robust tool for assessing latent constructs than traditional EFA
(Byrne 2010; Kline 2011).
First the dimensionality of the patriarchal attitudes measures was assessed. I
discussed in the previous chapter the dimensionality of patriarchal ideology and it
appears the four indicators might represent two of these dimensions. That is, two of these
indicators represent the dimension of rape-myth acceptance (herfault, askforit) and the
remaining two represent acceptance o f violence against women (hitwife, crywolf). In
order to test whether or not patriarchal attitudes was better operationalized with multiple
dimensions (i.e. discriminant validity) or as a unitary construct (i.e. convergent validity),
two different CFAs were conducted. The two-factor model can be found in Figure 4.1.
The one-factor model is not pictured, but essentially it combined both latent variables in
Figure 4.1 into one dimension labeled patriarchal attitudes (with all four indicators
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loading on this latent variable, with a 2 = 1, and reference indicator = 1 on arbitrary
indicator hitwife). The dimensionality measurement models were assessed at Wave 1 and
Wave 2, independent of one another. Since more indicators than just two per construct
would have been ideal, it was expected that the two-factor approach would have less
reliability than the one-factor approach. Because o f this, subsequent models in this
chapter discuss/model patriarchal attitudes as a unitary, four-item factor.

Q2: Are the Patriarchal Attitudes Measures Reliable over Time (i.e. longitudinal
measurement invariance)?
In order to determine whether or not the measurement structure o f patriarchal
attitudes was invariant over time, which would allow for comparisons between data
points, a longitudinal CFA (LCFA) was performed (see Brown 2006 for a review).
LCFA can be assessed using one of two techniques: autoregressive structural equation
modeling (ARSEM) or multiple group structural equation modeling (MGSEM). The
ARSEM involved the latent factor patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 as a covariate with the
same latent construct at Wave 2 (e.g. LCFA, longitudinal measurement model). Figure
4.2 shows the hypothesized ARSEM used to assess the reliability of patriarchal attitudes
over time, providing an answer to Q2. Models with and without covarying error terms
were assessed.
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Figure 4.1. Hypothesized Two-Factor Operationalization o f Patriarchal Attitudes
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Notes: Variance of each factor = 1 so that reference indicators would not be needed.
Error parameters = 1 reflect manual constraints.

Figure 4.2. Hypothesized Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analysis (LCFA)
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Notes: This figure does not include covarying error terms for repeated measures, although subsequent models in the next chapter did.
Parameters = 1 reflect manual constraints for arbitrary reference indicator and error-term regression weights.
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Q3: What are the Predictors o f Patriarchal Attitudes before College and after One Year
o f College?
Once measurement reliability was established the next research question was
addressed using multiple indicator multiple causes SEM, also known as MIMIC
modeling (for a review, see Smith and Patterson 1984). Figure 4.3 shows the MIMIC
model that was conducted for both data points, substituting the appropriate time, but
same variables for each. MIMIC models are very similar to OLS regression with the
exception that they control for measurement error and have a latent variable as an
outcome. Looking at just the cross-sectional data from Wave 1 makes causality
impossible, but it allowed me to assess significant relationships between the hypothesized
independent variables and patriarchal ideology. These analyses assessed the significant
predictors o f patriarchal ideology at each respective time point.

Figure 4.3. General MIMIC Model used for Wave 1 and Wave 2
White
Witnessed
Domestic Violence

resl
Religious
askforit

el

hitwife

e2

herfault

e3

crywolf

e4

Patriarchal Peers
Sex Assault
Program

Dating

Patriarchal
Attitudes

Single
Rel. Violence
Perpetration
Rel. Violence
Victimization

Notes: Covariates for independent variables are not drawn for clarity and space considerations. Parameter constraints = 1 are for
model identification and for all error and residual parameters. Error and residual ellipses are not drawn for clarity purposes. Wave 1
variables in actual models are same names as pictured, but they have a 1 after and the same is true for Wave 2 measures, but with a 2
after them.
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Q4: Do Patriarchal Attitudes Change from Pre-College to the end o f One s Freshman
Year?
Earlier t-tests suggested significant change in patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1
to Wave 2. This approach was limited, however, in that it deleted missing values rather
than taking advantage of all of the information by using ML estimation. Essentially, Q4
was addressed using CFA with structured means (see Arbuckle 2012: 229-240 for a
review). Unlike the previous ARSEM model from Q2 (but similar), this analysis used
multi-group structural equation modeling (MGSEM). Although described in more detail
in Chapter 5, the MGSEM for assessing mean structures essentially treats each data point
as a “group” and constrains one o f the latent variable’s mean to 0, while freely estimating
the other. The freely estimated latent mean reflected the number o f units higher or lower
from 0 (i.e. the other latent mean) that variable was. Significance in this value (p < .05)
would indicate significant change from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

Q5: What Accounts fo r the Change or Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes from PreCollege to the end o f one’s Freshman Year?
Q5 could only be addressed once the results of Q4 were known. If Q4 found
significant differences in the mean of patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1 to Wave 2, Q5
would address significant variation using a MGSEM. Model fit difference tests and
critical ratio differences (z-tests) for individual parameter estimates would help establish
where the source of significant variation was.
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Q6: What are the Reciprocal effects o f Patriarchal Attitudes and Experiences with
Relationship Violence?
The current study is one of the few to consider patriarchal ideology as a
dependent variable, whereas past research has typically only included it, at best, as a
mediating variable, predictive o f domestic/relationship violence. Chapters 2 and 3
clearly laid-out an argument for patriarchal ideology as an important concept for
understanding relationship violence against women outside o f its direct predictive power.
It should play a role (when conceptualized properly), however, for those few men that are
violent or perceive themselves as “victims” of relationship violence. No known research
has considered patriarchal ideology and relationship violence in a non-recursive manner.
It is unclear what the potential feedback effects are between patriarchal ideology and
experiences with relationship violence. Theoretically, it would be important to consider
the indirect feedback loops, which would assess the reciprocity of these three variables
(i.e. patriarchal attitudes, violence perpetration, violence victimization). I hypothesize
that patriarchal attitudes would predict the use of violence and that victimization would
then increase patriarchal attitudes. Keep in mind that the men’s “victimization” lacks the
exact context of the female partner’s use o f violence, but assuming a good amount of
these episodes were consistent with past research findings (e.g. women’s violence as pre
emptive, in self-defense, or secondary to men’s initial aggression) (Allen et al. 2009;
Daly and Wilson 1988) they should feedback to patriarchal ideology in a significant way
that increases the ideology. However, this is just one potential direction these
relationships could have with one another.
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Kline (2011) notes that there are many different ways to assess non-recursive
structural equation models using panel data (see Kline 2011:103-110 for a review; see
also Brito and Pearl 2002). Any time researchers want to know the feedback effects of
more than two variables, they must model the data in a way that has indirect feedback
effects as shown in Figure 4.4. The dashed lines in Figure 4.4 represent the multiple
feedback effects. Because this was the first study to consider the feedback effects o f
these variables, the dashed lines reflect the exploratory nature of the reciprocal analyses.
The feedback effects come into play by assessing the correlated residuals of these
variables (also dashed since the exact correlations vary depending on the direction o f the
feedback loops). Others might prefer cross-lagged parameters with no feedback effects.
Cross-lagged SEMs could still be assessed but such models are quite complex and have
been critiqued for what some see as an inherent tautology when only two-waves o f data
are present (Stoolmiller and Bank 1995). Also, the MGSEM approach does not work
here since direct relationships from Wave 1 to Wave 2 need to be modeled with
appropriate parameters when assessing feedback effects.
In Figure 4.4 the scaled variable for patriarchal attitudes was used rather than the
latent variable in previous models. As seen in Figure 4.4, the decision was made to
conduct a full structural model where all variables were manifest variables. This was
done for two reasons. First, a very complex model assessing the feedback effects of a
latent variable (i.e. patriarchal attitudes) with the two scaled manifest variables (domestic
violence perpetration and victimization) would have produced poor model fit. This may
not be as robust of an analysis as using just latent variables, but Sass and Smith (2006)
found that whether one decides to use single scaled variables, item parcels, or individual
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latent variables, all o f these produce very similar coefficients regarding measurement
error in SEM. Because the Cronbach’s a was at an acceptable level for these three
composite measures (a > .70), there was little reason to suggest that the complexities of
these variables would be greatly diminished treating them as observed measures.
Secondly, this was done because the sample size was too small for the amount o f
parameters needing to be assessed using the latent constructs of all three variables.
Once the initial reciprocal effects were assessed without any exogenous variables,
exogenous predictors were added to the model from Figure 4.4. Because of the many
autocorrelations of many time-variant independent variables the only independent
variables added are the three constants: white, witnessing domestic violence, and
religious. The key thing to take from these analyses in response to Q6 is that while such
models cannot “prove” causality, they can help establish the temporal order (Biesanz
2012) regarding these three key variables. These non-recursive models, therefore, should
provide insight not just for feedback effects regarding these variables in general, but also
specifically in that Chapters 6 and 7 have much to gain in their models from these
assessments.

Figure 4.4. Hypothesized Nonrecursive SEM of Key Outcome Variables
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Notes: Dashed arrows represent feedback loops for separate models. Parameter constraints are lacking since these will vary
depending on the temporal order of each model.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an overview o f the analyses performed to assess attitudinal
measures of patriarchal ideology over time using two-wave longitudinal data. The
complex data are described regarding the different cohorts, waves, missing data, removal
o f items, and key variables are discussed. The data analyses that mainly revolve around
the use o f structural equation modeling are then discussed. A model that assesses
reciprocal changes in patriarchal ideology is also presented. Overall, the data and
analyses are used to provide answers to two general questions: 1) does patriarchal
ideology change over time and 2) what accounts for this change/stability? The chapter
concludes with the limitations of the data and the analyses performed. The next chapter
presents the results from the methods described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME
USING ATTITUDINAL MEASURES FROM A TEST/RETEST PANEL DESIGN

The previous chapter established six major research questions that will be
addressed regarding attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology using a test/retest panel
design. The analyses below address these questions as far as whether or not patriarchal
ideology is: 1) reliable, 2) invariant over time, 3) related to the key independent variables,
4) changing over time, 5) changing over time due to any of the key independent variables
and 6) reciprocally related to experiences with relationship violence. The major sections
below are titled appropriately with the specific research question they address.

MEASUREMENT RELIABILITY
QI: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f Patriarchal Ideology Reliable?
The measurement reliability of the four attitudinal indicators o f patriarchal
ideology were assessed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Prior to running the
CFA, bivariate inter-item correlations and alpha reliability analyses were assessed.
Conducting these prior to the CFA allowed for an assessment of reliability that was not as
robust as the CFA in and o f itself, but these techniques allowed me to eliminate measures
that were not reliable. That is, while the CFA is more robust technique for measurement
reliability, the inter-item correlations and alphas needed to meet certain criterion before
even being considered in a CFA.
Inter-Item Correlations and Reliability Coefficients. Table 5.1 presents the inter
item coefficients, descriptive statistics, and Cronbach’s a reliabilities for the indicators of

patriarchal attitudes at each data point. The top of Table 5.1 shows that all four measures
at Wave 1 had significant (p < .01) and acceptable correlations with one another (Mean o f
6 correlations = .42). For Wave 2, 5 of the 6 inter-item correlations were acceptable in
size (Mean of 5 correlations = .45) with 1 fairly weak correlation (r = .12) and all 6 were
statistically significant (p < .01). The change in the a for the full sample from .74 at
Wave 1 to .70 at Wave 2 indicates that the scale o f all four measures is right at the cut-off
for Cronbach’s a reliability (typically a > .70). Although it is still acceptable at Wave 2,
the drop in the a value could have been due to numerous reasons (i.e. loss in sample size
due to attrition, measurement error). Perhaps most important, was determining whether
or not the lower reliability at Wave 2 was the result of true changes in these values or
changes in the meaning of this construct from Wave 1 to Wave 2. While “true change”
can be difficult to determine using panel data, it was important to minimize the chance
that the decline in reliability was due to issues with the data rather than a decline in the
meaning o f these items.

Table 5.1. Inter-Item Correlations, Descriptive Statistics, and Cronbach’s a for Patriarchal Attitudes
Wave 1
1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault
4. crywolf
Mean
skewness

1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault
4. crywolf

Wave 2

Full Sample (n = 608, a = .74)
1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault 4. crywolf
1.00
1. ask4it2
.40
1.00
2. hitwife2
.43
.38
1.00
3. herfaul2
1.00 4. crywolG
.42
.46
.38
1.96(1.0)
1.08

1.72(1.05) 2.33(1.02)
2.34 (.97) Mean (SD)
1.41
.52
.46 Skewness
Cohort 1 (n = 315, a = .73)
1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault 4. crywolf
1.00
1. ask4it2
.38
1.00
2. hitwife2
.41
.31
1.00
3. herfaul2
.44
.47
.39
1.00 4. crywolG

Mean (SD)
skewness

2.00(1.03)
1.10

1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault
4. crywolf

Cohort 2 (n = 293, a = .75)
1. askforit
2. hitwife
3. herfault 4. crywolf 1
1.00
jl. ask4it2
.43
1.00
|2. hitwife2
.45
.46
1.00
|3. herfaul2
.40
.45
.37
1.00|4. crywol£2

Mean (SD)
skewness

1.91 (.96)
1.05

1.75(1.09)
1.42

1.69(1.00)
1.37

2.35(1.03)
.52

2.30(1.02)
.52

2.35 (.97) Mean (SD)
.45 Skewness

2.33 (.96)'Mean (SD)
.47j Skewness

1. ask4it2
1.00
.30
.50
.55
2.62(1.29)
.33
1. ask4it2
1.00
.45
.50
.55
1.92(1.08)
1.39
1. ask4it2
1.00
,09NS
.39
.06NS
3.34(1.07)
-.27

Full Sample (n = 486, a = .70)
2. hitwife2
3. herfaul2
1.00
.38
.12

1.00
.32

1.91 (1.08)
2.64(1.10)
1.23
.21
Cohort 1 (n = 245, a = .79)
2. hitwife2
3. herfaul2
1.00
.45
.48
1.80(1.21)
1.47

2.02 (.92)
.91

1.00
3.08(1.29)
.03
4. crywolG

1.00
.49
2.36(1.11)
.56

Cohort 2 (« = 241, a = .19)
2. hitwife2
3. herfaul2
1.00
.26
-.43

4. crywolG

1.00
2.27 (.95)
.63
4. crywolG

1.00
-.07NS
2.93(1.02)
-.04

.

1.00|
3.91 (1.03)1
-.79j

Notes: Sample sizes are based on listwise deletion for a reliabilities. Cohort 2 at Wave 2 highlighted due to poor reliability. All
correlations are significant (p < .01) except where otherwise noted (i.e. NS = not significant, p > .05).
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One way to eliminate a potential confounding source of the decreased reliability
in the a level was to perform a sensitivity check on these items by assessing them for
each cohort independently. While cohort effects were not anticipated because each
cohort was thought to be homogenous, dividing the sample by cohorts was an easy way
to rule out one potential source for inconsistency in these measures over time. The data
was separated into: Cohort 1 (1990 incoming class) and Cohort 2 (1991 incoming class).
The middle matrices in Table 5.1 show that for Cohort 1, patriarchal attitudes was
reliable based on Chronbach’s a values at Wave 1 (a = .73, n = 315) and Wave 2 (a =
.79, n = 245)1. Thus, Cohort 1 actually had an increase in reliability at Wave 2. The
inter-item correlations were all significant (p < .01) and acceptable in strength (Mean of
all 12 items > .40). The bottom part of Table 5.1 shows that Cohort 2 had reliable
measures of patriarchal attitudes (a = .75) with acceptable and reliable inter-item
correlations (Mean of all 6 items > .42, all p < .01) at Wave 1. At Wave 2, however, the
a value was extremely poor (a = .186), as supported by the inter-item correlation matrix
with variable degrees of significance with most correlation coefficients being fairly weak.
The lack of reliability for the attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology at Wave
2 for Cohort 2 presented some confounding problems. After coding o f the items was
checked as well as potential outlying cases, the exact reason for the lack o f longitudinal

1 Wave 1 a was even higher for Cohort 1 when cases lost due to attrition at Wave 2 were
deleted from Wave 1 (a = .746). However, because later SEM analyses will estimate
these values using maximum likelihood (ML), these cases remained.
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measurement invariance for one cohort and not the other was not unclear. Previously it
was discussed that cohort effects were not anticipated since both cohorts were
homogenous regarding their sampling technique and among independent variables.
However, based on the available information, cohort interactions might be a potential
explanation for the lack o f measurement invariance over time. That is, the meaning o f
patriarchal attitudes (as measured by these 4 indicators) very well could have changed for
the incoming class of 1991 but not the 1990 incoming class. Since the conceptual
domain of these measures was unstable for Cohort 2, it was not appropriate to proceed
with further analyses regarding Cohort 2 (see Brown 2006). Thus, Cohort 2 was deleted
from the dataset fo r the remainder o f this chapter and analyses describedfrom this point
forward regarding the test/retest panel analyses involve ju st Cohort 1 (Wave 1 n = 332,
Wave 2 n = 245)1.
Since cohort 2 was deleted it was important to look at the descriptive statistics for
just Cohort 1. Table 5.2 includes the descriptive statistics for all of the indicators of

2 Sensitivity analyses were performed on the full sample as well as just Cohort 2 since
unstable inter-item correlations and a values are not the most rigorous techniques for
establishing measurement invariance. Confirmatory Factor Analyses were performed on
the full sample and Cohort 2. As expected, the Wave 2 measures for Cohort 2 (and thus
the full sample) showed poor fitting models (i.e. non-equivalence in the meaning o f the
construct of patriarchal attitudes over time). This further justified the removal of Cohort
2 from the data.
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patriarchal attitudes. Notice the statistically significant differences reported earlier are
now gone for all items, suggesting stability in patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1 to Wave
2. Descriptives for all other variables can be found in Table 5.3.
Like the last chapter’s descriptive statistics, relationship violence variables are not
reported in the above tables. The 9 items for relationship violence perpetration at Wave 1
for just Cohort 1 formed a reliable scale (a = .81) and had a mean of 2.33 (SD = 2.25,
skew = .91). The same 9 items at Wave 2 for formed a reliable scale (a = .80) and had a
mean of 1.89 (SD = 2.08, skew = 1.26). Because of the positive skew of the second
scale, both variables were computed using the In function to induce normality. Thus, the
Wave 1 scale had a mean of .96 (SD = .72, skew = -.07) and the Wave 2 perpetration
measures had a mean of .82 (SD = .70, skew = .19). A paired samples t-test for the In
variables showed significantly different values in relationship violence perpetration over
time (t = 2.81, d f= 238, p < .01). Because the original measures failed to meet the
assumptions of normality, anytime from this point forward “relationship violence
perpetration” or “RVP” are presented, these are the In versions of these variables.

Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Patriarchal Attitudes, Cohort 2 Deleted
Wave 1 (Pre-College)
Survey Item

Variable

n

In most cases, when a woman gets
raped she was asking for it.

askforit

317

2.00

1.03

A man is sometimes justified in
hitting his wife.

hitwife

315

1.75

If a woman is making out and she
lets things get out o f hand, it’s her
own fault if the man forces sex on
her.

herfault

316

Most charges o f “wife beating” are
made up by the woman to get back
at her husband.
crywolf

Composite o f all 4 items'*

Patriarchal
Attitudes 1

Mean

SD

Wave 2 (End of Freshman Year)
skew

a

Mean3

SD

skew

Variable

n

1.10

askforit2

248

1.92

1.08

1.39

1.09

1.42

hitwife2

246

1.80

1.21

1.47

2.35

1.03

0.52

herfault2

248

2.36

1.11

0.56

316

2.35

.97

0.45

crywolf2

247

2.27

.95

-0.63

315

8.45

3.04

0.85

Patriarchal
Attitudes2

245

8.35

3.40

1.18

0.73

a

0.79

Notes: “Paired samples t-tests indicated no statistically significant differences in any of the means from Wave 1 to Wave 2, p > .05.
bListwise deletion was used for the creation of each scale.
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Table 5.3. Frequency Distributions of Independent Variables, Cohort 2 Deleted

Variable
Constants (Time-Invariant)
White
0- Other
1- White
Witnessed Domestic Violence
0- Never
1-Yes
Religious
0- Not Religious
1- Religious
Time-Variant

Wave 1 (Pre-College)
n
Percentage

Wave2 (End of
Freshman Year)
n
Percentage

52
253

17.0
83.0

288
26

91.7
8.3

107
140

43.3
56.7

230
74

75.7
24.3

167
72

69.9
30.1

8
324

2.4
97.6

74
174

29.8
70.2

0- Almost never/Occasionally
dated

155

46.7

127

1- Frequent Dater

173

52.1

119

51.6
48.4

1- Never

24

7.2

19

7.7

2- A few times a year

47

14.2

38

15.4

3- Monthly

62

18.7

39

15.8

4- Weekly

126

38.0

73

29.6

73

22.0

78

31.6

Sex Assault Program Attendance
0- Never
1-Yes
Single
0-No
1-Yes
Frequent Dater

Patriarchal Peers

5- Daily

Note: Percentages not equal to 100 are due to rounding.
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The 9 items at Wave 1 for relationship violence victimization for just Cohort 1
formed a reliable scale (a = .85) and had a mean of 2.72 (SD = 2.59, skew = .84). The
same 9 items at Wave 2 formed a reliable scale (a = .84) and had a mean of 2.16 (SD =
2.40, skew = 1.03). Because o f the positive skew of the second scale, both variables were
computed using the In function to induce normality. Thus, the Wave 1 victimization
measures had a mean of 1.05 (SD = .76, skew = -.11) and at Wave 2 they had a mean of
.87 (SD = .77, skew = .19). A paired samples t-test showed significantly different values
in relationship violence victimization overtime (t = 3.26, d f = 241, p < .001).

Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Discriminant Validity. The previous chapter discussed the possibility o f a twofactor solution in which two o f the indicators for patriarchal attitudes represent rape-myth
acceptance and two represent acceptance of violence against women (see previous
chapter’s Figure 4.1). Both were thought to be underlying dimensions o f patriarchal
attitudes. Thus, the two-factor hypothesized model was assessed across both waves o f
data. The two-factor model had acceptable model fit, but had a large correlation
coefficient between each factor (r > .85) indicating poor discriminant validity o f the twofactor solution (i.e. high multicollinearity).
Convergent Validity. A four-indicator single-latent factor o f patriarchal attitudes
(results in Table 5.4) was more reliable than the two-factor (two indicators per factor)
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model3. Patriarchal attitudes, modeled as a latent construct, was reliable at Wave 1 and
Wave 2, when conducting two separate CFA models. Both had acceptable model fit and
moderate to strong (b > .54), statistically significant (p < .001) factor loadings. These
CFA models suggest that there were reliable measures of patriarchal ideology for each
wave of data, independent of one another. In other words, the answer to Q1 is simply:
yes, the attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology are reliable. Since these CFAs were
conducted independently, comparisons between the two waves (i.e. longitudinal
measurement invariance) were not yet possible.

3 This is not to suggest that multiple dimensions o f patriarchal ideology will always have
high multicollinearity. One reason for this finding could be that only two indicators per
factor were available. Thus, more indicators might reduce the correlation between these
two factors, but these were not available with this data.
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Table 5.4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Results o f Independent Measurement
Models
Wave l a

Wave 2b

3(SE)
Parameter Estimates
3(SE)
b
b
Patriarchal Attitudes —►hitwife
1.00
0.62
1.00
0.65
Patriarchal Attitudes —►askforit
0 .96 *** (. 12)
0.63
1.00*** ( . 12)
0.72
Patriarchal Attitudes —*• herfault
0.54
0 .82 *** (. 12)
0 .95 *** (. 12)
0.67
Patriarchal Attitudes —* crywolf
0.74
1.03 *** (. 13)
0.71
0 .90 *** (. 11)
***p<.001
Notes: Beta =1.0 reference indicator. aWave 1 model fit: y2 = 3.84, d f = 2, p = .147; CFI
= .992; RMSEA = .053. bWave 2 model fit: %2 = 0.65, d f = 2, p = .721; CFI = 1.0;
RMSEA = .000.
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MEASUREMENT RELIABILITY OVER TIME
Q2: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f Patriarchal Attitudes Invariant over Time?
In order to assess measurement invariance over time, the model fit for the initial
hypothesized CFA (Figure 4.2 in previous chapter), with all factor loadings freely
estimated (with the exception of the arbitrary reference indicators o f hitwife and hitwife2,
both = 1.0) was called Model 1A. The goodness o f fit for Model 1A and all of the CFAs
described in this section can be found in Table 5.5. As Table 5.5 shows, Model 1A fit the
data well based on the comparative fit index (CFI) but not for the %2 value and was only
moderately supported by the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
Since the factors o f patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 and Wave 2 were measured
with identical items administered in an identical fashion, correlated error terms for each
indicator were added to create a better fitting model (Model IB) that accounted for these
“method effects” (see Berry 1984 for a review; see also Brown 2006). That is, Model IB
added 4 covariances between each indicator’s error term at Wave 1 and the same
indicator’s error term at Wave 2. Table 5.5 shows that goodness of fit indicators for
Model 1B all suggested good model fit, which was much better than Model 1A (although
significant difference tests were not possible since Model 1A was poor fitting from the
onset). Results from Model 1B regarding individual regression weights/factor loadings
are shown in Figure 5.2. As Figure 5.2 shows, factor loadings were all statistically

Table 5.5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Auto-Regressive Structural Equation Models for Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Model and Description
1A. Unconstrained ARSEM

Comparative
Model

X2

df

P

CFI

RMSEA

AX2

Adf

Ax2Sig.

57.10

19

.000

.930

.078

16.78

15

.332

.997

.019

IB vs 1C

19.47

18

.364

.997

.016

2.69

3

.442

1C vs ID

23.37

22

.381

.997

.014

3.90

4

.420

ID vs IE

27.01

26

.409

.998

.011

3.64

4

.457

Model
1B. Covariances between error
terms added
1C. Equality constraints: factor
loadings
1D. Equality constraints: factor
loadings and factor intercepts
IE. Equality constraints: factor
loadings, factor intercepts, and
error variances

Notes: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
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significant (p < .001) and strong across both waves of data. Correlated error terms were
all statistically significant accept for the askforit error term4.
The covariance between the repeated latent variables (e.g. autocorrelation, serial
correlation, stability coefficient) was statistically significant and suggested weak to
moderate stability (r = .34, SE = .11, p < .001). While autoregressive coefficients that are
very strong make it clear that a measure has high stability, moderate coefficient strength
is not always as straightforward (Mroczek 2007). That is, it can be difficult to interpret
with the r alone whether or not the measures are unstable or the measures lack continuity
(i.e. significant mean differences). Keep in mind that one early test (paired samples ttest) indicated no significant differences over time while the a reliability indicated
measurement reliability. These early measures suggest reliable measures along with no
change over time in the construct. To be sure, the section below regarding mean
differentials within the confines of SEM allowed for more informed conclusions than the
paired-samples t-test/a reliability tests and the current LCFA. For now, keep in mind
that this coefficient o f .34 was positive in value, somewhat weak but close to moderate in
strength, and was produced in a CFA that had model fit indicators all suggestive of
acceptable reliability (thus far). Again, whether or not a low stability coefficient is the

4 Even though deleting this parameter showed slight improvements in the overall model
fit, there was no theoretical reason as to why this measure’s error was different from the
other indicators. Therefore, this correlated error term remained as the overall model fit
was still reliable.
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product of weak reliability over time or attitudinal discontinuity can be complicated but
the anticipation was that mean differentials were the likely culprit for why this coefficient
was not stronger in value. Prior to mean comparisons, further analyses were conducted to
ensure the measurement reliability over time.
The next step in testing for longitudinal measurement invariance involved
constraining factor loadings equal to one another across waves, which produced Model
1C. As seen in Table 5.5, Model 1C also had good model fit. Model fit comparisons
between Model 1C and Model IB regarding the A%2, ACFI, and ARMSEA indicated
Model IB and Model 1C were not statistically different from one another (p > .05).
Next, indicator intercepts were constrained equal to one another, called Model ID.
Model 1D was invariant from Model 1C, indicating the observed scores of the indicators
were not changing over time. Although some consider it a restrictive test (Byrne 2010;
Chan 1998) since previous models showed metric invariance from Wave 1 to Wave 2,
Model 1E was created in which indicator error variances for all 8 factors were
constrained equal (i.e. factor variance at Wave 1 constrained equal to repeated measure’s
variance at Wave 2), in addition to the existing factor loading and factor intercept
constraints. This “hypothesis of equal reliabilities” (Lance and Vandenberg 2000:34)
further supported the notion that these measures were equivalent at each data point as
seen in the model-fit difference tests between Models IE and ID.

Figure 5.1. Results of Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analysis (LCFA) (Model IB)
.34 (.11)

Patriarchal
Attitudes
End of 1st
Year

Patriarchal
Attitudes
Pre-College
.55 (.12)

.63 (.12) -7? (-13)

askforit

el

.64 (.11)

.72 (.11)

crywolf

hitwife

herfault

askforit2

crywolf2

hitwife2

herfault2

e2

e3

e4

e5

e6

e7

e8

.0 9 NS (.0 5 )

-2 9 * * (-0 5 )

•16* (-06)

,.34***(.04)

***p < .001; **p < .01; * < .05
Notes: All factor loadings and values in bold are significant (p < .001). All values are standardized estimates with SE in parentheses.
Model fit indicators: *2= 16.78, df = 15, p = .332; CFI = .997; RMSEA = .02.
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Since the conceptual domain showed consistency in the structural measures o f
patriarchal ideology across time, the final step in making sure that longitudinal
measurement invariance was established was to compare factor loadings from Wave 1 to
Wave 2. Parameter constraints were removed (with the exception of reference indicators)
meaning individual factor weights were compared in Model IB using z-tests (i.e. critical
ratios of indifference). The z-scores for all factors showed no significant differences (z <
1.96) across data points, further supporting the notion that patriarchal ideology had
longitudinal measurement invariance. In sum, the LCFA with equivalence tests answer
Q2 by simply saying: the measures fo r patriarchal attitudes were invariant over time.

PREDICTORS OF PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES BEFORE AND AFTER ONE YEAR
OF COLLEGE
Q3: What are the Predictors o f Patriarchal Attitudes before College and after One Year
o f College?
A correlation matrix containing bivariate Pearson’s r correlations among all
variables can be found in Table 5.6. Instead o f including each individual indicator o f
patriarchal attitudes, the composite scales are provided (i.e shortened in name due to
space to Pattitudesl and Pattitudes2). Bivariate analyses were conducted to get a feel for
what relationships would likely be significant in multivariate analyses.

Table 5.6. Pearson’s r Correlation Matrix, Cohort 2 Deleted
Variable
1 White
2 WitnessDV

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1.00
.04

1.00

-.12

.05

4 SAP1

.05

.00

5 Single 1

.04

-.03

.02

.04

1.00

6 FDaterl

.10

-.05

.02 -.05

.03

7 PatPeersl

-.02

.02

8 Pattitudesl

-.10

.20***

1.00
.13 1.00

-.00 -.18**

1.00

.02

.20*** 1.00

.03 -.07

.03

.00

.07

1.00

9 RVP1

.04

.11

-.05 -.04

-.10

.34***

.09

.13**

10RVV1

.09

.11

-.03 -.01

-.08

.37***

.15**

.11

11SAP2

-.00

-.01

-.22**

-.05

-.04

-.03

1.00

12Single2

-.07

-.05

-.13* -.24*** -.04

.07

-.08

-.13*

-.00

1.00

13FDater2

.07

.04

-.07

.45***

.01

.06

.12

.18**

-.05

-.39*** 1.00

14 Pat Peers2

.06

.25*** -.05 -.13*

.04

.14**

.45***

.10

.12

.10

-.14*

.08

.07

15Pattitudes2

-.15*

.15*

.03 -.09

-.06

.18***

.38***

.04

.03

.02

.02

-.07

16RVP2

-.07

.10

l
o
t
©
o\

3 Religious

6

-.09

.20**

.09

.08

.38***

.31***

.01

-.26***

17RVV2

-.12

.07

-.00 -.04

-.10

.23***

.11

.13*

.33***

.37***

.06

-.24***

.05 .32*** -.13* -.05
-.07

.01

.05 -.02

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

-.04

1.00
79*** 1.00

.13***
19***

1.00
.09 1.00
.01

.24***

1.0

.03

.22**

.82***

1.0
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SEM was used to assess the predictors o f patriarchal attitudes for the pretest and
the posttest, independent of one another, known as MIMIC models (see Figure 4.3 from
previous chapter). Results from both o f these MIMIC models can be found in Figure 5.2
(Wave 1) and Figure 5.3 (Wave 2). A few o f these key relationships are discussed
herein, but keep in mind that two models were assessed, independent of one another so as
not to confuse auto-correlated effects. At Wave 1 the independent variables explained
11 % of the variance in patriarchal attitudes, as evidenced by the squared multiple
correlations (SMC) of the patriarchal attitudes predictors. At Wave 2, the independent
variables explained 15% of the variance in patriarchal attitudes (SMC = .15).
As seen in Figure 5.2, witnessing domestic violence was significantly related to
patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 (b = .24, SE = .17, p < .001), but not at Wave 2
(b = .13, SE = .21, p = .07). This indicates that pre-college patriarchal attitudes were .22
units higher among individuals that witnessed domestic violence compared to those that
did not witness domestic violence as a child while controlling for other key independent
variables. However, the negative effects witnessing domestic violence had on patriarchal
attitudes appeared to subside after the first year o f college. White was significantly
related to patriarchal attitudes at Wave 2 (b = -.14, SE = .15, p < .05), but not Wave 1 (b
= .10, SE = .12, p > .05). That is, whites and non-whites had no significant differences in
patriarchal attitudes before college, but after that first year whites’ patriarchal attitudes
were .14 units lower than non-whites. Frequency in dating was not significantly related
to patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 (b = -.04, SE = .10, p > .05) but at Wave 2 it did
approach significance (b = -. 14, SE = . 11, p = .07). This indicates that frequency in
dating did not have any effect on pre-college patriarchal attitudes. However, frequent
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daters in college had levels of patriarchal attitudes that were -.14 units less than
individuals that rarely dated.
Regarding relationship violence perpetration and victimization, neither one at
Wave 1 or Wave 2 were significant predictors of patriarchal attitudes. Relationship
violence perpetration at Wave 1 approached significance (b = .18, SE = .10, p = .07).
Because this variable was computed using the In function, this implies that for every unit
increase in relationship violence perpetration, we would expect a 19% increase in
patriarchal attitudes while holding all other independent variables constant.

MEAN DIFFERENCES IN PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES
Q4: Do Patriarchal Attitudes Change from Pre-College to the end o f One's Freshman
Year?
Recall that the earlier paired-samples t-test of the patriarchal attitudes scale
originally showed significant differences (t = -9.90, d f = 457, p < .001) in mean values
from Wave 1 (= 8.29) to Wave 2 (x = 10.26), but remember that this scale initially
contained Cohort 2. The paired samples t-test also included just 458 of the original 636
respondents that were combined from cohorts 1 and 2 due to missing values (i.e. listwise
deletion). Since Cohort 2 lacked measurement reliability and only Cohort 1 was being
used, a similar comparison to this earlier t-test was to do the same paired-samples t-test of
just Cohort 1, which Table 5.2 reported earlier in this chapter.

Figure 5.2. MIMIC Model for Wave 1
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Figure 5.3. MIMIC Model for Wave 2
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In short, the average level of patriarchal attitudes decreased from Wave 1 to Wave
2. However, this decrease was not statistically significant, indicating patriarchal ideology
was stable from the initial, pre-college values to the end of one’s freshman year.
However, the paired samples t-test was not as robust o f a test for assessing mean
difference scores as a CFA with structured means (see Arbuckle 2009: 229-240 for a
review). The main reason the CFA with structured means is more reliable is its ability to
model error-terms for each indicator/factor as well as the ability to include the full sample
size for Cohort 1 (n = 332) by using maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation for missing
values lost to attrition at Wave 2.
CFA with structured means comparisons were assessed using multi-group
structural equation modeling (MGSEM). All models and their appropriate goodness-offit statistics are presented in Table 5.4. The first step in the MGSEM was establishing
appropriate model fit for each wave separately, which was the CFA models from Q1 that
already showed reliable measures for each independent wave. The next step involved the
initial, baseline multi-group model (Model 1.1), which freely estimated all parameters
(with the exception of one reference indicator for each data point). As expected, Model
1.1 had acceptable model fit with the data. The next model constrained all parameters
equal to one another (Model 1.2). This model also had good model fit and showed no
significant differences (p > .05) from it to Model 1.1. The next model (Model 1.3)
constrained the intercepts of each factor equal to one another while keeping all of the
previous parameter constraints from Model 1.2. Model 1.3 also produced good model fit.
Next, Model 1.4 removed the Wave 1 latent variable (patriarchal attitudes) mean
constraint, which defaults = 0. The Wave 2 mean constraint of 0 remained. Since SEM
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is typically not used for mean difference comparisons, there is no procedure for
computing a mean for each latent variable simultaneously (Arbuckle 2012). Thus, either
Wave 1 or Wave 2 needed its mean constrained to 0 while the other was freely estimated
(while keeping all previous constraints). The constraining o f the Wave 2 mean to 0 was
completely arbitrary. As seen in Table 5.4, Model 1.4 had good model fit. The mean in
patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 was .04 units higher than the mean at Wave 2. However,
this difference was not statistically significant (p = .602), indicating the answer to Q3 is
simply: patriarchal attitudes did not change from their pre-college levels to the end o f the
first year o f college.

PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES AND STABILITY
Q5: What Accounts fo r the Change or Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes from PreCollege to the End o f One ’s Freshman Year?
The earlier measurement model assessing longitudinal measurement invariance of
patriarchal attitudes found that the correlation between the two latent factors was
significant, but only moderate in strength (r = .34, p < .001). The value of this
autocorrelation led to the assumption that patriarchal attitudes were stable over time (i.e.
stability coefficients). This assumption was strengthened by the previous mean
comparison tests.

Table 5.7. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Multi-Group Structural Equation Models
Comparative
Model

df

P

CFI

RMSEA

Adf

AX2 Sig.

4.49

4

.343

.999

.014

1.1 vs 1.2

6.99

7

.430

1.00

0.00

2.50

3

0.475

1.2 vs 1.3

10.11

11

.520

1.00

0.00

3.12

4

0.538

1.4 vs 1.3a

9.84

10

.455

1.00

0.00

0.27

1

0.603

model
1.2 Constrained factor loadings

x2

<1

Model and Description
1.1 Unconstrained multi-group

1.3 Constrained factor loadings
and factor intercepts
1.4. Constrained factor
loadings, factor intercepts. M of
Patriarchal Atitudesl = freely
estimated, mean of Patriarchal
Attitudes = 0.
Notes: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. aThe x2 and df
were both lower than the previous model because Model 1.3 had mean constraints = 0 for patriarchal attitudes at both waves (the
default value in SEM) and Model 1.4 only constrained one of these.

Stoolmiller and Bank (1995) suggested that when repeated measures produce
small levels of change, autoregressive (AR) SEM (i.e. residual change model) may be
better than simple difference score (SDS) models at assessing predictors o f change.
Arbuckle (2012) provides an alternative to the popular ANCOVA technique when
variance over time is of interest and is most closely in line with the autoregressive
method. The first approach simply took the previous LCFA from Q2 and changes the
model from a measurement model to a structural model by replacing the double-headed
covariance between the two latent factors o f patriarchal attitudes with a single-headed
arrow from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The first step actually produced a regression weight that
was exactly the same as the previous covariance value as well as model fit parameters
that were the same as the LCFA (which were reliable). Thus, the previous LCFA showed
reliable measurement and introducing manifest variables in an autoregressive SEM could
continue. However, due to model complexity, patriarchal attitudes were included in these
models as a composite scale (i.e. observed variable). Also, since the previous chapter
noted the somewhat exploratory nature of these analyses, the goal was to create the most
parsimonious model based on sound theory and empirical evidence from previous
analyses. Therefore, the new model (seen in Figure 5.4, with results) includes the
constant variables witnessed domestic violence and white (excluding religious due to
non-significance in earlier analyses). The time-variant measures included: patriarchal
peers, relationship violence perpetration 1 and patriarchal attitudes 1. Other time-variable
measures were left out because of non-significance and frequent dater was included at
first, but doing so produced poor-fitting models. The model was not fully-identified so as
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to allow for some flexibility in degrees o f freedom. The final model, pictured in Figure
5.4, had acceptable goodness-of-fit statistics (x2 = 2.33, d f = 5, p = .803).
A few things should be highlighted from Figure 5.4. First, the predictors o f each
time-variable measure are all fairly weak at explaining the variance in each (i.e. squared
multiple correlations), presented as R2. Regarding stability, or predictors for Wave 2
variables, the only significant cause parameter is the parameter from Patriarchal Peers 1 to
patriarchal attitudes2 (b = .14, SE = .02). The variance in the residuals for each repeated
measure further suggested stability in that z-scores reflect no significant changes in each
(z< 1.96).
Although it was known prior to this analysis that accounting for change in a twowave panel design is inherently difficult, a tentative conclusion can be drawn for now.
That is, the answer to Q5 is simply: accounting fo r the stability in patriarchal ideology is
very difficult with the current dataset. Although this answer to Q5 may be entirely
unsatisfying, it is the only valid answer considering the available data. Given the
confounding issues with two-wave panel designs, any other conclusions might be
erroneous. However, one area to discuss is in the area o f male peer influence on
patriarchal attitudes. Patriarchal peers might cause stability in patriarchal attitudes in
college but the origin of patriarchal attitudes before college starts appears to be unrelated
to patriarchal peers. Keep in mind, however, the effect o f patriarchal peers in the crosssectional analyses was non-significant when other controls were added to the model.
This is a point further explored in the discussion chapter, Chapter 8.
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RECIPROCAL EFFECTS OF RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE AND PATRIARCHAL
ATTITUDES
Q6: What are the Reciprocal Effects o f Patriarchal Attitudes and Experiences with
Relationship Violence?
The directionality of the patriarchal attitudes/relationship violence variables was
going to be assessed using non-recursive SEM. Unfortunately, these were not possible.
Cross-lagged, non-recursive models require at least three data points (Kenny 2012). An
alternative was to at least conduct a cross-sectional, non-recursive model for each wave
independently. This too was problematic. Essentially, non-recursive causal models
suffer from inherent problems of under-identification (Berry 1984). One way around this
is to include exogenous variables that covary, but predict different outcomes (i.e.
instrumental variables). This was not possible with either Wave 1 or Wave 2. Simply
adding non-significant variables to improve model fit (i.e. adding a variable = 0 was the
same thing as not adding a variable) was inappropriate.

Figure 5.4. Autoregressive SEM Assessing Predictors of Change/Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes
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In short, Q6 could not be answered because o f limitations in the data that prevent
logical theoretical tests o f reciprocal relations between patriarchal attitudes and
relationship violence. Fortunately, the data in the next chapter had three data points and
non-recursive models could be conducted that assessed the reciprocal relationship
between relationship violence and patriarchal attitudes.

LIMITATIONS
Assessing change in two-wave panel designs can involve a number of statistical
approaches (Kline 2011; Markus 1979). While the numerous analysis techniques are
partially a reflection of how advanced statistical techniques have become, none o f these
can account for the fact that assessing change from just two waves of data is inherently
difficult. However, two-wave panel models can provide preliminary insight into building
more complex (or more parsimonious) theoretical models, which could aid in the
analyses covered in the next two chapters.
One benefit of having fewer data points in a longitudinal analysis is that the threat
to internal validity known as history is far less likely (see Campbell and Stanley 1963).
While other threats to internal validity are also minimized in one group pre-test/post-test
designs, history is particularly important to discuss when dealing with concepts like
patriarchal ideology that may be influenced by macro-level factors. Although it was
previously discussed that changes in the structure o f patriarchy can occur without any
change to the ideological components, this does not mean institutional sources can never
influence patriarchal ideology. The limited data points here, and the relatively short time
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period between them (9 months) is beneficial for reducing the likelihood that aggregate
and/or exogenous variables that are unaccounted for will influence the outcomes.
This limitation, however, seems contradictory to the longitudinal measurement
variability o f patriarchal attitudes for Cohort 2. Also, keep in mind that Chapter 4 had a
footnote (Footnote 2) that showed these measures were unreliable for Wave 3 for Cohort
1. Admittedly, these findings were completely unexpected. It is possible that these
measures were just not reliable over time and perhaps it was mere coincidence that Wave
1 and Wave 2 were reliable for Cohort 1. Attitudinal measures, after all, are considered.
Despite this, some have measured ideological constructs reliably in the past (see Chapter
3). There may be something unique about patriarchal ideology that makes attitudinal
constructions of them variable over time and perhaps other methods of capturing this
construct are more reliable. Theoretically and methodologically these points, in general,
are definitely possibilities. However, I suspect that the actual data collection techniques
were the likely culprit for the lack of longitudinal measurement invariance.
At the beginning o f this chapter, I gave the breakdown of the sample size
distributions at each data point for each cohort. In the next chapter I do the same
regarding the vignette-style items. Although more detailed in that section, briefly, I
should mention that Cohort 1 was not given those items at Wave 2, but Cohort 2 and
Cohort 3 were. Once Cohort 1 was given these items at Wave 3, the reliability o f the
attitudinal items dropped considerably. Moreover, 175 respondents from Cohort 1 at
Wave 3 were missing from the attitudinal items, the same number o f respondents that
had valid responses to the newly added vignette items. This seemed too odd o f a
coincidence, but nowhere in the codebook was this mentioned. The principal investigator
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was also unaware of any overlap in items that would create this issue5. This is one o f the
consequences of dealing with older datasets, unfortunately, and is one o f the limitations
in this data. Pointing out the confounding issues o f these items actually helps solidify the
analyses that were done, however. If the only times (with the exception o f Wave 3,
where it appears half the sample received the vignette-style items and half received the
attitudinal items for Cohort 1) that the attitudinal measures were not reliable were when
these new items were not included in the surveys, then most likely the survey
construction is the real reason for the lack of longitudinal measurement reliability for
Cohort 2 and for more than 2 data points.
The last limitation to discuss in this chapter is that this sample of college males
was not generalizable to males in the general population. Additionally, the college
students selected are not nationally representative o f all college students since they are
from one college. Also, the emphasis placed on intersectionality in previous chapters
cannot account for the fact that the use o f a homogenous sample o f college students
produces nothing more than a dichotomous measure of race and no indicators of SES.
The use of a non-representative sample is somewhat problematic for theory building
concerned with patriarchal ideology for men in general. However, insights can be gained
from the current research since it is really the first o f its kind to assess individual
patriarchal ideology as the key outcome variable for any sample o f males. Future studies
should analyze individual patriarchal ideology over time amongst samples o f the general
population, especially those with more variable race categories and some measure o f

5Jackie White, email correspondence, November 11,2011.
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SES. College men, however, do present some unique attributes that make them
interesting to study. This is why many research studies involving violence against
women have relied on samples of college men (e.g. DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b; Koss
et al. 1987; Porter and Williams 2011; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).

CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the analyses that addressed 6 major research questions
about attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology. The panel data of college males from
1990-1991 was analyzed in a test/retest manner in order to assess: 1) the measurement
structure of the attitudinal items of patriarchal ideology, 2) the reliability o f these
measures over time, 3) the predictors o f patriarchal ideology, 4) the change/stability in
patriarchal ideology, 5) the reasons for the change/stability, and 6) the reciprocal
relationships between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences.
The findings imply that attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology are reliable,
even over time with only minor reservations, most likely due to data collection
techniques. In multivariate analyses, witnessing domestic violence between one’s parents
suggested a higher level of pre-college patriarchal ideology than those that did not
witness domestic violence, while controlling for other key independent variables. These
effects were not as significant at the end o f the first year of college, although a levels did
approach significance. This was the only significant predictor of pre-college patriarchal
ideology, although relationship violence perpetration did approach the a level as those
with higher levels of involvement were likely to have higher levels of patriarchal
ideology. At Wave 2, the only significant predictor o f patriarchal ideology was race,
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suggesting non-whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology than whites. One
variable besides witnessing domestic violence approached the a level o f significance at
Wave 2, was dating frequency. That is, those that dated rarely or only occasionally in the
first year of college appeared to have lower levels of patriarchal ideology than those that
dated frequently.
Regarding change, individual patriarchal ideology appears to have been stable
from wave to wave. The exact source o f this stability was difficult to assess, although
there was some evidence that patriarchal male peers prior to college significantly
predicted higher levels of patriarchal ideology after the first year o f college. Patriarchal
male peers during college, however, were not indicative o f a higher level o f patriarchal
ideology. In other words, it appears patriarchal male peers before college may have a
delayed effect on patriarchal ideology, since they were not significant predictors until
after the first year of college. No other explanations for stability could be drawn. The
last research question could not be assessed. This was either due to non-reciprocity
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences because these
constructs/experiences are just not related (hence why none of the models were reliable)
or limitations in the data.
Some of the limitations in the data and analyses from this chapter are addressed in
the next two chapters. Those analyses ask very similar research questions in comparison
to those addressed in this chapter. Although there are slight variations in these questions,
overall, they, in combination with this chapter’s questions, address the overall question
of: how does patriarchal ideology change over time and what accounts for these changes
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(if any)? After the next two chapters is Chapter 8, the Discussions chapter in which
many of the findings from this chapter and the next two will be put into context.
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CHAPTER VI
METHODS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME
USING LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODELING

In this chapter, a major limitation of the previous analyses is addressed.
Specifically, the difficulty in assessing “true change” in individual patriarchal ideology
from two data points is addressed in this chapter. This chapter describes a more
sophisticated method for modeling intra- and inter-individual change in patriarchal
ideology through the use o f latent growth curve modeling (LGM) over three waves o f
data. LGM accounts for some of the deficiencies found in the previous chapter’s
analyses, but is not without its own limitations. As Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski
(1982) so eloquently put it, “To discard the logic of models for individual change because
o f the deficiencies of two-wave data is like ‘throwing away the baby with the bathwater”’
(735). The prior chapters’ analyses, along with those described in this chapter (results in
Chapter 7), complement one another in providing a holistic approach to understanding
individual patriarchal ideology. Outside of the LGM approach, the other key distinction
in the second major analysis is the key outcome, patriarchal ideology, is measured with
vignette-based items instead o f attitudinal measures. Five o f the key research questions
addressed with the LGM analyses (which closely parallel research questions from the
previous two chapters) are:
Ql: Are the vignette-based items reliable measures o f patriarchal ideology?
Q2: Does patriarchal ideology change over time?
Q3: If patriarchal ideology does change, in what direction does it change (i.e.
what is the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology over time)?
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Q4: How does patriarchal ideology change over time (i.e. direction of trajectory)
in conjunction with relationship violence involvement?
Q5: What predicts the variation in patriarchal ideology over time?
Q6: What is the reciprocal relationship between patriarchal ideology and
relationship violence?
Unlike the previous chapter, where all research questions were addressed in the analysis
chapter, Ql and Q2 are addressed in this chapter, and the remaining questions are in
Chapter 7. This was done so that Chapter 7 would focus entirely on multivariate growth
and change in the key variables of interest.
This chapter begins with a description of the data and sample used in this chapter
and Chapter 7. This is followed by a discussion o f the key variables o f interest, including
their descriptive statistics and reliability analyses for key constructs. Then, bivariate
analyses are performed to help get a basic understanding of some o f the key relationships
of interest in later multivariate models. Lastly, the growth curve models used to address
many of the above research questions are explained. The next chapter (Chapter 7)
presents the results of various models aimed at addressing Q3-Q6.

DATA AND SAMPLE
The methods described in this chapter rely on data from the same Longitudinal
Study o f Violence against Women (White et al. 2002) as the previous test/retest analyses.
As part of the original research design, the items used to represent patriarchal ideology in
this chapter were added to the survey after the initial wave of data collection. Thus,
Wave 2 (end of first year of college; end o f freshman year), Wave 3 (end o f second year
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of college; end of sophomore year), Wave 4 (end of third year of college; end o f junior
year), and Wave 5 (end o f fourth year of college; end of senior year) all contained these
items; however, Wave 5 was deleted because the sample size was too small for LGM (n <
200; see Byrne 2010)1. This left Wave 2, Wave 3, and Wave 4 as the data points under
study for the current chapter, with results in the very next chapter (Chapter 7). Since the
previous chapter used this same dataset, the waves of data are called Waves 2, 3, and 4
even though Wave 2 was the initial/baseline data point fo r this chapter.
Recall that the original sample size was 851. However, this number was reduced
when respondents with missing answers (mainly due to attrition) at all three waves
regarding the key dependent variable o f patriarchal ideology were deleted from the
dataset. Thus, the initial sample size for Wave 2 was 578. That is, 578 respondents had
at least 1 data point in which they responded to the key outcome variable o f interest:
patriarchal ideology. Table 6.1 summarizes the total sample size at each time point along
with sample retention rates.

1Class level changes are not automatic from year to year if the appropriate credits are not
met. However, the assumption was that most participants were making satisfactory
progress from one academic school year to the next. While it is possible some may have
made satisfactory progress towards graduation within 4 years and not made the expected,
time-appropriate increase in class status, the time periods are at times referred to in
relation to class-status (e.g. “end of sophomore year”). This was done mainly because of
the generality and easy frame of reference that college-class level provides.

174

Missing Data
Recall that in the previous two-wave panel analyses there were three cohorts
combined into one dataset as part o f an accelerated-cohort sequential design. By
combining all cohorts, the original research assumed cohort effects were not present,
essentially employing a traditional longitudinal design. Table 6.1 provides clarity
regarding the size of each cohort at each wave of data collection since there was data
missing by design as well as data missing due to attrition. Cohort 1 was the only cohort
that did not receive the items/indicators o f patriarchal ideology across all three time
points and for reasons not discussed by the original researchers, they only received these
measures at Waves 3 and 4 (i.e. missing by design at the initial data point, see Little and
Rubin 1989). When data were missing by design, they were treated as MCAR whenever
LGMs were used (see Duncan, Duncan, and Strycker 2006)2. These missing cases, as
well as those lost due to attrition, and those missing due to item non-response (< 5%)
were later estimated using maximum-likelihood (ML).

2 Like the panel data from Chapter 4, the MCAR assumption was supported by an
independent samples t-test was performed comparing the mean level of patriarchal
ideology among those that remained at all three waves and those that dropped out (at any
point). There were no significant differences between the patriarchal ideology o f those
that were retained at all three waves and those that dropped out of the study.
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Table 6.1. Sample Size for Valid Responses for each Data Point for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 4
End o f
End o f
Average
Freshman
Sophomore End o f Junior Retention
Year__________Year________ Year____Percentage

Cohort 1

0 (1991)*

Retention
Wave 1 to
Wave 3

175(1992)

120(1993)

69%

69%

Cohort 2

241 (1992)

181 (1993)

112(1994)

69%

47%

Cohort 3

157(1993)

94(1994)

66(1995)

65%

42%

398

450

298

N/A

N/A

Total Sample
Size

Notes: Retention percentages o f total sample are not listed since these can be difficult to
interpret since Wave 3 “retained” more respondents than those that were available at
Wave 2. “Items were not given to Cohort 1 until Wave 3 (i.e. missing by design).
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Many of the variable descriptions discussed below appeared in the earlier twowave panel models. The descriptive statistics of these, however, differ from those in
Chapter 4. This is because of the differences in: the number o f cohorts used, the number
o f data points, and the data points used including the initial wave of data. Also, because
of various issues regarding missing data, some variables were excluded from the previous
chapter while some new variables were introduced.

OPERATIONALIZING PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY WITH VIGNETTES
Whether or not the use o f vignette items to represent ideologies is “better” or
“worse” than traditionally used “attitude/agreement” statements is a contested issue.
Finch (1987:105) correctly discussed how challenging it can be to study ideologies when
she stated, “The empirical study of beliefs, values and norms has always posed some o f
the most difficult methodological questions for sociology.” Using an individual’s actions
as a reflection of their ideology is highly problematic for two obvious reasons. First, the
psychological literature on cognitive dissonance tells us an individual’s actions can be at
odds with their ideology. Second, this can be tautological if trying to predict an
individual’s actions based on their ideology (when the ideological measures contain the
very actions one is interested in, in the first place). Finch (1987) argued for the use of
vignettes as one of the more reliable measurement tools to measure ideology. Note the
less subjective and contextual components o f attitudes/ideologies:
Vignettes move further away again from a direct and abstracted approach, and
allow for features o f the context to be specified, so that the respondent is being
invited to make normative statements about a set of social circumstances, rather
than to express his or her ‘beliefs’ or ‘values’ in a vacuum. It is a method which,
in other words, acknowledges that meanings are social and that morality may well
be situationally specific. (Finch 1987:105-106)
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Finch’s argument helps make the case for why vignettes might be preferred when
researchers are specifically measuring ideological concepts. Specific to violence against
women, research from Pease and Flood (2008) has echoed Finch. They argued against
the use of attitudinal statements in saying, “ideology is more concerned with how
individual character is shaped by social conditions and social consciousness’’’ [emphasis
added] (554). The use of vignette-style items in assessing patriarchal ideology appears to
be just as reliable, if not a better measurement technique than traditional attitudinal items.
The vignettes described in this chapter represent a dimension o f patriarchal
ideology: rape myth acceptance. At first glance, this may appear to be quite limiting
since four dimensions of patriarchal ideology were previously discussed (i.e.
dominance/power over women, hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, acceptance of
violence against women). Recall that rape myth acceptance overlaps considerably with
acceptance of violence against women and dominance/power over women. This is
because rape is viewed as intrinsically violent3. At the same time, rape is a direct form of
dominance for the individual perpetrator and at times institutional responses to rape have
resulted in the continued subordination of women (Caringella 2009; Sanday 2007).

3 These issues are highlighted by Caringella (2009) who notes changes in legal
terminology, “Redefining rape as criminal violence, or replacing the rape-as-sex view
with the notion of rape-as-violence, is designed to make rape and/or sexual assault
offenses as serious, legally and sociologically speaking, as other offenses that are violent
in nature.” However, she further argues that not all sexual assaults are violent and the
sexual nature o f these crimes can sometimes be lost if one nuances these terms.
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Whether rape myth acceptance should be treated as a dimension of patriarchal ideology
or as an indicator of an existing dimension is still unclear. For the current study, it is the
only component of patriarchal ideology that the vignettes measured. For these reasons,
the combination of these six items might be considered a proxy measure o f patriarchal
ideology.

OUTCOME VARIABLES AND RELIABILITY

Dependent Variable: Patriarchal Ideology
Patriarchal ideology was operationalized using six vignette-style items in which
male respondents were given the following scenario:
There are a number of circumstances under which some people think it is OK to
have sex with a woman who didn’t want to (i.e., resisted verbally and/or
physically). How likely is it you would have sex with a woman when she didn’t
want to if each of the following happened? (White et al. 2002)
The vignettes were:
You spend a lot of money on her.
She’s had sexual intercourse with other guys.
She previously had sexual intercourse with you.
She is stoned or drunk.
She gets you sexually excited.
She said she’s going to have sex with you and then changes her mind.

179
Responses were based on Likert-scale items (0- Never, 1- Very Unlikely, 2- Somewhat
Unlikely, 3- Somewhat Likely, 4- Very Likely)4.
Q l: Are the Vignette-Based Items Reliable Measures o f Patriarchal Ideology?
The six vignette-based items were scaled into composite variables called
Patriarchal Ideology2 (at times shortened for space and clarity to PID2), Patriarchal
Ideology3 (at times PID3), and Patriarchal Ideology4 (at times PID4) for each respective
wave. When referring to this variable in general and not in terms o f any specific wave, it
is presented as simply, “Patriarchal Ideology.” Each of the time-specific measures of
patriarchal ideology had strong levels o f reliability as evidenced by their Cronbach’s a
values: Wave 2 (a = .901), Wave 3 (a = .920), and Wave 4 (a = .966). The descriptive
statistics for these dependent variables can be found in Table 6.2. As anticipated, the six-

4 Original response options were: 0- No Response, 1- Very likely, 2- Somewhat likely, 3Somewhat unlikely, 4- Very Unlikely, 5- Never. Response options were re-coded from
the original data so that higher scores^ would indicate a higher degree o f patriarchal
ideology and 0 would be the baseline, consistent with other variables. Non-response
items were recoded into a 9-Missing and were list wise deleted when all items were
combined into a scale.
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item scale had a positive skew5. Therefore, the variable PIDln was created to induce
normality, in which the In function of PID was computed (+ 1 due to 0 starting point).
This was done for each time period (i.e. PIDln2, PIDln3, PIDln4). Because the
patriarchal ideology variable was skewed, only the In version of the variable was used in
any of the analyses from this point forward. So when “patriarchal ideology” is seen in
any of the analyses in the remaining sections o f this chapter, it is the In version, even if it
is not explicitly labeled as such. Based on the a values for each composite scale, the
answer to Ql is simply: yes the six vignette-style items all scaled together to form one
reliable construct at each data point.
The previous chapter did emphasize the importance of checking for longitudinal
measurement invariance (i.e. longitudinal CFA). Longitudinal measurement invariance
was not assessed here, however, because such models make more sense to conduct when
latent factors are used in subsequent SEM models. LGM does not typically use latent

5 Although Chapter 3 highlighted that patriarchal ideology is normalized (e.g. complicit
masculinities), these measures were proxy measures and were really only one dimension
o f patriarchal ideology, rape myth acceptance. However, since the items were based on
hypothetical scenarios in which individuals would behave, most individuals were thought
to report that they would not rape in almost any circumstance, hence the positive skew.
Theoretically, however, we would expect these values to be less extreme (as they were in
the previous chapter) if they were traditional “acceptance of rape myths”-type measures
in which they accepted rape in general (e.g. not individualizing it, friends use of rape).
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constructs (since the slope and mean are modeled as latent factors). Although it is
possible to first create a latent variable CFA and then assess the slope and mean o f the
latent construct as second-order factors, these models are quite complex and are difficult
to fit with data from relatively small samples such as the one currently being used. While
this may seem limiting to some, requiring latent factors as outcomes and means as well as
slopes as second order factors is not a common practice within the LGM literature. The
primary focus o f LGM is not latent psychometrics, but latent factors that represent the
change in the outcome (Preacher et al. 2008).

Covariates o f Patriarchal Ideology: Relationship Violence
Table 6.2 also includes measures derived from 9 questions asked at all 3 waves
that assessed relationship violence perpetration as well as another 9 items that assessed
relationship violence victimization. Both the perpetration and victimization scale items
contained 5 items regarding verbal aggression and 4 regarding physical aggression. The
individual items were ordinal in that respondents were asked, “How often have these
things happened during the last year?” Responses were: 0- 0 times, 1- Once, 2- 2-5
times, 3-6-10 times, 4- more than 10 times6.

6 These responses reflect the current coding scheme. They were re-coded from the
original scheme of 0- No Response, 1- 0, 2- Once, 3- 2-5 times, 4- 6-10, 5- More than 10
times. This was done for ease in interpretation so that 0 would reflect never, 1 would
reflect 1, and then the subsequent numeric values would represent their respective
categories.
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LGM requires that outcome variables and their covariates be continuous.
Ignoring the censored-nature of ordinal variables by combining them into composite
scales produces highly skewed variables and over exaggerates less-serious
ideologies/behaviors (Osgood et al. 2002). Nonetheless, two variables for each wave
were created in which the ordinal nature was ignored and all 9 items were combined.
These scales for relationship violence were known by their variable names of
Relationship Violence Perpetration (at times shortened for space and/or clarity to RVP,
followed by numeric values o f either 2, 3, or 4 for each respective time point) and
Relationship Violence Victimization (at times shortened to R W , followed by the
appropriate value for the respective time point). As expected, these items were positively
skewed. In order to reduce their skew, the In function o f each was computed (+1 due to
“0” starting point). These newly computed variables can also be found in Table 6.2 (i.e.
RVP21n, RVP31n, RVP41n, RW 21n, RW 31n, RVV41n). The reason for treating these
measures as continuous was done in an exploratory sense in order to see how these items
would perform in the subsequent LGMs since no prior research has assessed individual
patriarchal ideology over time while controlling for the covariance o f relationship
violence variables. A third pair of variables were created for each wave in regards to
perpetration that were similar to those created in the previous chapter in which the 9
items were dichotomized (0- Never, 1- Ever) then summed into one composite scale.
Hindelang et al. (1981) found this to be reliable when dealing with skewed self-reported
delinquency since: it induced normality, the higher values reflected more serious offenses
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(ideologies in the present case), and it avoided potential problems with assigning metric
values to ordered categories. These variables actually remained non-normal (skewness
statistic > 1 .0 , albeit less skewed than the original measures) after items were
dichotomized. Because these variables did not meet the assumptions o f normality, they
were not included in any of the analyses. They are mentioned here because it was one
possible alternative to the In transformation, which ignored the ordinal nature of these
variables (i.e. RVPln and RVVln variables). However, the variables that ignored the
ordinal nature of these variables were preferred because it is far less biased than including
non-normal measures. All composite scales for relationship violence perpetration and
victimization across all waves were indicative o f reliability (Cronbach’s a > .80).

Time- Variant Measures
The descriptive statistics for the time-variant measures described below can be
found in Table 6.3.
Dating Frequency. Respondent’s frequency in which they dated was captured
over each wave of data with the question, “Which o f the following best describes your
dating behavior during the past school year? By a date we mean a planned activity with a
specific person.” Responses ranged from: 0- Never dated to 4- Dated Frequently7. This
variable label was “Frequent Dater” so that positive values would indicate a higher

7 See

previous note regarding the coding o f this variable.
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frequency in dating. At times, this variable is presented simply as “Dating” due to space
limitations (e.g. Table 6 .6 ).
Relationship Status. Relationship status was captured over three waves. As
expected, most respondents were either single or in some form of a relationship (e.g.
dating someone exclusively, engaged, married, divorced/separated/widowed). Thus, this
variable was dichotomized (0- Not Single, 1- Single) and was simply called: “Single” so
that positive values would reflect one’s single-status.
Sexual Assault Program Attendance. Respondents were asked whether or not
they had ever attended a sexual assault awareness program. The responses were
dichotomized (0- No, 1-Yes). In reality, the only change one would expect in this
variable (if any) would occur from “No” responses to a “Yes.” Respondents cannot undo
the fact that they had attended a sexual assault program. Nonetheless, some respondent’s
changed their responses from “Yes” to “No.” The decision was made to accept these
changes under the assumption that a respondent that changed their answer from a yes to a
no had not fully understood what a sexual assault program was in earlier waves o f data
collection. However, it is equally likely that they thought the question was in reference
to the past year (despite no change in the wording of the question) or that they forgot
about their earlier attendance. Statistically speaking, t-test results showed no significant
differences in the average number o f respondents attending a sexual assault program from
wave to wave, justifying the assumption and not re-coding the variable. This variable
name was, “Sex Assault Program” but at times is shortened due to space and/or clarity
reasons to “SAP” (followed by a numeric value for each respective wave).
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Time-Invariant Predictors

The following predictors’ descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6.4.
Race. Respondent’s race was dichotomized (0 -Other, 1-White). Other racial
groups were present in the original surveys, but since so few respondents were non-white
dichotomizing the race variable seemed appropriate. “White” was given as a label since
white was coded as 1 .
Witnessed Domestic Violence. Whether or not the respondent ever witnessed
domestic violence between their parents was captured with the question, “For an average
month, indicate how often one of your parents or stepparents delivered physical blows to
the other.” Responses were ordinal: 1- Never, 2- One to five times, 3-Six to ten times, 411 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. Due to an expected skew and the difficulty SEM and
LGM have with ordinal variables, this variable was dichotomized (0- Never witnessed
domestic violence, 1- Witnessed domestic violence). For simplification, this variable was
labeled, “Witnessed D. Violence.” At times, due to space limitations and/or clarity
purposes, this variable is labeled “WitnessDV.”
Childhood Abuse Experiences. Whether or not the respondent was abused by a
parent was asked with the question, “Physical blows (like hitting, kicking, throwing
someone down) sometimes occur between family members. For an average month, when
you were growing up (i.e., ages to years), indicate how often one o f your parents did this
to you.” Responses were ordinal: 1- Never, 2- One to five times, 3- Six to ten times, 411 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. It was hypothesized that in a sample of college
students, most would not have experienced child abuse. This was supported in that this
variable had a positive skew. Because o f the skew and the difficulty SEM and LGM has
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with ordinal variables, this variable was dichotomized: 0- No, 1- Yes. This variable is
labeled in most figures as “Victim of Child Abuse”, but at times, in some tables (e.g.
Table 6 .6 ) is shortened for clarity and/or space to “CAbuse.
Religiosity. Religiosity was captured over three waves of data with the question,
“How much of an influence would you say religion has on the way you choose to spend
your time each day during this school year i.e. August to the present?” Responses ranged
from: 0- No influence to 3- A great deal o f influence8. While religiosity was originally
hypothesized to be time-variant, a paired samples t-test showed that the mean at each
wave (Religiosity2, x = 1.04; Religiosity3 x = 1.05; Religiosity4 x = 1.04) was not
significantly different from Wave 2 to Wave 3 nor from Wave 3 to Wave 4 (p > .05).
The lack of variability in the mean of religiosity justified the inclusion of it as an
exogenous predictor variable, which was continuous.
Rapist Best Friend. Borrowing from the Koss et al. (1987) “Sexual Experiences
Survey” there were 10 items assessing the respondent’s best friend’s use o f attempted or
completed coerced sex. Participants were asked how often (0- No, 1- One time, 2- Two
times, 3- three to five times, 4- More than five times) their best friend engaged in various

8 The

original variable was coded with the same responses ranging from 1-4, but were

changed in order to stay consistent with other variables, whose starting points were also
0.

Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics of Key Outcome Variables

Variable
(Coding)________________ n

Wave 2
Mean (SD)

skew

n

Wave 3
Mean (SD)

skew

n

Wave 4
Mean (SD)

skew

Patriarchal Ideology
(Range 0-24)

397

5.53 (6.43)

1.34

450

4.20(6.02)

1.76

297

3.45(6.29)

2.11

Patriarchal Ideologyln

397

1.38(1.03)

0.07

450

1.07(1.06)

0.48

297

0.78(1.10)

0.96

Rel. Viol. Perpetration
(Range 0-36)

557

2.72 (3.90)

2.49

445

3.61 (4.99)

2.18

292

3.06 (4.49)

2.45

Rel. Viol. Perpetration

567

0.91 (0.87)

0.49

445

1.05(0.97)

0.37

292

0.96(0.91)

0.47

Rel. Viol. Victimization
(Range 0-36)

566

3.55(5.07)

2.45

445

3.57 (4.89)

2.27

295

3.88 (5.47)

2.24

Rel. Viol. Victimizationln____ 566______ 1.04(0.96)

0.40

445

1.07(0.95)

0.34

295

1.09(0.98)

0.39

00

-j

Table 6.3. Descriptive Statistics of Time-Variant Measures

Variable
(Range/Coding)________
Frequent Dater
(Range 0-4)

n

569

Wave 2
Mean (SD)

3.16(0.97)

n

Wave 3
Mean (SD)

skew

n

Wave 4
Mean (SD)

-0.74

447

2.33(1.31)

0.22

296

3.27(0.96)

-1.06

skew

skew

Single
(0-Not Single, 1-Single)

575 0.66(0.48)

-0.67

455

0.63 (0.48)

-0.52

299

0.53 (0.50)

-0.11

Sex Assault Program
Attendance
(0-No, 1-Yes)

557 0.19(0.40)

1.55

444

0.15(0.36)

1.93

297

0.26(0.44)

1.13

00
00
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Table 6.4. Descriptive Statistics o f Predictors

Variable
White

Description
Other Racial Group or White

n

Percentage

0- Other

189

32.8

1-

388

67.2

527
36

93.6
6.4

412

73.2

151

26.8

0- No

341

76.3

1-

106

23.7

n

x (SD)

296

3.09 (2.65)

White

Witness D. Violence
0- No
1 - Yes
Victim of Child
Abuse

Ever witness domestic violence between
parents

Ever physically abused by parent

0-No
1-Yes
Patriarchal Best
Friend

Best friend ever attempt sexual assault

Yes

Religiosity

Influence of religion in day to day life
(0- No Influence, 1- Some Amount, 2Fair Amount, 3- Great Deal).
Collected at each wave (Range 0-4),
then combined into one overall
religiosity scale (Range 0-9).
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coercive sexual acts since the age o f 149. Responses ranged from: “Has he engaged in
sex play (fondling, kissing or petting but not intercourse with a woman when she didn’t
want to by overwhelming her with continual arguments and pressure?” to “Has he
engaged in sex acts (oral or anal intercourse or penetration by objects other than the
penis) with a woman when she didn’t want to by threatening or using some degree o f
physical force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.)?”
Because the 10 responses reflected extreme forms of delinquency (i.e. attempted
sexual assaults and completed sexual assaults), it was no surprise that these variables all
had a positive skew. Since the measures were ordinal, the decision was made to use the
technique previously employed in this chapter that Hindelang et al. (1981) found to be
reliable regarding the combination of skewed, ordinal variables. Thus, all 10 items were
dichotomized into (0- No, 1- Yes) and combined to form a composite variable of
patriarchal best friend (a = .821). This variable also had a positive skew (albeit not as

9 These

items were asked during Wave 3. Their retrospective nature makes them

appropriate to use as a constant variable. It was not known what the respondent’s best
friend’s experiences with sexual assault were at the initial wave (Wave 2), nor was it
known if more respondent’s friends engaged in sexual assault from Wave 3 to Wave 4.
Thus, it was possible that more respondent’s best friend’s attempted or completed a
sexual assault than what is captured here. However, this increase is not expected to be
drastic since this retrospective measure is going all the way back to when their best friend
was 14.
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skewed as the original 10-item scale). Thus, the decision was made to go one step
beyond the Hindelang et al. (1981) technique in order to best account for the lack o f
normality by dichotomizing the composite scale (0 - non-rapist best friend, 1 - rapist best
friend). While this reduced the variation in this concept, it served as a proxy measure for
an individual’s differential association with patriarchal male peers10. Based on the
positive coding of this dichotomous measure, this variable was labeled “Rapist Best
Friend.” Some tables were limited regarding space (e.g. Table 6 .6 ) therefore, “RapeBF”
was used.
Although this proxy measure of patriarchal peer support is not what is
traditionally used, it does provide some alternative benefits to assessing this relationship.
Mainly, one’s best friend is thought to have a greater likelihood of influencing their
patriarchal ideology since the relationship is more intense than other peer associations.

10 Although

this is admittedly not the best indicator of male peer support, it was the only

one available in the data that had enough valid responses for the data points currently
used. As noted in Chapter 3, male peer support for violence against women has been one
of the more developed theoretical concepts that should be included in a theory o f violence
against women. Thus, a proxy measure is preferred over no measure. Furthermore,
treating this measure as a constant might be problematic because male peer support is
thought to be dynamic, not static (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). Nonetheless,
patriarchal male peer support has never been considered as an independent variable
predictive of individual patriarchal ideology and its inclusion can be the starting point for
future research in this area.
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Intensity of the relationship is a crucial component to social learning theory (see Akers
2009). Traditional measures of patriarchal male peers may be capturing the intensity of
the relationships (assuming one’s best friend is among the peer group) and the frequency
of exposure to male peer groups but the former is just an assumption. While the current
measure used herein is measuring the frequency in which the respondent’s best friend did
various patriarchal/sexually assaultive acts, the frequency of contact/learning from these
best friends is not known. The fact that the questions are about one’s best friend,
however, ensures the intensity of the relationship.

BIVARIATE STATISTICS

Paired-Samples -Test
Table 6.5 shows the means comparisons for time-variant measures, which used
paired-samples t-tests for repeated measures. These analyses compared each variable
from Wave 2 to Wave 3, Wave 3 to Wave 4, and Wave 2 to Wave 4. A limitation in ttests with multiple data points is that they only account for changes at two data points.
Despite this, this preliminary test gave a decent understanding of the relationships to
expect in the more complex multivariate analyses in Chapter 7. While wave to wave
comparisons make the most inherent sense, the Wave 2 to Wave 4 comparisons help
show differences from the beginning data point to the end data point.
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Table 6.5. Results o f Paired Samples T-Tests for Mean Differences in Repeated
Measures
Wave
Variable
Comparison
Wave 2 Wave 3
Patriarchal
Wave 3 Ideologyln
Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 3
Relationship
Wave 3 Violence
Wave 4
Perpetrationln
Wave 2 Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 3
Relationship
Wave 3 Violence
Wave 4
Victimizationln
Wave 2 Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 3
Wave 3 Frequent Dater
Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 3
Wave 3 Single
Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 4
Wave 2 Wave 3
Sex Assault
Wave 3 Program
Wave 4
Attendance
Wave 2 Wave 4

M (SD )
1.40(1.00)
0.74(1.08)
1.15(1.08)
0.78(1.10)
1.42(1.05)
0.82(1.12)
0.89 (0.88)
1.05(0.96)
1.07 (0.97)
0.97 (0.92)
0.85 (0.86)
0.96 (0.92)
1.02 (0.97)
1.06 (0.94)
1.07 (0.96)
1.10(0.98)
0.98 (0.96)
1.10(0.98)
3.12(0.98)
2.33(1.31)
2.39(1.31)
3.29 (0.95)
3.10(1.00)
3.26 (0.97)
0.33 (0.47)
0.37 (0.48)
0.39 (0.49)
0.47 (0.50)
0.33 (0.47)
0.47 (0.50)
0.20 (0.40)
0.15(0.36)
0.15(0.36)
0.25 (0.43)
0.17(0.38)
0.26 (0.44)

N

t

df

AM (SD)

273

9.28

272

0.66***(1.17)

292

4.77

291

0.37***(1.32)

176

5.94

175

0.60***(1.34)

436

-3.3

435

-0.15***(0.97)

286

1.68

285

0.10(0.97)

285

-1.87

284

-0.11 ( 1 .0 2 )a

436

-.80

435

-0.04 (0.96)

289

-.41

288

-0 .0 2 ( 1 .0 1 )

287

- 1.8

286

-0 .1 2 ( 1 .10 )b

441

11.86

440

0.80***(1.41)

289 -11.03

288

-0.89***(1.38)

291

-2.53

290

-0.16** (1.09)

452

-1.55

451

-0.04 (0.58)

297

-2.28

296

-0.08* (0.58)

297

-4.07

296

-0.14*** (0.60)

431

1.93

430

0.05* (0.52)

290

-3.51

289

-0.10** (0.49)

288

-3.00

287

-0.08** (0.47)

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Notes: Listwise deletion used for missing cases (analysis-by-analysis). aApproaches
significance (p = .06). bApproaches significance (p = .07).

194
Inter-Item Correlations

Table 6 .6 provides inter-item correlations (i.e. Pearson’s r) o f all of the key
variables of interest. Previously discussed measures that were not normally distributed
are absent from the table. Like the t-tests, these help in understanding some o f the basic
relationships before controlling for more in multivariate analyses.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY: USING LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODELING TO
ASSESS PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME
Byrne’s (2010:304-309) research served as a guideline for the latent growth curve
models. LGM was used within the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework
using AMOS 21 for Windows. Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation was used for
missing values.
The LGM technique allowed for the assessment o f change in patriarchal ideology
within individuals (e.g. Level-1, intra-individual) as well as between individuals (e.g.
level-2, inter-individual) (see Willett and Sayer 1994). Multi-level modeling can also be
performed using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). While it is typically one’s personal
preference for using either HLM or SEM for multi-level modeling, there are unique
instances in which one should be used over the other. In the present case, since data was
collected for each participant at the same point in time (for each cohort that is), the SEM
technique was appropriate. Moreover, the SEM approach was preferred since it can
estimate covariance structures (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Covariance, after all,

Table 6.6. Pearson’s r Correlations for All Variables
Variable
1.White
2.WitnessDV
3.C Abuse
4.RapistBF
5.Religiosity2
6.Religiosity3
7.Religiosity4
8.Dating2
9.Dating3
10.Dating4
11 .Single2
12.Single3
13.Single4
14.SAP2
15.SAP3
16.SAP4
17.PIDln2
18.PIDln3
19.PIDln4
20.RVPln2
21.RVPln3
22.RVPln4
23.RVVln2
24.RVVln3
25.RVVln4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1 .0 0

.05
-.03
.0 1

-. 1 1 *
-.16***
-.08
-.03
-.18***
.06
.0 0

-.08
.0 1
.0 2

1 .0 0

.23***
.05
-.0 1

-.04
.05
-.03
.0 1
.0 2

.03
.05
.03
-.03

1 .0 0
.0 1

-. 1 0 *
-. 1 1 *
- .0 1

.04
- .0 1

.03
.0 2

-.05
-.0 1
.0 2

-.0 1

-.0 1

-.0 1

.0 1

-.0 1

- .0 1

,32***
.13***
-.06
.08*
.07
.08
.09*
.03
.05

.08
.09
.13**
.08

.05
.09
.03
.16***
.07

.0 2

.0 2

.09*
.08
.05

.14**
.1 0 *
.06

.0 1

1 .0 0
.0 1

1 .0 0

-.04
.01
.08
.01

.76***
.70***
-.05
-.03

- .0 1

-.0 0

.07
.01

-.05
-.03
.0 2
.06
.03
-.07
.04
-.16***
.05
-.06
.20** -.03
.2 0 ** .0 1
.14* -.02
.25** -.10*
.16** -.09
.2 0 ** - . 1 1
.2 2 ** -. 1 2 **
.15** -.11*
.20** -.14*

1 .0 0

.74***
-.03
-.06
.08
-.05
- .0 2

.07
-.03
-.16***
-.07

1 .0 0

-.06
-.04
.06
-.07
.0 2

.07
- .1 0

-.24***
-.06

-.0 2

- .0 1

-.04

-.03
-.09
-.03

-1 0

-.07
-. 1 2 *
-.15**
-.07
-. 1 2 *
-.17**

1 .0 0

.27***
.39***
.23***
24***
.06
.03
.09
-.05
.03
-.03
29***

- .1 1

.25***
.07
.31***
.24***

-.09

.1 0

-.1 1

-.13*
-.04

1 .0 0

.29***
.09
.25***
.19**
.18**
-. 1 1 *
.17**
-.30***
.2 2 ***
-.03
.1 2 *
-.05
.08
.1 1 *
.13**
.08

1 .0 0

.2 0 ** 1 . 0 0
.33*** .27*** 1 . 0 0
.52*** .24*** .30*** 1 . 0 0
.07
.04
.0 2
.1 0
1 .0 0
.04
-.07
-.05
.06
-.14*
.06
-.04
.08
-.05
.34***
-.1 2
-.08
.04
.0 2
-.0 0
.07
-.04
.03
.05
.0 1
-.04
-.0 2
- .1 1
-.07
-.05
.07
-.0 2
.14*
.26*** .0 1
2 i***
.04
-.09
.08
.26***
.0 0
.17**
.1 2 *
.15**
.15*
.05
.0 2
.18**
.23*** .05
.15*
.25*** .24*** . 1 2 * -.05
.24*** .13*
.16**
.17** .05

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
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Table 6.6. (Continued)
Variable
1.White
2.WitnessDV
3.C Abuse
4.RapistBF
5.Religiosity2
6.Religiosity3
7.Religiosity4
8.Dating2
9.Dating3
10.Dating4
ll.Single2
12.Single3
13.Single4
14.SAP2
15.SAP3
16.SAP4
17.PIDln2
18.PIDln3
19.PIDln4
20.RVPln2
21.RVPln3
22.RVPln4
23.RVVln2
24.RVVln3
25.RVVln4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 .0 0

.25***
-.03
-.08
.05
.04
.05
.03
.05
.03
.03

1 .0 0

.03
.0 2

.03
-.0 2

-.07
.04
.07
-.03
.03

1 .0 0
37

***

1 .0 0

.27***

1 .0 0

.08

.1 0

.18***
.1 1 *
.18**
. 1 2 **
17***

.1 0

.1 2 *

.2 0 ***

.25***
.16***
.1 0

.09
.1 2 *

.1 1

17**
.08
.1 2

1 .0 0

.45***
^3 4 ***

1 .0 0

,84***
.45***
.35***

47

47

***
***

.85***
.42***

1 .0 0

32***
.47***
.85***

1 .0 0

,4 9 ***
.36***

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
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is a crucial component of a theory o f patriarchal ideology and violence against women
since patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences were thought to
change/vary together.This contradicts with much o f the literature that suggests that
relationship violence should predict patriarchal ideology. Recall, however, that the exact
causal order is not well understood, with little to no research considering the feedback
effects between relationship violence and patriarchal ideology. In such cases, then,
covariates are preferred since they make no assumptions regarding a relationship’s
direction.

Single-Domain Growth Curve Models
The first set o f growth-curve models assessed the significance and the direction o f
change in the three key outcome variables o f interest: patriarchal ideology, relationship
violence perpetration, and relationship violence victimization. The models that assessed
patriarchal ideology provided answers to two o f the general research questions presented
at the beginning o f this chapter:
Q2: Does patriarchal ideology change over time?
Q3: If patriarchal ideology does change, in what direction does it change (i.e.
what is the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology over time)?
The expected growth was assumed to be linear (a common assumption when using LGM,
see Byrne 2010)". Figure 6.1 represents the hypothesized LGM for patriarchal ideology

11

In order to challenge this assumption, a quadratic factor could be added to any o f these

models, but unfortunately quadratic LGMs need a minimum o f four data points.
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(In variables used), which was the same structural model used for the relationship
violence perpetration and victimization variables. Although the key variable o f interest is
patriarchal ideology, it is important to independently assess the trajectories of relationship
violence experiences in order to provide context for later analyses when they are
simultaneously assessed. Essentially, the 5 key components of Figure 6.1 are:
1) Mi,

the mean of the intercept (i.e. the average initial level o f each construct at

the first wave of data to end of one’s freshman year).
2 ) Di,

the variance of the intercept (i.e. the amount o f variation in the average

initial level for each construct).
3) Ms, the mean of the slope (i.e. the average rate o f change from the average
initial level).
4) D s, The variance of the slope (i.e. the amount of variance in the average rate of
change).
5) cov, The covariance between the slope and the mean (i.e. assessing whether or
not individuals who have high initial levels experience higher rates of change).
The 1’s in Figure 6.1 from the latent intercept to each repeated manifest variable
represent the constant intercept value for all three data points. The parameters from the
latent slope factor labeled 0 , 1 , 2 represent each time point (0 - baseline/end o f freshman
year,

1-

end of second/sophomore year o f college, 2 - end of third/junior year o f college).

The two-headed arrow from the latent intercept factor and the latent slope factor
represents the covariance between the latent intercept and latent slope.
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Figure 6.1. Hypothesized LGM for Patriarchal Ideology
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Figure 6.2. Multiple-Domain Latent Growth Curve Model
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Conditional Model(s)

After the multiple-domain LGMs, the analytic strategy was to then account for the
expected variation in any of the key outcome variables by introducing predictor variables
(e.g. time-invariant, exogenous measures), also known as conditional models. No figure
is provided here since the exact model was not known until the results o f the previous
multiple-domain analysis was known. Essentially, these exogenous variables (i.e. White,
Witness D. Violence, Victim of Child Abuse, Rapist Best Friend) were added to the
multiple domain model in which all four variables co-varied with one another and each
had regression parameters directly predicting the intercept and slope of each latent
variable. In order to assess the covariance between these latent factors (which is not
possible once predictors were added to the model), residual terms are added to each latent
factor and covariances between the residuals serve as “proxies” for the variance o f the
latent factor intercepts and slopes (see Byrne 2010).

Time-Variant Covariates
After the multiple-domain LGM, either more time-variant measures could have
been added to the model (as covariates, making no assumptions regarding temporal
order) or the time-invariant predictors could be assessed. The analytic strategy was to do
the latter because these exogenous variables were thought to account for inter-individual
change. Also, time-variant measures add quite a bit of complexity to these models (i.e.
one time-variant measure means 3 new manifest variables to the model), which increases
the likelihood that the model fit indicators would suggest rejecting the models. Because
of this, time-variant measures were assessed in an exploratory sense, with specifics
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discussed in Chapter 7. Also, because o f the exploratory nature o f introducing timevariant covariates to the model and because the conditional model would determine the
initial, best-fitting model, there is no hypothesized figure included here.

LIMITATIONS
There are some limitations with the data as well as with the analyses in this
chapter. The data are limited in that the initial data point is the end o f the respondent’s
freshman year. There may have been influences o f patriarchal ideology that occurred
during that first year of college that are unknown in these analyses because pre-college
measures of patriarchal ideology are missing. Additionally, the items that represent
patriarchal ideology are a proxy measure or, at worst, just one dimension o f patriarchal
ideology. These limitations are duly noted, which is why it is important to re-iterate that
some of the shortcomings in this Chapter are accounted for in Chapter 4 and vice versa.
Both chapters, however, cannot account for the fact that this data is dated. It is important
to acknowledge that findings could reflect male college students at this particular
historical time period (1991-1995). Related to this, this sample is a convenience sample
and findings could be a reflection of one particular group of male college students in one
particular region of the country. Since no prior studies have looked at individual
patriarchal ideology and how they change over time, this research should serve as the
baseline to studying them. Thus, the only way to know whether or not the findings are a
reflection of this historical time period or this particular social setting is to replicate the
research and draw from more generalizeable samples in the future.
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One way to account for time-period effects is to use a cohort-sequential (Baltes,
Cornelius, and Nesselroade 1979) LGM that uses calendar year as the wave of
assessment rather than year in college. The data could easily be reorganized to create this
alternative metric of time, while controlling for age, however, doing so would make little
theoretical sense. As Baltes et al. (1979:85) note, “The issue of trifactorial age-cohort
time of measurement confounds is only relevant if one assigns theoretical status to all
factors.” The developmental model used throughout this chapter is based on the fact that
participants are homogenous regarding age and that year o f data collection (i.e. cohort) is
less relevant than year in college (time period).
The LGM analyses have some limitations as well. These coincide with data
limitations regarding sample size. That is, the complex models that include timeinvariant and time-variant predictors o f patriarchal ideology and relationship violence
will include too many parameter estimates for this sample size. Some researchers believe
the ratio in sample size to parameter estimates should be 20:1 (Jackson 2003), whereas
others feel 10:1 is satisfactory (see Kline 2011). Thus, the LGMs will need to introduce
certain variables one at a time rather than all at once while remaining cognizant o f the
relevant parameters needing to be estimated in relation to sample size and model fit.
Missing data creates some issues as well with LGM. Most missing cases are
either missing by design (i.e. absence o f baseline measures for Cohort 1) or attrition in
subsequent waves. For these cases, ML will be used to estimate these responses, a
technique that has been reliable for SEM in general and LGM specifically (Allison 2002;
Preacher et al. 2008). The key outcome variable, however, is the only variable missing
by design at the initial wave (for Cohort 1). This can create problems with internal
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consistency when the data are not collected at the same occasion for all individuals
(Preacher et al. 2008). The combination o f all cohorts actually does meet the assumption
that all individuals are measured at the same occasion (end o f each academic school
year). This is a redundant point that must be emphasized yet again since this dataset is
quite complex regarding multiple cohorts, multiple waves, and multiple years. It also
meets the assumption that “planned missingness” items be treated as MCAR (thus ML is
appropriate) since this is a type of missing data that can be controlled (Duncan et al.
2006).
The ML function for the missing by design items at the baseline meets the
assumptions of LGM and SEM, but the estimates could still be biased. For this reason,
MGSEM will be used in which one group includes Cohorts 2 and 3 (complete data) and
another group includes Cohort 1 (missing by design) (for a review see Duncan et al.
2006; Preacher et al. 2008). Doing this provides the best fitting model for both groups
simultaneously. Keeping with this same technique, as a sensitivity analysis, all 3 cohorts
will be partitioned using the MGSEM approach in order to check for potential cohort
interactions. Cohort effects would suggest that the developmental model o f patriarchal
ideology proposed is insufficient and interactive, contextual, and ecological models are
perhaps more explanatory than micro-level variables (Baltes et al. 1979).

CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an overview o f how patriarchal ideology is operationalized
in studying its change over time. Analyses are described that will use LGM to assess
what the trajectories of patriarchal ideology look like over time. Additionally, details are
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given regarding the appropriate LGM that will assess the covariation o f individual
patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration and victimization. The last
group of analyses involves an assessment o f potential predictors of these key outcome
variables using time-variant and time-invariant predictors. As is typical with SEM, the
later models are less detailed and relatively unknown for now because SEM requires that
the hypothesized, baseline model be trimmed in order to create the most parsimonious
model. The results of the analyses in this chapter, in conjunction with those in Chapter 4,
should provide a holistic understanding to how individual patriarchal ideology changes
over time and what may account for these changes. These analyses will contribute to the
theoretical development o f patriarchal ideology in a theory of violence against women.

CHAPTER VII
RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME, A LATENT
GROWTH CURVE MODELING APPROACH

This chapter presents the results o f latent growth curve models (LGM) aimed to
assess the change in patriarchal ideology over three waves o f data. The analyses
performed had three major goals: 1 ) to assess the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology and
relationship violence experiences (independently and simultaneously), 2 ) to evaluate the
rate in which individuals change over time regarding these variables, and 3) to evaluate
potential predictors of these trajectories.

SINGLE-DOMAIN GROWTH CURVES

Patriarchal Ideology Trajectory
The first latent growth curve model assessed the average initial level of
patriarchal ideology and how these levels changed across each data point. The results of
this model can be found in Figure 7.1. As seen in the figure, the model fit indicators
suggest this model fit the data extremely well

(%2 =

.520 [df = 1, p = .47]).
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Figure 7.1. Results of Single Domain LGM for Patriarchal Ideology
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Notes: NS = Not statistically significant (p > .05). Values in bold are significant (p <
.05). Ellipses for error terms are absent and values represent variance of each (all p <
.05). All values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: %2 = .002 (df = 1,
p = .965); CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.

The mean of the intercept o f patriarchal ideology (M i) was 1.44 (SE = .05, p <
.001), which represents the average initial level o f patriarchal ideology. The intercept
variance was significant (Di = .49, SE = .14, p < .001), indicating significant individual
differences in initial levels of patriarchal ideology. The mean of the slope (M s) represents
the average rate of change in patriarchal ideology, which was -.36 (SE = .04, p < .001).
The significance of the mean o f the slope provides an answer to Q2, simply stated:
patriarchal ideology does change significantly overtime. The negative value indicates the
answer to Q3 would be: the direction o f change for patriarchal ideology is negative for
the whole sample. More specifically, levels of patriarchal ideology declined over time at
an average rate of .36 units. However, the slope variance (Ds = .08, SE = .08) was notsignificant (p = .31) indicating there were no significant inter-individual differences in
the rate of change in patriarchal ideology over time. Additionally, the covariance
between the latent intercept and latent slope of patriarchal ideology was not significant
[cov = -.11 (r = -.57), SE = .09, p = .21)]. This indicates the rate o f change in patriarchal
ideology was homogenous for the whole sample. In sum, the trajectory of patriarchal
ideology was negative and moderate over time for the whole sample, regardless o f how
high or low initial levels o f patriarchal ideology were.

Relationship Violence Perpetration Trajectory
The results for the growth curve for relationship violence perpetration can be seen
in Figure 7.2. As seen in the diagram, the model fit indicators were somewhat mixed.
This was expected, with the RMSEA =.11, which is likely to show poor model fit with
simple models that have few degrees o f freedom (Steiger and Lind 1980, as cited in
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Arbuckle 2012). In these cases, the CFI is preferred, which suggested this model fit the
data quite well (CFI = .958). The %2 was, however, showing poor model fit (x2 = 8.12 [df
= 1, p = .004]). The x2, however, is not as reliable as the CFI, since relatively small
sample sizes (at least for the second and third data points) are likely to produce non
significant x2 values.
Figure 7.2 also shows the mean o f the intercept (M i) for relationship violence
perpetration was .93 (SE = .04, p < .001), which represents the average initial level o f
relationship violence perpetration. The intercept variance was significant (Di =.49, SE =
.08, p < .0 0 1 ), indicating there were individual differences in initial levels of relationship
violence perpetration. The mean of the slope (M s) represents the average rate of change
in relationship violence perpetration, which was .04 (SE = .03, p = .125). This indicates
little change in relationship violence perpetration on average over time. Additionally,
significance in the slope variance (D s = .13, SE = .04, p < .001) suggests there were
individual differences in the rate of change in relationship violence perpetration over time
(i.e. inter-individual differences over time). Lastly, the covariance between the latent
factors was significant [cov = -.11 (r = -.46), SE = .09, p < .05), suggesting individuals
whose initial levels of relationship violence perpetration were high experienced higher
rates of decline than individuals whose initial relationship violence perpetration levels
were not high. In sum, the trajectory of relationship violence perpetration was stable over
time for the sample as a whole, although some individual trajectories did change,
specifically those whose initial levels were high (in which case they declined at higher
rates than others).
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Figure 7.2. Results o f Single Domain LGM for Relationship Violence Perpetration
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.05). All values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: %2 - .002 (df = 1,
p = .965); CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.
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Relationship Violence Victimization Trajectory
The last single-domain growth curve model assessed relationship violence
victimization. Like the previous two models, the In of relationship violence victimization
was used due to a positive skew. The results o f this model are presented in Figure 7.3.
As seen in the diagram, the x2 statistic suggested excellent model fit (x2= .002, d f = 1, p
= .965). Because this model was “just-identified”, the CFI and RMSEA were not
computed.
Figure 7.3 also shows that the mean of the intercept (Mi) for relationship violence
victimization was 1.04 (SE = .0 4 , p < .0 0 1 ). The intercept variance was significant (Di =
.55,

SE = .09, p < .001), indicating there were individual differences in initial levels o f

relationship violence victimization. The mean o f the slope (M s) represents the average
rate of change in relationship violence victimization, which was .03 (SE = .03, p = .27).
This indicates little change in relationship violence victimization on average over time.
Additionally, significance in the slope variance (Ds = . 10, SE = .05, p < .0 0 1 ) suggests
there were individual differences in the rate of change in relationship violence
victimization over time (i.e. inter-individual differences over time). Lastly, the
covariance between the latent factors was significant [cov = - . 1 1 (r = -.4 6 ), SE = .09, p <
.05),

suggesting individuals whose initial levels o f relationship violence victimization

were high experienced higher rates of decline than individuals whose initial relationship
violence victimization levels were not high. In sum, the trajectory of relationship
violence victimization was stable over time for the sample as a whole, although some
individual trajectories did change, specifically those whose initial levels were high (in
which case they declined at higher rates than others).
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Figure 7.3. Results of Single Domain LGM for Relationship Violence Victimization
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values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: y 2 = .002 (df = 1, p = .965);
CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.

213
MULTIPLE-DOMAIN GROWTH MODELS
The multiple-domain latent growth models were to originally include the three
previously used variables simultaneously. A full multiple-domain model with all three,
however, could not be performed. When the growth-curve model was assessed that
included all three variables, fully-identifying all covariates (recall Figure 6.2 from the
previous chapter) the y 2 could not be computed because the correlation matrix was “not
positive definite.” The most likely reason for this was the highly correlated relationship
violence variables. This was not a surprise considering the previous chapter’s correlation
matrix suggested very strong correlations among the perpetration and victimization
variables too (r > .84 at all three time points). Considering the use o f the CTS to capture
relationship violence perpetration and victimization, this was expected. The solution of
combining two highly correlated variables into one higher-order composite variable (i.e.
2nd-Order Factor) might be one way to include both domains in such an analysis.
Unfortunately, in this case, creating a broad variable called “relationship violence
experiences” would have created too general of a concept and interpretation would have
been quite difficult. Instead, the choice was made to drop the relationship violence
victimization variable and keep the perpetration variable. While the CTS measures might
minimize men’s use o f violence because they focus primarily on physical assaults, the
victimization measures o f the CTS tend to decontextualize men’s “victimization”
(Dobash and Dobash 1992; DeKeseredy forthcoming-, Stark 2007). In other words,
men’s “victimization” is taken out o f context since their reports do not distinguish
between women’s use of violence as primary aggressors (which is uncommon) versus
women’s use of violence as a form o f self-defense (which is much more common).
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After removing the victimization variable, the multiple-domain growth curve
assessed the growth o f two domains: patriarchal ideology and relationship violence
perpetration, simultaneously. The initial model fully identified (not-pictured, but similar
to the hypothesized model from Figure 6 .2 , with the removal of the victimization
domain) all covariances between the four latent factors (i.e. two latent intercepts and two
latent slopes) and met the necessary criteria for good model fit with the data (%2 = 11.64
[df = 7, p = .113]; CFI = .981, RMSEA = .03). Despite good model fit, however, only
two of the covariances (cov of the ideology intercept <-» violence perpetration intercept;
cov of violence perpetration intercept <-> violence perpetration slope) were statistically
significant (p < .01). Thus, the non-significant covariances were trimmed from the
model. However, one non-significant covariance remained. Due to the importance o f the
within-domain covariance between the slope and intercept of patriarchal ideology, and
because deleting non-significant covariates is not a necessity in linear growth-curve
models (see Byrne 2 0 1 0 ), this was the only non-significant covariate that remained in the
model (see Figure 7 .4 ., with results). The trimmed model had even better model fit than
the fully-identified model (x 2 = 13.34 [d f= 10, p = .2 0 5 ], CFI = .987, RMSEA = .02).

Figure 7.4. Results of Trimmed Multiple-Domain Latent Growth Curve Model
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The results o f the multiple-domain model can be seen in Figure 7.4. Regarding
means estimates, all four were statistically significant (p < .05). The mean of the
intercept (M i) for patriarchal ideology and the mean for the slope of patriarchal ideology
(Ms) were almost identical to the previous single-domain model. The mean of the
intercept (M i) for relationship violence perpetration and the mean for the slope (Ms) o f
relationship violence perpetration also had nearly identical estimates to its previous
single-domain model (see Figure 7 .2). The similarity in estimates is expected in LGM.
More important, for now, are the goodness-of-fit statistics, which do suggest that the
simultaneous assessment of the trajectories of both of these concepts is appropriate.
Regarding covariances, the within-domain covariances were almost identical to
the prior single-domain estimates. That is, the covariance between the intercept and the
slope of patriarchal ideology remained non-significant (p > .05). This, again, suggests
that those with high levels of patriarchal ideology did not experience significantly higher
rates of change. The covariance between the intercept and the slope o f relationship
violence perpetration (cov = -.1 2 , SE = .05; r = -.4 6 ) remained significant (p < .05). This
suggests that individuals whose initial levels of patriarchal ideology were high
experienced higher rates of decline from these initial levels.
The only cross-domain covariance in the multiple-domain model was between the
mean intercept o f patriarchal ideology and the mean intercept of relationship violence
perpetration. The covariance among the intercept mean (M i) o f patriarchal ideology and
the intercept mean (M i) of relationship violence perpetration was .14 (S E = .03; r = .2 9 )
and it was statistically significant (p < .0 0 1 ). Based on the size of the standardized
coefficient, this suggests there is a positive relationship that is moderate in strength
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between average initial level o f patriarchal ideology and average initial level of
relationship violence perpetration.
In response to research question Q4: the average level o f patriarchal ideology and
the average level o f relationship violence perpetration are related at the initial wave o f
data, but from there, the trajectories are unrelated to one another. More specifically, the
cross-domain LGM suggests very little difference in individual growth curves for both
concepts, compared to their previous, independent/single-domain LGM. The cross
domain covariance that was significant suggested initial average levels o f both concepts
were related, but the change in each was not related to cross-domain avg. initial levels or
cross-domain rate of change.

Predictors o f Change
The next step in the analytic strategy was to introduce time-invariant exogenous
variables into the multiple-domain model (i.e. conditional LGM). The purpose o f
introducing time-invariant measures is to try and account for the variation in the key
variables o f interest (mainly slope variance). However, since the slope variance o f
patriarchal ideology was not significant, this means such models would not be very
useful. However, there was significant variation in the slope of relationship violence
perpetration. Thus, time-invariant predictors o f change can be added to the multipledomain model to explain the heterogeneity in relationship violence perpetration over
time, while controlling for the trajectory of patriarchal ideology over time.
The first conditional model (not pictured) found that religiosity was not a
significant predictor of the intercepts and slopes for both patriarchal ideology and
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relationship violence perpetration. Therefore, religiosity was excluded from the final
conditional model used, which included all four o f the other predictor variables,
predicting the intercepts and slopes of patriarchal ideology and relationship violence
perpetration. Figure 7.5 shows the results of the conditional model. As noted therein, all
o f the predictor variables had regression parameters predicting the intercept and slope o f
patriarchal ideology and the intercept and slope o f relationship violence perpetration (4
parameters per variable, fully identified). However, as the figure also notes, only the
significant parameters are drawn in the model for clarity purposes. Additionally, all o f
the exogenous variables had covariance estimates among them, which are also left out of
the figure for the sake of clarity. Further attempts to trim the model pictured in Figure
7.5 either did not improve the model fit statistics, made the model fit worse, or created
models that made little theoretical sense. Thus figure 7.5 is the most parsimonious,
theoretically significant predictor model.
As seen in Figure 7.5, the multiple-domain LGM with predictor variables had
similar results to the previous non-predictor variable model regarding cross-domain
covariances. The covariance between the residuals of the patriarchal ideology intercept
and the relationship violence perpetration intercept showed that initial levels o f both were
positively and moderately related to one another (cov = .09, SE = .03, r = .22). This
means that individuals with higher initial levels o f patriarchal ideology had higher initial
levels of relationship violence perpetration, a finding similar to the previous non
conditional model.

Figure 7.5. Conditional LGM with Domains: Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration
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Predictor Variables. Whites had average initial levels of patriarchal ideology that
were 46% (B = .69, SE = .10, b = .46) higher than non-whites (p < .05), while controlling
for the effects of patriarchal best friend, child abuse, and witnessing domestic violence.
Additionally, the rapist best friend variable significantly predicted the average initial
level of patriarchal ideology (B = .26, SE = .08, b = .25). In other words, having a
patriarchal male peer for a best friend meant one’s average initial level of patriarchal
ideology was 25% higher than those individuals who did not have a patriarchal best
friend, while controlling for child abuse, witnessing domestic violence, and race.
Like earlier models, there was no significance in the slope variance of patriarchal
ideology (residual variance = .03, SE = .07, p > .05). Essentially this means the rate o f
change was the same for the whole sample (as found earlier). The only significant
predictor of the slope in patriarchal ideology was race (B = -.40, SE = .08, b = -.73),
which was unexpected. That is, because the variance was not significant, this suggests
there were no inter-individual differences in the average rate of change in patriarchal
ideology, but the significant predictor o f race on the slope suggests inter-individual
differences. This creates some confusion since a variable is essentially predicting
variable change, when the variation is not significant. This is one o f the reasons why
Byrne (2010) notes it would not make much sense to proceed with time-invariant models
unless one is presented with evidence o f inter-individual variability in the non
conditional models. In the current study, there was no inter-individual variability in the
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slope of patriarchal ideology1. So, this significant parameter is not very useful. Keep in
mind, however, that although earlier tests revealed non-significance in the rate o f change
of patriarchal ideology, it was still valuable to assess the growth o f the concept
simultaneously with relationship violence perpetration while assessing other key
parameters o f interest2. Also, since the conditional models were to address Q5, regarding
predictors ofpatriarchal ideology over time, the simple answer is: the lack o f significant
variance regarding the slope o f patriarchal ideology suggests predictors o f individual
change are not possible since there is no evidence o f individual change in the first place.
Three of the predictor variables significantly predicted the average level of
relationship violence at the baseline (p < .05). Experiencing child abuse was one o f these
(B = .26, SE = .08, b = .17). Individuals who were victims o f child abuse had an average

1 Muthen

(2002), however, suggests predictor variables are likely to produce better fitting

models, showing significance in predictors. She too notes the confounding issues
involved, but does not suggest the lack o f significant variation in the slope means one
should not proceed with conditional models.
2 Since

there was evidence of variability regarding the intercept of patriarchal ideology, I

made the decision to run a multiple-domain predictor variable model that included
patriarchal ideology. This decision was made so that the key variables predicting change
in relationship violence perpetration would be assessed while simultaneously the model
would control for the significant covariance between initial levels o f both o f these key
outcome variables (i.e. Mi of patriarchal ideology and Mi of relationship violence
perpetration).
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initial level of relationship violence perpetration that was 17% higher than those that
were not victims of child abuse, while holding constant race, witnessing domestic
violence, and patriarchal best friend. Witnessing domestic violence as a child meant one
was

11 %

higher in their average initial level of relationship violence perpetration than

those that did not witness domestic violence (B = .32, SE = .15, b = .11), while
controlling for race, patriarchal male peers, and child abuse. Rapist best friend
significantly predicted average initial level of relationship violence perpetration (B = .37,
SE = .09, b = .22), where individuals who had patriarchal best friends were 22% higher in
their average initial levels of relationship violence perpetration than those that did not
have patriarchal best friends, while holding constant child abuse, witnessing domestic
violence, and race. Race was the only exogenous variable that did not significantly
predict the average initial level o f relationship violence perpetration (p > .05).
None of the three significant predictors o f average initial level o f relationship
violence perpetration significantly predicted the rate of change in these values (p > .05).
However, the one exogenous variable that did not predict average initial level of
relationship violence was the only predictor that significantly predicted (p < .05) the rate
of change in these initial levels (B = .02, SE = .06, b = .02). Keep in mind, the rate o f
change (i.e. slope residual) was statistically significant (.13, SE = .04). Although
significant, the regression parameter was not very large. Thus, whites were 2% faster in
their rate of change in relationship violence perpetration than non-whites while
controlling for child abuse victimization, patriarchal male peers, and witnessing domestic
violence. Also, regarding change in relationship violence perpetration, the covariance
between the residuals of the intercept and slope of relationship violence perpetration was
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-.10 (SE = .05, r - -.44, p < .05). Keep in mind that race did not predict initial level o f
relationship violence perpetration, just the rate o f change. Thus, there was no significant
variation in the average initial level o f relationship violence perpetration between whites
and non-whites, but over time, whites experienced a rate o f change in relationship
violence 2 % higher than non-whites while controlling for child abuse, witnessing
domestic violence, patriarchal best friend, and the average initial level of patriarchal
ideology.

Introducing Time-Variant Covariates as Predictors
The introduction of time variant measures included the addition of the variables:
Dating, Single, and sexual assault program attendance into the conditional model. This
model, however, makes for one very complicated SEM, which can be problematic in
general, but this is especially true when the sample size in comparison to the number of
parameters to be estimated is beyond the 10:1 ratio (Kline 2006). The addition o f timevarying models, as a result of these issues, produced very poor fitting models. One way
around this was to introduce each of these one at a time, but that, too, produced poor
fitting models. Time-varying measures were not included in any of the LGMs.
Alternative procedures were used.
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UNDERSTANDING THE DIRECTIONALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE

Autoregressive Structural Models
Because of the exploratory nature of these analyses, alternative models were
created in order to get a better understanding o f the directionality of the associations
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence. Essentially, if it could be
determined that one has a stronger effect on the other in a non-recursive model, this could
help justify the inclusion of a LGM that treats one of these two key outcomes as an
endogenous variable and the other as a predictor. It is entirely possible that patriarchal
ideology is a better predictor of relationship violence perpetration than the other way
around, considering the lack of variation in the rate of change observed for patriarchal
ideology.
The first non-recursive model freely estimated the autocorrelations for the
repeated measures of the two key variables o f interest: patriarchal ideology and
relationship violence. This model, with results, can be found in Figure 7.6. This is
immediately followed by Figure 7.7, which placed equality constraints on the
autoregressive parameters for each respective measure (pi, P2), since the assumption o f
stability was supported in the significance o f the model from Figure 7.6. The likelihood
ratio tests for the y2, CFI, and RMSEA all suggested the constrained model fit the data
better than the unconstrained model Ay2.

Figure 7.6. Fully Unconstrained Autoregressive SEM for Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration across 3 Waves
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Figure 7.7. Autoregressive SEM for Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration across 3 Waves (Constrained
Autocorrelations)
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In short, there does not appear to be a reciprocal relationship between patriarchal
ideology and relationship violence perpetration. This is evidenced in the non
significance (p > .05) of patriarchal ideology —> relationship violence at Wave 3 (second
data point) and the non-significance (p > .05) o f relationship violence —> patriarchal
ideology at Wave 4 (last data point). At each wave, the opposite relationship is
significant. These inconsistent findings in the non-recursive model as well as the LGMs
suggested the need for further sensitivity checks with this data. The biggest o f these was
to reassess the two key outcomes and test the assumption of sample homogeneity.

LIMITATIONS
Many of the broader limitations to the data described in Chapter 5 are applicable
to the analyses in this chapter. One consistency is the potential cohort interactions. One
way to check for these interactions was to conduct a simple one-way ANOVA for each
cohort at each data point for the key outcome variables.

Cohort Interactions using One-Way ANOVA
The original researchers used a cohort sequential design (i.e. accelerated
longitudinal design) in which all of the cohorts were measured at the same time point
(year), but at different levels o f schooling (college class). The researchers made the
assumption that the cohorts were homogenous because they were combined into one
large dataset, which assumed the time-related change was college class. Even though
past research has found true longitudinal designs produce similar results to cohortsequential designs (Duncan et al. 2006), this does not mean every study should assume

homogeneity nor should they assume one hypothesized moment o f change is the only
period of variation. Thus, in order to test the assumption of homogeneity, two analyses
were performed. First, patriarchal ideology and relationship violence were examined
regarding significant variation in their means across cohorts using one-way ANOVAs.
The second check reconsidered the data point for change from college class to year. That
is, each wave or data point was changed from second year in college, third year in
college, fourth year in college to 1992, 1993, and 1994 respectively. It may seem
backwards to go from a much more reliable analysis of variance technique in the use of
SEM to an ANOVA. In fact a multi-group SEM (MGSEM) would have been an
excellent way to assess cohort interactions. However, this was not possible because o f
the lack of measures at Wave 2 for Cohort 1. MGSEM can use ML for missing cases, but
when an entire wave of data is missing, MGSEM is not possible. This was why the
ANOVA was used to see if there was evidence to suggest cohort interactions were
present.
Table 7.1 shows the results o f the ANOVA for patriarchal ideology and
relationship violence perpetration regarding significant mean variation across cohorts.
Essentially, Waves 2 and 3 (i.e. first two data points) suggest significant cohort
differences in mean values for patriarchal ideology, but no differences at Wave 4 (final
data point). Relationship violence perpetration showed significant cohort variation in the
mean of patriarchal ideology at the middle wave, whereas Wave 2 and Wave 4 were
homogenous. These results are enough to suggest there were cohort effects regarding
these two key variables of interest.
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The second ANOVA, which reorganized the data in which the time period o f
interest, was year rather than college course is not presented. Rearranging the data in this
manner was useless. That is, the ANOVA had many confounding issues, and the later
LGMs used to assess change in these outcome variables at these new data points
produced very poor fitting models. So the ANOVA, along with other analyses
throughout this chapter, tell us two things: 1 ) patriarchal ideology is likely variable from
cohort to cohort and 2 ) the cohort sequential design was a reliable longitudinal technique
to assess patriarchal ideologies over time.
This brings me to the first limitation from the LGM analyses: the inability to
conduct LGMs on each cohort independently. For Cohort 1, this was obviously not
possible since there were only two data points. However, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 would
not produce acceptable models of fit where the LGMs could even be conducted. Even
after the data was rearranged to reflect calendar year, rather than college class as the
metric o f time these models fit poorly with this data (see Bollen and Curran 2006: 73-86
for a review on rearranging data for alternative metrics o f time)3.

3 These

two data points address period and cohort. The third most common time metric

o f age so closely aligns with cohort/college class in this sample (and in college
populations) there is nothing to gain by re-arranging along this time metric. Moreover, as
Baltes et al. (1979: 85) note, “The issue of trifactorial age-cohort-time of measurement
confounds is only relevant if one assigns theoretical status to all factors.”
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Table 7.1. One-Way ANOVA Assessing Cohort Differences in Patriarchal Ideology and
Relationship Violence Perpetration (RVP)
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While there are a variety of reasons why these models fit poorly, the most likely reasons
are the fairly small sample size and the somewhat high levels of attrition from Wave 2
(69% retention from Wave 1) to Wave 3 (64% retention from Wave 2) for cohorts 2 and
3.
Considering alternative metrics o f time as a sensitivity check (but also as an
alternative theoretical explanation for change among the key outcomes) can add value to
a study. However, the inability to produce appropriate models of fit for these alternative
models does not negate the analyses performed in this chapter. In fact, poor model fit is
not just the result o f missing data. That is, poor-fitting models that considered year for
each metric o f time could have yielded poor model fit because this metric o f time created
even more heterogeneity than using the metric o f time college class. After all, the
empirical data did produce model fit that was acceptable for the college class metric. The
next step would be to keep the original time metric, but use the aforementioned multi
group LGM approach for each cohort. As noted earlier, however, this leaves us with the
earlier dilemma because we still have issues with the sample size o f each cohort. In sum,
the inability to use a multi-group LGM to test cohort effects in the most robust manner is
a limitation o f the current study. There is still something that can be learned from the
empirical heterogeneity from these results, a point further discussed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the analyses that addressed patriarchal ideology over threewaves of data, primarily with the use o f latent growth curve modeling (LGM). Initial
analyses using single-domain LGM assessed intra- and inter- individual differences in
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average initial levels of patriarchal ideology and average rates of change across threewaves. This was followed by similar analyses assessing average initial levels and
average rates of change regarding relationship violence perpetration. These two models
were then combined, using multiple-domain LGM to simultaneously assess the growth in
both constructs. In short, initial levels o f patriarchal ideology and relationship violence
perpetration were related to one another, but over time the trajectories of each took on
different, unrelated shapes. The rate of change in patriarchal ideology was significant
over time, but the variance for the rate o f change was not, meaning there were no inter
individual differences (i.e. everyone’s patriarchal ideology changed at the same average
rate over time). Relationship violence perpetration declined over time, but the average
rate of decline was not significant, while the variance for the rate o f change was
significant, meaning there were inter-individual differences in relationship violence
perpetration over time. Additionally, the covariance was significant between the
intercept and slope of relationship violence perpetration, meaning those individuals
whose initial levels of relationship violence perpetration were high experienced greater
rates of decline.
Conditional LGM was used to determine what predicted the variance in
relationship violence perpetration (while controlling for the covariance o f the intercept
and slope of patriarchal ideology). The only significant predictor o f the variance of the
rate of change in relationship violence perpetration was race, albeit a very small effect
size (b = .0 2 ), indicating whites’ rate o f change in violence perpetration was 2 % higher
than non-whites. Additional significant predictors of average initial level of patriarchal
ideology and average initial level of relationship violence perpetration were found.
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However, the most significant finding was few exogenous variables explained the
variation in the rate o f change for relationship violence perpetration. Additional analyses
found evidence of cohort interactions and mixed support for a reciprocal relationship
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration. The next chapter
discusses the findings in this chapter along with those from the initial two-wave panel
data, making broader connections across each.
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CHAPTER VIII
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter discusses the findings from the previous four methods and analyses
chapters. Discussions center on the major research questions addressed regarding:
measurement of patriarchal ideology, predictors of patriarchal ideology, change/stability
in patriarchal ideology, accounting for change/stability, and the covariation as well as the
feedback effects of patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration. Although
data limitations were discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 , broader limitations and
directions for future research are discussed at the end o f this chapter.

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The attempt was made in this research to operationalize individual patriarchal
ideology in the most consistent and accurate way, a point covered in Chapter 3. This is
certainly not the first study of its kind to use attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology
(see Smith 1990, 1991). It is, however, one of the few studies to consider vignettes for
measuring patriarchal ideology. Moreover, it is one of the few to use these measures in a
longitudinal research design and is one of the only known studies to consider the origins
o f patriarchal ideology by including it as the main outcome variable o f interest in various
statistical models. Although the evidence was not strong in some areas, overall, the
various measures used for patriarchal ideology were reliable. Methodologically, this
research has some noteworthy implications for future research.
Looking at the first set of analyses, attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology
showed signs of measurement reliability and had mixed findings regarding longitudinal
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measurement reliability. This lack o f consistency in longitudinal measurement
invariance was most likely due to one o f three things. One reason could be that grouplevel influences affected the meaning and interpretation of the attitudinal measures over
time for the whole sample. If so, the measures would need to be re-evaluated to see why
the lack of consistency was found. However, the conceptualization in Chapter 3 was
thorough and the measures were not entirely unique from past research (e.g. Smith 1990,
1991).
The second, and better, explanation for the lack of consistency in measurement
reliability is that method effects were present. One of the problems with using dated
secondary data is that despite communication with the original principal investigator,
unless changes to the research design are explicitly stated, we are left to assume. The fact
that Cohort 2 had reliable measures at Wave 1 (1991) but not Wave 2 (1992) could have
been due to changes in the research design. Although various items were added and
deleted throughout this study by the original researchers, for some reason the introduction
o f the vignette-based measures o f patriarchal ideology seem to have influenced the
attitudinal measures. These items first appeared in 1992 when patriarchal attitudes first
had indications of unreliability. In 1992, when it was Wave 3 for Cohort 1, the new
patriarchal ideology-vignettes were only given to Cohorts 2 and 3 (Wave 2 and Wave 1
respectively). Reliability in the attitudinal measures was lacking for Cohort 2 in 1992 as
well as for Cohort 3. Thus, in 1992, the reliability of the vignette-based items was strong
for each Cohort, separately and combined.
The third potential source for the lack of consistency regarding measurement
invariance really relates to validity, experimenter bias or observer reliability. Since the
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original researchers were accepting o f the outside studies during their day that concluded
patriarchal ideology was not a significant predictor of “sexual coercion”, this could have
impacted how these items were measured. They could have contaminated the items in
some way, possibly by telling respondents to devote less time to them. They could have
entered these items into their dataset inaccurately. Although there is no direct empirical
support to these speculations, the principal investigator did mention that during the time
o f data collection, researchers accepted the assumption that attitudinal items were not
important predictors for their outcome of sexual coercion1. Whether or not significant
relationships were found in past research, however, should not have affected the
independent measures’ internal reliability. Over time, if researchers were not as
meticulous in presenting, collecting, or assessing the few attitudinal items about
acceptance of violence against women, this may say more about researcher bias than any
real problems with the long-term reliability of these indicators of patriarchal ideology.
This brings me to the first suggestion for future longitudinal research designs:
when conducting longitudinal research over relatively short periods, or across relatively
few data points, changes to the original testing measures should be minimal. The original

1 Jackie

White, email correspondence, November 11, 2011. These researchers conducted

their study in a thorough and detailed way with the utmost integrity. This discussion is
merely provided to highlight the dilemmas researchers face in longitudinal studies. One
of these involves decisions as far as altering measurement instruments so that we are
collecting current concepts exogenous from the pre-test survey instruments, while also
not giving up on the original measures or bombarding respondents with lengthy surveys.
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researchers cannot be blamed for the removal of these attitudinal items when they were
not a main variable of interest for their purposes. However, the original inclusion of
them should have meant the researchers deemed them important at one point.
Additionally, none of the meta-analyses produced around the time the data was being
collected mentioned longitudinal research. As Lieberson (1985) put it, “Cross-sectional
data are certain to be relevant only under special circumstances [...] Conclusions based
on cross-sectional data are not of equal merit to those based on longitudinal data
(180, 181). This is especially important considering very few longitudinal studies on
relationship violence existed from the inception o f domestic violence research until the
1990s when the original research was conducted. Future research designs should use
great caution when changing/removing portions from the initial design. Justifications for
the removal of “non-significant” constructs should be critically assessed, whether they
are made theoretically, empirically, or both.
One weakness of the current measures o f patriarchal ideology is that they were
only tapping into portions of the concept. Chapter 3 made note that individual patriarchal
ideology really consists of 4 major dimensions related to: dominance/power over women,
hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, and acceptance o f violence against women.
To illustrate these dimensions, Figure 8.1 is provided. Thus, the second major
methodological suggestion for future research is that studies in this area should include at
least one indicator of each concept with more complicated designs (e.g. SEM, HLM)
using multiple measures from each.
Lastly, vignette-based measures o f patriarchal ideology consistent with rape myth
acceptance/likelihood of rape are reliable proxy measures o f patriarchal ideology. The
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third suggestion for future research is that they should consider the use o f vignette items
for multiple dimensions o f patriarchal ideology. This should be not just an alternative to
attitudinal items, but as better measures for assessing ideology since context for the
attitude/likely behavior is provided.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: UNDERSTANDING PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY
IN A THEORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The fact that patriarchal ideology declined for the entire sample at equal rates is
really quite remarkable. There is no doubt that individual patriarchal ideology is a
concept that is real, valid, and important as has been argued throughout this research.
These findings concerning change really question the significance o f individual
patriarchal ideology in a theory of violence against women. Thus, institutional
patriarchal ideology, or at the very least some sort of meso-level, group-based patriarchal
ideology is perhaps more important for a theory o f violence against women. To see equal
rates of change in patriarchal ideology suggests, first, that this is a reflection of the social
institution in which this sample was composed. In a sample conducted within a
university setting, a place where progressive ideals are arguably stronger than in other
social institutions, it may not be too shocking to see declines in the rate of patriarchal
ideology.

Figure 8.1. Dimensions of Patriarchal Ideology
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To others, however, this may be very shocking considering these results are essentially
showing patriarchal ideology from the first, roughly 18 years of one’s life declines after
just three years o f college. It was interesting to find that before-college patriarchal
ideology had no effect on patriarchal ideology at the end o f one’s first year o f school.
Both longitudinally and cross-sectionally, some o f the key relationships are discussed
below.

Social Learning Theory and Patriarchal Ideology over Time
Many research studies (e.g. Brown 1987; Payne and Triplett 2009) have found
childhood exposure to domestic violence as well as child abuse victimization to
significantly predict adulthood domestic violence perpetration. These relationships are
typically explained using social learning perspectives in that these boys are learning how
to use violence within the family (DeKeseredy and MacLeod 1997; Payne and Gainey
2009). These social learning perspectives, however, have been somewhat short-sighted
(DeKeseredy 2011; White and Smith 2009). This is especially true if we are considering
the most noteworthy variant of social learning theory for criminologists, that which
comes from Akers (2009). Unfortunately, the current research presents more questions
and challenges than answers in regards to childhood exposure to domestic violence
relating to patriarchal ideology and/or relationship violence. Nonetheless, these
challenges are discussed below.
Many studies that assume adult batterers who come from violent households are
“learning” how to be violent would find more specific support in the component o f social
learning theory of modeling/imitation. Thus, why do boys learn to imitate such violence,
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whereas girls leam that familial violence is normal? If the answer is boys and girls
“learn” gender norms early in life and violence perpetration by men is one o f these many
forms of gendered difference, then this is a weak explanation. For one, male violence
against an intimate partner, while more common and more serious than female violence
against an intimate partner, is not “normal.” It may be normal for men to be more violent
than women or to repress emotions, but it is certainly not the norm for men to use
violence against female intimate partners. Secondly, it cannot be concluded that
“modeling” is taking place without a discussion o f reinforcement, or what Akers (2009)
calls “differential reinforcement.” Without reinforcement, we are left to assume that
coming from a violent household and being violent as an adult is a 1:1 ratio of
equivalence and that individuals inevitably and blindly follow others.
It might be better to explain the learning process as part of “differential
reinforcement.” This component of social learning theory notes that although
reinforcement can vary in many ways, social reinforcers are the most salient component
of differential reinforcement (Akers 2009). Thus, the link between witnessing domestic
violence to becoming an adult batterer should not be framed within the context o f social
learning theory if reinforcers are unknown. How exposure to domestic violence during
childhood impacts one’s patriarchal ideology is more confounding since outcomes are not
as directly observable.
These findings do add to the research that suggests that any negative impacts o f
childhood exposure to domestic violence can be overcome. Witnessing domestic
violence and even being the victim of child abuse did not significantly influence
patriarchal ideology in college (but was significant before college). This suggests that
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protective factors are available later in the life-course. Whatever these protective factors
may be is still unclear but with the transition from one major social institution (the
family) to another (higher education), the mere change in social settings may be enough
to offset the negative effects o f such childhood experiences.

Patriarchal Male Peers: Differential Association and Definitions
Social learning theory notes that learned “definitions” can be broad as far as
having a general attitude favorable or unfavorable towards criminality, with Akers
(2009:28-29) often using the terms “beliefs” and “ideologies” interchangeably with
definitions. Thus, if definitions are learned through symbolic interaction with those from
primary groups (e.g. close peer associations, parents), then patriarchal ideology should be
learned in a similar manner having similar origins. Prior to the start o f college, there
appears to be some support to suggest parental (i.e. father) influence on patriarchal
ideology exists, since witnessing domestic violence was a significant predictor o f having
a higher level of patriarchal ideology. Once college begins, perhaps the increased
frequency of differential associations with patriarchal male peers is why this variable
significantly predicted the average level o f patriarchal ideology whereas witnessing
domestic violence and childhood abuse did not. Perhaps these findings give more weight
to the learning process of modeling because all three o f these variables predicted higher
initial levels of relationship violence perpetration. The consistent dimension o f social
learning theory in predicting patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration is
“differential association.”
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Recall that the operational measure for patriarchal male peer associations was a
proxy measure and it was not clear the exact frequency or intensity of the male peer
association(s). Perhaps this is why this variable was not predictive o f patriarchal
ideology. The growth-curve models used a measure for male patriarchal peer
associations that was definitely high on intensity since it was the respondent’s best
friend’s likelihood of committing rape. In the growth-curve models, patriarchal peer
associations were the only significant predictors o f both patriarchal ideology and
relationship violence perpetration. Thus, this study supports previous research findings
(e.g. Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997) suggesting male peer support influences violence
against women. It adds to the research in providing support for male peer associations as
one of the predictors of individual patriarchal ideology in college.
A final point on differential male peer associations regarding causal ordering is
needed. Figure 5.4 from Chapter 5 showing the results o f the cross-lagged panel model
might speak to the earlier discussion concerning the causal order o f male peers. The
covariance of patriarchal attitudes and patriarchal peers and relationship violence was not
significant at Wave 1, nor was the covariance o f patriarchal peers with patriarchal
attitudes. At Wave 2, these covariances were still not significant. However, the cross
lagged coefficients showed that Wave 1 patriarchal peers predicted patriarchal attitudes at
Wave 2 but not relationship violence perpetration. These findings suggest that
patriarchal attitudes are not related to male peer associations until college. The
aforementioned causal ordering o f patriarchal male peer associations in a theory of
violence against women noted the larger debates in criminology regarding the “birds o f a
feather” argument compared to differential association perspectives for the origins o f
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definitions, or in this case patriarchal ideology. It appears that as individuals begin
college, their patriarchal ideology is no longer influenced by sources o f familial
patriarchy (e.g. witnessing domestic violence) and instead these ideologies are influenced
by social patriarchy (i.e. patriarchal male peers in college).

Race and Individual Patriarchy Ideology
The panel data using attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology found non
whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology. This was contrary to the growth-curve
models using vignettes, which discovered whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology
over time. The panel data can perhaps best be interpreted within the context of social
institutions. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argued individual patriarchal ideology is
likely to vary in different social institutions, especially for racial minorities. The lack of
power in various social institutions, mainly the economy and polity, might help explain
why non-whites have higher levels o f patriarchal ideology when using attitudinal
measures, whose origins lie in the family. In fact, hooks (2000) argues the family is the
one institution black men can expect to have domination.
Some have argued many o f the negative stereotypes about black women in
connection to familial patriarchy (e.g. “mammy”, “matriarch”) are created and
maintained by dominant social institutions controlled by whites (Collins 2000). So while
white institutions are likely to develop stereotypes about black women, individual white
men are not likely to develop high levels o f patriarchal ideology when measurement
dimensions include items connected to familial patriarchy. Because intimate
relationships are most commonly intraracial, individual white males’ acceptance of
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violence against women is likely capturing their acceptance o f violence in their own
personal lives. The same is true for African Americans, hence their higher levels on the
patriarchal attitudes items. So why would African Americans have higher levels of
patriarchal ideology after the first year o f college, but not before? It is possible that once
these individuals started at this new institution they were exposed to these negative
stereotypes about black women, influencing their patriarchal ideology? The reason for
this finding is not clear. Future research should consider patriarchal ideology as a multi
dimensional construct over multiple waves of data (i.e. more than two).
The growth-curve models suggest the opposite when it comes to the relationship
between race and patriarchal ideology. Whites had significantly higher average levels of
patriarchal ideology across all three waves. Additionally, the only significant predictor of
the change in patriarchal ideology over time was race, indicating the rate o f change was
slower for whites than it was for non-whites. One explanation for this is that whites may
feel a higher sense of entitlement than other racial groups. Again, level-2 variables were
not available in this dataset, so group-level interpretations are not possible. While future
research should be conducted using aggregate variables, we can also use past research to
perhaps better understand these relationships.
Sanday’s (2007) research found that some white fraternity members bonded
together through sexism and racism, especially when they felt powerless. Her research
also discovered that many young, white college fraternity members felt entitled to
women’s bodies in various scenarios. Some individuals in her study even noted how in
college they sought out male peers who could provide emotional support for the
challenges presented in college, including support for when they failed to live up to their
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monikers of “powerful” and “successful” white men. It is possible that white males
develop patriarchal ideologies higher than racial minorities before college, but that these
ideologies are not positively reinforced in the same manner as they are by male peer
groups in college. These peer groups are likely to be stronger and more influential since
the family is less present in everyday life for these men, hence less frequent. Also, these
men may have stronger patriarchal ideologies throughout college because o f backlash.
That is, college is likely the most diverse institution to date these individuals have come
in contact with. Perhaps patriarchal ideology is higher for whites because their sense of
entitlement is challenged by women’s gains, something they become aware of once they
are in college.
These findings may even support the earlier argument that vignettes, which can
take into consideration context better than attitude-agreement items, are perhaps better at
capturing ideology. This may explain why the current study’s findings are different from
past research. Suarez and Gadalla’s (2010) meta-analysis on rape myth acceptance
reported that among men research has found, overall, that non-whites have higher levels
of rape myth acceptance than whites. Recall the discussion in Chapter 6 regarding Pease
and Flood (2008) who were cited regarding their argument that ideology is rooted in
“social conditions and social consciousness” (554). If ideologies are better captured by
scenario-based vignettes that can contextualize various beliefs and attitudes rather than
recording level of agreement with various statements, then perhaps this explains the
differences from past research. Perhaps past studies assessing rape myth acceptance with
attitudinal measures have fallen into the trap of “abstracted empiricism” (see Mills 1959).
When these researchers find white males have lower rape-myth acceptance attitudes than
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minorities, these findings reinforce the “matrix o f domination” (see Collins 2000).
Chapleau and Oswald (2013) found that white men were less accepting o f rape myths in
scenarios where victims were o f high status and perpetrators were o f low-status.
Historically, this can be seen in stereotypes of the “black male rapists” and aggressive
prosecutions of black men accused of raping white women. Researchers need to consider
context specific measures o f rape-myth attitudes in order to better assess their purpose
and their meanings, especially in regards to race. Beyond the ability to assess context in
assessing rape-myths, a theory of violence against women should take the lead of
Chapleau and Oswald (2013) in determining the purpose o f these myths. While the
current research treated these items as proxy measures, or a dimension of patriarchal
ideology, they can also be used in a more general sense to address questions like: how are
they used to reinforce the status quo in regards to violence against women?

Relationship Violence and Patriarchal Ideology
Chapter 3 reviewed and criticized the literature suggesting “patriarchal ideology”
was not predictive of relationship violence perpetration. It was discussed that individual
patriarchal ideology does not need to be directly predictive o f violence against women to
have significance in a theory o f violence against women. Initial bivariate correlation
coefficients for the two-wave panel design suggested positive, weak, but significant
correlation coefficients for each time period regarding the links between patriarchal
attitudes and violence perpetration. The growth-curve data suggested bivariate
correlations between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration for each
respective time period to also be positive, weak and significant. These effects, however,
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were absent when controls were considered in the MIMIC models. These preliminary
findings suggested relationship violence was not predictive o f patriarchal ideology.
However, since these models were cross-sectional, it would be erroneous to assume this
was the end of the story and that no relationship between the two existed. It was entirely
possible that the time-lag, which was not known in the cross-sectional analyses, was too
short to see any effect. Thus, the cross-lagged and reciprocal models tell us more about
the lagged effects of relationship violence perpetration and patriarchal ideology than any
previous study in this area.
Although findings suggested no reciprocal relationship between the two, results
did show how the two were significantly correlated at the initial wave (i.e. end of
freshman year). While controlling for their autocorrelations, the next wave of data
suggested relationship violence was predictive of patriarchal attitudes, while the opposite
was true in the final wave. This suggests a dynamic causal process may be taking place
over time. While patriarchal ideology may not always predict relationship violence and
relationship violence may not always predict patriarchal ideology, they definitely have
direct and indirect effects on one another. Thus, the finding that these two had significant
covariation in their average initial levels, but that their rates of decline were not
significantly related to one another (and one had between individual declines while the
other had within individual declines) means the simultaneous changes in each are still not
accounted for. The goal for future research studies is to develop longitudinal growthcurve or hierarchical linear models that take into consideration the covariation o f
relationship violence perpetration and patriarchal ideology, while controlling for secondorder predictors of each.
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PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY: CHANGE OVER TIME AND FEEDBACK EFFECTS
The major focus o f this study was the assessment of patriarchal ideology over
time, using a sample of college males. Combining all analyses, change in patriarchal
ideology can be summed up in the following:
1) Patriarchal ideology is stable from the beginning of the first year o f college to
the end o f the first year o f college.
2) Patriarchal ideology declines from the end of one’s freshman year o f college
to the end of their junior year of college.
3) Despite significant differences within individuals, overall, the entire sample
had the same rate of change in patriarchal ideology over time.
The results in regards to change in patriarchal ideology over time tell us first that
individual patriarchal ideology is not a static “trait” as some role-theorists may believe.
Despite the fact that only a short period of time was covered in this research, observed
declines were still seen. It is entirely possible that these declines were reflective of the
sample, college men. While certainly college men should not be reflective o f all men,
Chapter 4 did mention some of the unique qualities college male samples hold in
considering various aspects related to violence against women. The fact is, we should
expect patriarchal ideology to decline over time for college men, but the degree o f this
seemingly inevitable outcome is likely to be small when not specifically targeted by
college institutions. However, as the few institutional patriarchy examples illustrated in
Chapter 2 showed, colleges and universities often employ symbolic change while lagging
behind in any real, progressive reforms or policies aimed at changing patriarchy within
the institution.
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The lack of inter-individual change in patriarchal ideology over time suggests
group-level variables account for the observed declines rather than individual variables.
Thus patriarchal ideology as a “pathological, static trait” as seen by some is not true. The
exact source of the equal rates of decline is unknown since aggregate-level variables were
not available in this research. Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) suggestion that
micro-level psychological dynamics should be considered in their theory o f hegemonic
masculinity might need to be reassessed. While certainly individual traits can determine
one’s patriarchal ideology, patriarchal ideology is far more likely to change at macro or
meso levels rather than at micro levels.
Future research examining individual patriarchal ideology in a theory o f violence
against women would need to consider level-2 variables when it comes to their change
over time. They might also benefit from considerations of level-2 variables that assess
the origins of patriarchal ideology. These variables should consider important
characteristics of the institution as well as general group-level factors important in all
social institutions (e.g. percent minority, SES, regional characteristics). Institutional
variables to consider for educational institutions would include controlling for various
rates of violence against women as well as types o f and numbers of institutional programs
that address violence against women, or more generally women’s subordination.
Solutions to violence against women that focus on attitudes towards women,
patriarchal ideology, or just sexism in general almost always have the same policy
solutions. Generally speaking, they typically note how the solution is to address these
“learned” characteristics through some sort of education program. While these solutions
are often appropriate, they fail to produce radical change because they treat violence
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against women or more generally “sexism” as individual problems. The fact that changes
in individual patriarchal ideology occur at the group-level, not the individual level,
suggests these solutions are perhaps misguided. Violence against women courses in
universities do not treat these issues as individual problems, but the institutions that house
such programs and course offerings do so by not making these mandatory.
Some researchers have suggested these programs become university requirements
(Payne and Triplett 2009; York 2011). While most universities have some sort o f
freshman seminar course meant to ease students into college life, these courses pay very
little attention to some of the most serious issues like violence against women. If not
entire courses on violence against women, this should at least be a main topic covered in
these mandated freshman seminar courses. Qualitative research with students enrolled in
these courses has shown students have an interest in knowing more about experiences
with alcohol and violence (Davig and Spain 2004). Others suggest combining alcohol
abuse prevention programs (something widely discussed on college campuses) with
sexual assault prevention programs (Payne, Ekhomu, and Carmody 2009). Sexual assault
prevention programs in college have been shown to be effective (Langhinrichsen-Rohling
et al. 2011)2. Yet, when these programs are not mandated, those who might need the

2 The current study had no significant findings in regards to sexual assault program
attendance in reducing patriarchal ideology, but this was most likely a selection effect.
That is, this question did not make it clear if respondents attended a sexual assault
awareness program out of obligation (e.g. course requirement, mandate from the
university, a court mandate) or because they were generally concerned about this topic
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programs the most are highly unlikely to enroll on their own free will. Universities that
mandate such courses send the message to young men that the institution and those in
power take these issues seriously, as they should (for similar discussions, see Payne, et al.
2007; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). It may seem like it is asking much to mandate
such courses, but as Payne and Triplett (2009) have pointed out, the state has no problem
mandating training in programs like homeland security awareness, despite a very low
likelihood of ever coming into contact with such social phenomenon. Certainly there are
far more instances of men raping women on college campuses than there are o f any Al
Qaeda-sponsored terrorist networks.
It is also important that the content of these courses remain woman-centered and
that they keep the focus on the broader social impacts o f patriarchal ideology and
patriarchy in general. As hooks (2000) notes, men’s groups like those focusing on malerole strains, “run the risk o f overemphasizing personal change at the expense of political
analysis and struggle” (74). Similarly, batterer intervention programs have been shown
to be effective at reducing men’s future acts of violence. Although these programs have
had significant decreases on men’s violence, these decreases have been minimal. Such
programs tend to overemphasize individual pathology. Instead, group-based approaches
that show individual offenders that violence against women is not just wrong, but that the
wider society, including men, will not tolerate such behaviors, should be encouraged.
They are not likely to work, however, when men’s collective patriarchal ideology

(e.g. men that choose to attend a sexual assault awareness program are most likely to
have lower levels of patriarchal ideology).
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disagrees. The starting point is to target men’s patriarchal ideology at the group level
first.

CONCLUSION
This research has responded to recent calls by feminist researchers to “resurrect”
patriarchy in theories of violence against women (Hunnicutt 2009). The case was made
that patriarchal ideology has not been well-developed or well-understood in theories o f
violence against women. Chapter 2 conceptualized and provided historical examples of
institutional patriarchal ideology. Chapter 3 conceptualized individual patriarchal
ideology and gave a review of the research relevant to violence against women that has
largely ignored, misinterpreted, or failed to address the role individual patriarchal
ideology plays in a theory of violence against women. Chapters 4 and 5 provided one o f
the few analyses to consider attitudinal measures o f individual patriarchal ideology
longitudinally and as outcome variables using traditional test/re-test panel data and
traditional, attitudinal operationalizations o f patriarchal ideology. Chapters 6 and 7 used
vignettes to operationalize patriarchal ideology, assessing how they change over time in
various latent growth-curve models. The methods chapters (4 and 6) highlight the
limitations to this study. This final chapter has attempted to make the most sense of the
results, while noting the challenges faced with little precedence in this area since no prior
research has considered longitudinal analyses of patriarchal ideology.
The conclusion of the opening chapter o f this research highlighted six main goals
o f this research. To repeat, they were:
1) To accurately conceptualize patriarchal ideology.
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2) To explore the reliability of operational measures of patriarchal ideology.
3) To investigate potential etiological variables related to patriarchal ideology.
4) To better understand how patriarchal ideology changes over time.
5) To uncover how patriarchal ideology fits in feminist theories o f violence
against women.
6) To consider potential social policies that might effectively target patriarchal
ideologies.
The front-end of this dissertation laid-out a clear definition o f patriarchy and patriarchal
ideology, differentiating between institutional patriarchal ideology and individual
patriarchal ideology. The operational use of attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology
had every indication of acceptable reliability, with the only evidence to the contrary
leaning more towards research strategy rather than something inherently wrong with
these measures. The vignette-based items, too, were reliable and might be preferred for
future research going forward wanting to quantify any sort o f “ideology.”

While there

was not overwhelming support for the origins o f patriarchal ideology, some findings
suggest that they lie in demographic characteristics (i.e. race) as well as aspects o f
familial patriarchy (i.e. witnessing domestic violence). Patriarchal ideology appears to be
fairly stable within individuals from before they start college to the end o f their first year
of college. After that, patriarchal ideology declines over time at equal rates for this
sample of college men. Feminist theories o f violence against women should consider
patriarchal ideology as a group-level variable, rather than a “trait” that resides within
individuals. Thus, macro-level programs and policies that are aimed to reforming
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patriarchal ideology at the group level should be given precedence over those that target
individual-level patriarchal ideology.
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